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A Form in the Road: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Path Toward Globalization in the Middle East, 1945-2014

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State University of New York
College at Buffalo
Department of History

A FORK IN THE ROAD:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PATH TOWARD GLOBALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, 1945—2014

A Thesis in
History

by

Joshua P. Brotka

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements
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Master of Arts
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

This thesis examines the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since 1945. From the start of the Cold War immediately following the conclusion of WWII and up to the present day (2014), U.S. policy has been subject to many revisions and simultaneously, upheld national security measures. As the world heads toward an era where globalization is most prevalent, the United States will have to make drastic decisions regarding its foreign policy in the Middle East. Its alliance with Israel, oil interests, Islamic fundamentalism, an evolving Muslim society, and supporting a national security agenda has forced the United States to reevaluate its role in the region and throughout the world.

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Chapter 1

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Historiography

The contemporary history between the Middle East and The United States is saturated with detail, and presents a series of relationships that extend far beneath the surface of the common, yet misleading, course of logic. To clarify, the current problems that the United States faces in the Middle East are not problems that have been generated by a single episode or based on religious and cultural factors alone. These problems are a result of U.S. intermingling with Middle Eastern society, and the U.S.-explicit vision of globalization in the Middle East. The current affairs between the United States and Middle Eastern countries involve a complex series of historic episodes that have affected U.S. policymakers' efforts to implement globalization -- composed of economic, social, cultural, and political factors. These factors are interrelated to the problems that have plagued American policy objectives and Middle Eastern society for decades, dating back to the end of the Second World War.

Since the dawn of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Middle East has been a pivotal region for the first-world in carrying out their respected diplomatic means and goals, furthermore, rendering the region's global importance regarding natural resources and community - the major resource being petroleum. The religious, social, and political conflicts between isolated Israel and its surrounding Muslim neighbors that have

occurred in the region over the years, were birthed decades ago by much larger, global patterns of Cold War diplomatic rigidity, instigated by the two superpowers of the world following World War Two.

Historians have been consistent and accurate, and for the most part thorough, with the evidence collected in detailing the relations between Western powers and the Middle East in recent history. For the case of this research project, the focus will be on the relationship between the main historical figures, premises, and episodes between the United States and the Middle East -- primarily the Gulf States -- due to the abundance of natural resources in the region pursued by the Western powers. The Gulf States are the several Arab nations bordering the southwestern side of the Persian Gulf, which include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, and Qatar. These nations are pivotal to the global economics scene, because they refine and export a major portion of the world's oil resources to other nations, including the United States, who have been a major trade partner since oil was discovered there in the early twentieth century. Other nations the U.S. has had a strong relationship with in past years has been Israel, Turkey, and Egypt, and more recently, the U.S. has attempted to rekindle a diplomatic peace with Iran. To understand the history and the dynamic of the Gulf States' importance on a global scale, and for the most part their collective relationship with the United States, one must first understand the major factors encompassing this dynamic, often redundant, and complex diplomatic relationship with Middle Eastern states. Moreover, with a general notion of this relationship and a contextual knowledge of this specific area of diplomatic history, one can conclude that the United States has, and had, much at stake regarding an impactful, state-founded legacy within a cautious foreign policy with the Gulf

States. Likewise, the Gulf States have had a unique relationship with the United States in terms of trade and monetary return from the sale of their most coveted resource -- oil.

Since the mid-twentieth century, historians and researchers have written some extraordinary work on United States' foreign policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, they have analyzed a great deal of evidence that would establish the general mind-frame that global economics and big business play a leading role in the creation and framework of United States' foreign policy dating back to the first half of the twentieth century. The global impact of the relationship between the United States and the Middle East today could be better understood after analyzing the formation and evolution of this relationship within an accurate historical context. For the sake of argument, the beginnings of this specific history can be traced back to the era following the conclusion of WWII, and consequently, the outcome that presented the two global superpowers, which dawned in the Cold War: The United States and The Soviet Union.

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Early Developments of the Cold War (1945-1991)

In 1956, the scholar C. Wright Mills published his acclaimed and pioneering work entitled *The Power Elite*. In his book Mills argued that during the Great Depression, within “[President Roosevelt’s] policies, he subsidized the defaults of the capitalist economy, which had simply broken down; and by his rhetoric, he balanced its political disgrace, putting ‘economic royalists’ in the political dog house.”¹ In hindsight, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies allowed big businessmen to enter the ranks of federal government and harbor more political power than ever

¹ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 274.

before in American history. The biggest names in the American capitalist system had a major influence in Washington and its policymaking from the 1930s onward. According to Mills, these Americans of high military, economic, and political ranking in American society, were all part of a power elite, and therefore it seemed only fitting that matters that pertained to foreign policymaking fell, “in the hands of the... business and professional men who control[led] Congress...”, and, “military men who control[led] defense and, in part, foreign policy....”²

Years after Mills published *The Power Elite*, historian Kim McQuaid tackled the task of analyzing the connection between presidential power and big business. Published in 1982, McQuaid’s book examined the United States and its foreign policy-making process from FDR until the presidency of Ronald Reagan. He cited pivotal episodes, influential groups, and entities involved in this historic narrative that demonstrated the union between American business leaders and American political leaders. In the text McQuaid explained that in order for U.S. leaders to “flex” their international strength to meet the elite’s foreign policy interests, they, “expand[ed] the scope of American military and economic power abroad in ways amenable to the business politicians of the Business Council and the CED (Committee for Economic Development).”³ Kim McQuaid rationalized that as early as the 1960s and into the Nixon Administration, new types of committees and groups such as the Business Roundtable, formed to spawn a new era of political-economic policies to best fit their interests. “[B]ig business in the United States may at last... have come of political age.”⁴ As the Cold War decades progressed into the eras of the Carter and Reagan Administrations, the strategies imposed by groups such as the Business Council, Business Roundtable, and CED transpired to political-economic policies

² Ibid., 243.

³ Kim McQuaid, *Big Business and Presidential Power: from FDR to Reagan* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1982), 197.

⁴ Ibid., 308.

which were novel in the wake of a rapidly expanding global economy. Instead of remaining with a foreign policy designed in a political mind frame pertinent to combating the Soviets in a “crusade” against “big government” and “socialism”, economic elites took the task upon themselves to pursue a path that allowed them to be, “more prone to play for power” and to, “pursue their concrete and collective and individual interests” both domestically and abroad.⁵

After analyzing these scholarly works, one can reason that there exists a powerful bond between American government and big business entities. Thus it is essential to possess this knowledge, and relate it to matters concerning United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East, which is designed and put into action by these political, economic, and even military elite of the United States. With this knowledge one can theorize that many of the diplomatic episodes or actions taken between the United States and the Middle East that have occurred, or will occur for that matter, are likely a result of the motives and goals behind these unique and powerful relationships that exist within the upper-echelons of American and Middle Eastern society.

Beginning in 1973, The United States found itself in the midst of a foreign crisis -- one which negatively affected and altered the global-economic scene, and which brought about an ‘energy crisis’ and a series of recessions involving inflated oil prices from OPEC exports. Political tensions between the West and the Gulf States also grew subsequently, because of conflicting interests involving an American alliance with the state of Israel. In the midst of this global episode, a scholarly article was published in 1980 by Richard Barnet, David Dellinger, and Richard Falk entitled, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Invited by the Institute for Palestine Studies, these three intellectuals were asked a series of questions regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the aims of third-world liberation movements, and the United States’

⁵ Ibid.

aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union that was implemented during the Carter Administration.

During the course of these interviews, many valid points of United States' foreign policy were discussed and analyzed regarding the United States' containment policy dating back to the conclusion of World War Two. Richard Barnet addressed the interviewer by declaring that the foreign policy implemented by the Carter Administration was just a continuation of the policy put together by Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under the Nixon and Ford Administrations.⁶ Barnet basically criticized the United States for following an outdated Cold War policy of containment. He advocated that third-world nations like Iran (at the time this article was published, the Iranian Revolution was reaching its peak, alongside the hostage situation at the American embassy in Tehran) continued to resist American attempts to liberate those countries, and in a sense, imperialize those economically undeveloped regions of the globe.⁷

In their respective criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, all three speakers agreed on three main points of emphasis. The first point mentioned in the article encompassed the need by the United States to control the access of the Middle East's oil supply. Secondly, the Middle East was a global stage where the world's superpowers confronted each other over diplomatic power and resources, which in part is interconnected with the first point of emphasis. The final point, which Falk emphasized, was a favorable American policy toward the Jewish state of Israel that "increasingly" isolated the United States diplomatically within the entire world.⁸ Although this

⁶ Richard Barnet, David Dellinger, and Richard Falk, "Symposium: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East", *Journal of Palestine Studies* 10, no. 1 (1980): 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

article was created during the height of Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union, many of the factors presented by these three intellectuals remain relevant for decades regarding Middle Eastern foreign policy. American policies established in the Middle East have left a foundation of fragile and negative impressions, along with undesired consequences, toward Western society.

By the end of the bloody Iraqi-Iranian conflict of the 1980s, the Muslim world had shifted through a paradox of direction. A portion of Middle Eastern society became more uneasy and wary toward the United States' influence in Middle Eastern political, social, and economic affairs. As a result, an increasing number of Persians, Arabs, Palestinians, and other groups of Middle Eastern people fostered their own practice of Islamic faith, which had morphed into forms of fundamentalist and extremist worship, to battle what they saw as a foreign invasion by the 'evil' West. Meanwhile, The United States maintained their Cold War diplomacy in the Gulf States, all while continuing to maintain big business policies and structure between large American companies and the Arab entities that controlled the region's oil reserves. Renowned activist and philosopher, Noam Chomsky, remained highly critical of United States' foreign policy in the Middle East during the final years of the Cold War. In 1991, Chomsky declared, in hindsight, that the goal of American policy in the Middle East was never based on the need for oil itself. Rather the goal was to "dominate the world system," in order to become the world's sole superpower.⁹ In his bold and speculative conclusion, Chomsky declared that he saw:

[L]ittle reason to expect the United States to modify its goals with regard to oil production and profits or to abandon its [sic] rejectionism on the Israeli-Arab conflict.... There is no reason to expect changes in the principles that guide policy. There are no significant public pressures for policy change. In polls,

⁹ Noam Chomsky, "After the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East", *Cultural Critique* 19 (1991): 19.

about two-thirds of the public regularly express support for the international consensus on a two-state settlement, but few have the slightest awareness of U.S. isolation in blocking the peace process.... The official U.S. position and the record of diplomacy are rigidly excluded from the media and public discussion. There is, then, little reason to anticipate a shift in U.S. [sic] rejectionism.¹⁰

In Chomsky's cynical and melancholy conclusion of his article on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, he portrayed the United States as the central catalyst – taking on an intentional and unintentional role -- to the violence between the Jews, Arabs, and Palestinians in the Middle East. Moreover, he believed that the relationship which has existed between the Middle East and the United States is one that was parasitic in nature, where the only parties that benefited from the diplomatic arrangement were the political and economic elite of the United States -- the elite which controlled the capital, resources of the region, and the spreading of mainstream public knowledge.

Researchers Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler displayed that big business, specifically in the petroleum and weapons industries, benefited the greatest from U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In effect, political conflicts over resources and control of influence in the region had erupted into what the authors claimed as 'energy conflicts.' In their 1996 article, "Putting the State in its Place," Nitzan and Bichler conducted a study that exhibited alarming consistencies and correlations between large oil companies' decrease in profits and the wars that have erupted on Middle Eastern soil since the late 1960s. Basically, "oil firms became more inclined to accept open hostilities as a means of achieving higher conflict-driven prices and better rates of return."¹¹ Their observations were more than alarming, as they analyzed several conflicts including the Iraqi-Iranian War, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Arab-Israeli Wars

¹⁰ Ibid., 30.

¹¹ Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, "Putting the State in its Place: U.S. Foreign Policy and Differential Capital Accumulation in Middle East 'Energy Conflicts,'" *Review of International Political Economy* 3, no. 4 (1996): 612.

of 1967 and 1973, and the Gulf War of 1990, as well as a few other major episodes of warfare in contemporary Middle Eastern history. Nitzan and Bichler both declared that although the American public overwhelmingly wanted peace in the Middle East since the 1960s, U.S. officials under the Clinton Administration and the “Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition” had precise, yet conflicting goals, including: the “mutual containment” of Iraq and Iran’s regional hostility toward other nations and peoples in the region, the promotion and implementation of democracy in the region, and advocating for the Muslim-Israeli peace - all while “undermining” Islamic fundamentalism.¹²

Following the Gulf War (1990-91), it seemed apparent that the United States was in the Middle East for the long term in order to promote their exclusive political and economic agenda. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the United States becoming the only major power in the world, influencing U.S. diplomatic visions throughout the Middle East. From the Reagan to the Clinton presidency, the directive of foreign policy in the Middle East was twofold: American diplomacy was molded to allow big business, in the form of trading weapons technology and oil, to maintain the profiteering standards for certain U.S. and Arab economic entities and parties. The second goal was to establish peace between the state of Israel and the surrounding Muslim nations, which presented a problem to America’s former objective. Although the United States sought to establish peace between the Islamic religious sects and Judaic religious factions of Middle Eastern society, too often, Islam was portrayed in a negative light by the American public and by the U.S. mainstream media. Moreover, the rise of momentum in Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East has only retarded the ongoing peace process.

¹² Ibid., 648.

Frank Ninkovich has published several historical works on U.S. foreign policy, including *The United States and Imperialism* in 2001. Ninkovich believed that during, and following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States altered its foreign policy to reduce its national security state attributes. Although some elements of a national security state are still in existence today, the United States had taken on the role of leading the rest of the world into a 'new world order' in a sense, which can also be depicted as the progression toward globalization. In his book, *The United States and Imperialism*, Ninkovich rationalized that, "[I]n many quarters globalization was seen as the Americanization of the world.... Americans saw little to be ashamed of in their ambition to recreate the world in the image of their own nation... [Americans] continued to envision themselves as the champions of a universal empire of the spirit and way of life, the empire of modernity."¹³ Americanization refers to efforts by United States' diplomats and personnel to instill their own cultural, political, social, and economical doctrine onto peoples in foreign lands. This nationalistic attitude possessed by American policymakers had transpired on the world stage as American doctrine was poised as a guiding light for the rest of the world. This undertaking eventually led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States due to Islamic backlash against American policymaking. Once again, American foreign policy in the Middle East created resentment by the Muslim extremists toward Americanization. The effect of Islamic extremism toward United States' foreign policy in the Developing World, especially the Middle East, caused the United States to consider altering their entire diplomacy into a new direction.

As the United States headed into the new millennium, it remained the only standing power that some of its elitist citizens and leaders believed would lead the world into the era of an interconnected global society. According to Ninkovich, the notion of the Americanization of the

¹³ Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001), 245-6.

world was born years preceding the official collapse of Soviet Russia. During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran had nearly 50,000 students studying at universities within the United States. The presence within Iran of an increasingly secular, westernized elite clearly resulted in the “explosion of fundamentalist resentment.”¹⁴ A book written by Jalal al-e Ahmed and published in 1962, *Westoxication*, captured the animosities Iranians held toward the West. Ahmed and his book heavily criticized Western cultural norms and political theories, harboring pro-Leftist and pro-Shia clerical sentiments, and provided the underpinnings of the Iranian Revolution years prior to its culmination.¹⁵ Yet this was just one historic example of a cultural backlash against the United States and its attempt to lead the world into a new era. If the United States and its leaders believe it was supposed to lead the world into the future, should it have been done with the current power structure in place, which included the political, economic, and to an extent, military elite?

Ninkovich argued this aspect of globalization, and explained that, “[g]lobalization is not a temporary occupation of the world that, once lifted, would allow traditional cultural values to reassert themselves. It is, at its most ruthlessly effective, a juggernaut that utterly destroys traditional cultures....”¹⁶ Emily Rosenberg argued this viewpoint as early as 1983. In her book, *Spreading the American Dream*, she predicted that foreign cultures would be replaced by American influence, through the merging of “lessons” of the United States’ own economic development with, “traditional liberal tenets about freedom and the marketplace.”¹⁷ Is this what

¹⁴ Frank Ninkovich, *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1996), 43.

¹⁵ *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, 15th ed. rev., s.v. “Ahmed, Jalal al-e.”

¹⁶ Ninkovich, *United States and Imperialism*, 251.

¹⁷ William Becker, review of *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*, by Emily Rosenberg, *The Journal of American History* 70, no. 3 (December 1983): 699.

the native peoples of the Middle East feared based on this perspective? This question can be answered within the rhetoric of the proponents and opponents of the Western trends toward globalization, as well as the recent history between Western policymakers and actors, and the peoples of the Middle East.

The Seeds of Globalization in U.S. Foreign Policy

President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that globalization, following the World Trade Center attacks of 2001, was the inevitable goal of United States' foreign policy by the beginning of the twenty-first century. In his 2004 book, *The Choice: Global Dominance or Global Leadership*, Brzezinski argued that in order to defeat modern Middle Eastern terrorism, terrorist organizations like *al-Qaeda* must "lose their social appeal and therefore their recruitment ability," as well as, "their financial backing." Moreover, in order for globalization to come to its fruition, the United States must "command genuine international support," and the proliferation of terrorism must be, "brought under control when suspect national efforts are either subjected to effective international controls" by the use of an organized and global coalition spearheaded by the developed nations of the world.¹⁸ While Brzezinski believed that Middle Eastern inclusion into a global political system would be a tedious and uphill battle, the only way to accomplish this objective would be to eliminate the sole threat of religious fundamentalism from the mindset of the Muslim peoples across the region.¹⁹

¹⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Dominance or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 33.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

In her 2005 book, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, Janice Terry listed four goals of United States' policy, which have remained historically accurate. These four goals included: securing the free flow of oil in the Gulf, improving relations with Muslim regimes on a bilateral basis, preventing the region from becoming a sphere of influence to any other developed nation, and supporting the continued existence of the state of Israel.²⁰ Terry remained consistently objective while criticizing the actions and portrayals that the mainstream media and political elite display toward the Israel issue. In the midst of their overwhelming support for Israel and its expansion into Palestinian territories, American Israeli supporters typically foster and believe the “exaggerations” and false stereotypes about Muslims and Middle Eastern people by the American mainstream.²¹ She does an admirable job in identifying the underlying conflicts between the United States and the Middle East regarding policy-making, generated from myths and misunderstandings of their culture and society, which found their way into the American legislative process. In essence, Terry declared that U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East was an unfair and misleading practice. On the one hand Terry contended that the Jewish lobby within the U.S. has been very influential and committed to the State of Israel, while on the other the lobby enjoyed the tremendous support it received from federal, state, and local levels of the U.S. government.²²

In 2010, Sean Foley constructed a very detailed narrative on the relations between the United States and the Arab Gulf states. In *The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam*, Foley illustrated that Arab states in the Gulf are challenged with the dual nature of being pressured by American foreign policy and simultaneously attempting to evolve their societies into a more

²⁰ Janice J. Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), 23.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

²² *Ibid.*, 122.

liberal and modern one. Foley examined the influence of mass media, culture, social norms and taboos, foreign and domestic policies, technology and modernity trends, economic concerns, and many other factors in his analysis. A great deal of the animosity toward the United States possessed by Arab peoples in the region, argued Foley, resulted from instances such as the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, where key figures like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia increased the price of oil per barrel exponentially out of resentment of the United States' support for Israel during the war -- consequently leading to a global economic crisis.²³ The United States' alliance with Israel has been detrimental throughout the years in that it has constantly been dampening positive relations between the West and the Islamic nations surrounding Israel.

Foley concluded that the global recession of 2008 had major impacts on the oil-rich Gulf countries, in that although, "[t]he current downturn has yet to devastate the Gulf petroleum industry in the same way that the Great Depression decimated pearling and pilgrimage, there are signs that it may accelerate social and technological trends that will reduce the importance [of oil revenue] to the Gulf and to the world economy in general."²⁴ Furthermore, as United States' power and influence declines in the Gulf states, so does the global dependence on the region's petroleum resources. Kingdoms like Saudi Arabia will have economic setbacks, yet they still have "investments", such as alternative energy and education, which, according to Foley, "have the potential to yield significant economic growth in the future."²⁵

In 2012, Stephen Walt, a Harvard University professor who specializes in American foreign policy, commented on current U.S. affairs and policies in the Middle East. He indicated in his article, "Balancing Act: Foreign Policy in a New Middle East", that the United States has

²³ Sean Foley, *The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 35.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 275.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 280.

been “actively engaged” in the region since World War Two; however, now that the Gulf Wars of the previous two decades are history, we are beginning to follow a strategy of “dual containment,” meaning we will maintain close relationships with Middle Eastern governments, but only “engage” our military in times of “crisis or emergency.”²⁶ Walt concluded that there will likely be no power vacuum forming in the Middle Eastern landscape, as we continue to decrease our influence and military presence in the region. In addition, he explained that Israel will “continue to be the strongest military power,” in the region while having little political influence due to the “obvious” reasons of overwhelming religious differences.²⁷ Walt presented his argument that the United States will draw its focus on sharing its foreign policy objectives with other powerful nations like China. This will allow the United States to continue to tackle global activities such as foreign aid while, in a hopeful presumption, rising powerful states such as Russia and China must share a multinational objective in bringing about a unipolar globalized planet.

Forces against globalization, such as various sects of religious fundamentalists and nationalists around the world, would surely contest an exclusively Americanized attempt at indoctrinating globalization policy throughout the world. The rising global stature of other developed nations, who are integral players in a global economy and political system, must all agree on the same concept of globalization if it is to become tangible. If the United States leads this crusade alone, it will face much opposition and resistance from foreign societies for being too homogenous, and too dedicated to its own social norms and desires. Yet, if a global coalition of various nations carry out a plan of globalization in their own variations of foreign policy, then

²⁶ Stephen Walt, “Balancing Act: Foreign Policy in a New Middle East,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 19, no. 1 (winter 2012): 9-10.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

perhaps globalization will face less opposition and resistance. A Strong opposition will present itself, especially from those foreign cultures unwilling to subject to a seemingly American policy, which was established to serve its own national interests.

The United States' Role in the Middle East: From the Dawn of the Cold War to the Present

The material that has been documented and published on United States' foreign policy in the Middle East is extensive to say the least. With the current social unrest, civil warfare, international tensions, and terrorist activities that exist in the region today, it is difficult to imagine that the uniform and numerous historical trends on this particular subject matter will decline, or change substantially for that matter. Analyzing United States' foreign policy in the Middle East since the early-middle days of the Cold War was that there has existed several obvious factors that have played a crucial part in this U.S. policymaking process. Beyond the militarization by the United States in the region in order to combat the Soviet threat and Islamic extremism and aggression toward Israel and the West, a considerable amount of evidence has presented the solid argument that the relationship between 'Big Business' and government policy is a tangible factor that plays a major role in U.S. foreign policy. Primarily in the form of large oil companies and weapons firms, big business and the government entities of the United States and certain Middle Eastern states present confirmations that cannot be overlooked or ignored. The economic and political relationships formed over the years have been responsible for much of the diplomacy, conflict, turmoil, and historical episodes, which have occurred or might occur in the present and near future.

Historical analysis on this matter must be constantly conducted, since it is one of the major episodes currently being played out in contemporary global society - with the United States being a key player in this ongoing episode. Today there is much certainty that the diplomatic conflicts between the United States and the Islamic nations of the Middle East, such as Iran, will not stop anytime soon, nor does it appear that the United States will abandon its current position as a world mediator to the conflicting Middle Eastern nations in the coming days. Therefore, taking historical trends in consideration, a new trend of American diplomacy has evolved from within the basis of the former trend, and has existed since the latter half of the twentieth century. The transition into a new age of United States' foreign policy in the Middle East began to surface following the finale of the first Gulf War (1990-91) and first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; however the newest foreign policy trend came to full fruition following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001.

There are many unique, complex, and diverse factors involved in this evolving relationship between the United States and Middle Eastern society, as well as novel aspects forming out of this historical narrative. In the ongoing effort to lead the world toward the path of globalization, the United States has altered its position in Middle East foreign policy over the previous decade or so – transitioning from a conservative and national defensive policy to a policy that has sought to find a common ground of social, economic, and cultural understanding between the United States and the entire Middle Eastern region. Moreover, the transformation of the Middle East into a more democratic and Western model of society, while maintaining a position of benevolent instigators and supporters of liberalization, while attempting to cooperate with the insubordinate theocracy in Iran, is a task that will prove easier said than done. The Obama Administration has prolonged the United States' stance against nations like Syria and

Iran, who continue to resist assimilating into the global path toward globalization. Under Obama, the United States has moderated its Middle Eastern foreign policy from an attempt to play a neoconservative role in forcing change, to reducing their military presence and making a more democratic attempt, using mediating techniques and negotiating peace between hostile and agitated groups like the Palestinians and the Israelis. Numerous failures in transforming the sociopolitical landscape of the Middle East, and the rise of Islamic extremism, have forced the Obama Administration to seek and analyze new means and measures in order to bring about positive change to the Muslim world.

In *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, author Vali Nasr brilliantly laid out the current landscape of Middle Eastern society in the wake of this new path in American foreign policy. Nasr argued in his introduction that, “[b]y breaking the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001, toppling Saddam, and then uprooting Baathism in Iraq, the United States removed local rivals that had contained Iranian power to its east and west.”²⁸ The following actions committed by U.S. forces allowed Iran more freedom to carry out their plans of expansion, along with their expansion of anti-Western and Shia rhetoric and ideologies. These actions, which were carried out by the outdated and former foreign policy that had been rebirthed during the George W. Bush presidency, had presented a new series of problems for U.S. policymakers. The problems from the previous administration are what the current administration must confront and dissolve.

Nasr believed that as time persisted, the rise of a global economy will affect the Middle East in a positive manner in regards to assimilating it with the global pattern of modernity and liberal ideology, which typically accompanies capitalist growth and prosperity. Iran, with its extremist Islamic nature, is one of the few and powerful nations in the Middle East which has

²⁸ Vali Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the New Muslim Middle Class is the Key to Defeating Extremism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Free Press, 2009), 3.

tried to halt the momentum of globalization. Nasr added that it is the, “Middle East’s rising middle class, and working to bring the economies of the region more fully into the web of globalization, can push the status quo to the tipping point where national leaders have no choice but to embrace change....”, which, in effect, is “the key first step toward liberalization of the political systems.”²⁹ This is Nasr’s vision of a Persian Spring, which is the hope other globalists envision and covet as well.

Rising unemployment among Middle Eastern middle class men also poses as a major concern. This evolution can either hurt or aid the United States’ mission of globalization. Aside from Nasr’s argument, there are many more factors than just the economic aspects, including various U.S. religious groups (pro-Israel lobby) that favor a stronger Israeli state, which contribute overwhelmingly to United States’ foreign policy decisions in the region. If stability is to come to the Middle East sooner rather than later in the form of a Western-style socio-economic society, certain barriers must be removed in order to allow this evolution to occur.

What Does the Future Hold?

From an American standpoint, several factors exist that present a barrier for globalization and the establishment of permanent peace and stability to the Middle East. In addition, these factors will prevent the United States from abandoning its role as the pivotal actor on the Middle Eastern stage of diplomacy and follow a policy of isolationism. As the United States’ makes valiant attempts to reopen cordial relations with Iran, relations between Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors who oppose Iran’s hostile regional might are weakening. Iran is a nation ruled

²⁹ Ibid., 26.

by an extreme Islamic fundamentalist elite whose aspirations are to halt the Americanization, or globalization for that matter, in the Middle East through the use of political might via nuclear technology, promotion of terrorist actions against the West, and the threat of warfare. If the United States wishes to continue in plunging the Middle East into the realm of a new world order, so to speak, it must first eliminate the threat Iran poses currently on the secular states of the region. Iran's aggressive theocracy has held onto the ideals of Islamic fundamentalism, which has included the jihad against Western society and the present one against Middle Eastern Sunni regimes who have been open to the prospects of modernity. This war against the West and Sunni Muslims, carried out by Islamic extremist organizations like al-Qaeda, have only retarded the goals of the modern United States' foreign policy of globalization.

The United States has exhaustedly and tediously been pursuing efforts toward some form of peaceful and meaningful negotiations with Iran recently. In effect, relations with Saudi Arabia have soured to a slight degree. As Iran continues to flex its regional muscle, Saudi Arabia's monarchy, ruled by the House of Saud, have grown very uneasy by the current stance of reconciliation that the United States has taken toward Iran. The fundamental issue of Sunni statist governments such as Saudi Arabia's, and Shia theocracies such as Iran is deeply rooted in ancient Islamic religion – a problem that will not be easy for policymakers to remedy. In October, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal in the city of Riyadh in an attempt by the United States to ease Saudi Arabia's anxieties over Iranian advancements toward an effective nuclear program. Saudi Arabia remained alarmed, as nothing was achieved from the talks, as their media portrayed President Obama and his administration as, “turn[ing] his right and left cheeks to his opponents in hopes of

reconciliation.”³⁰ The United States, on the other hand, has been agitated by the abuse of civil rights that the Saudi government has committed on portions of its domestic population.

The Saudi impatience with the United States has been a persistent theme since the George W. Bush Administration left power. This is likely due to the result of an absence, or lack, of business and the sustained conservative diplomatic relationships between Saudi and American figures within the Obama Administration, which had previously existed for decades. In previous Republican administrations under George H.W. Bush, and his son George W. Bush, there existed an established relationship between Saudi officials, Arab oil sheikhs, the Bush Family and their government appointees. This diplomatic relationship has been reinforced by decades’ old involvement in the Gulf oil industry and U.S. national security interests in the Middle East. Currently, Obama and his administration have struck a discord with King Abdullah’s monarchy. The current unwillingness, or lack of urgency, by the United States to dissolve Iran’s nuclear program and its threatening regional stance, in backing the Syrian rebellion against President Bashar Assad, and the U.S. inactivity during the 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt – a longtime ally to the United States -- have raised suspicions within the Saudi government regarding the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East.³¹ Saudi Arabia openly displayed their disappointment toward the United States in late October, 2013, when the Arab nation refused a seat on the United Nations’ newly formed Security Council.³²

³⁰ Robert F. Worth, “U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift as Power Shifts,” *New York Times*, November 25, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/middleeast/us-and-saudis-in-growing-rift-as-power-shifts.html>.

³¹ Christi Parsons, Kathleen Hennessey and Laura King, “President Obama Seeks to Bolster Ties with Saudi Arabia,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 27, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-obama-saudi-20140328,0,4484108.story#axzz2xZ06T0IT>.

³² Worth, “U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift...,” *New York Times*, November 25, 2013.

Part of this growing rift between the United States and Saudi Arabia can be attributed to other unintentional developments as well. Advancements and innovations in the energy industry, including hydro-fracking for natural gas, has been a giant contributor to minimizing the U.S. dependency on Saudi oil imports. On the domestic front, the United States is in the process of possibly creating the Keystone Pipeline. This pipeline will carry crude oil, resulting from hydro-fracking techniques and innovations, extracted from the earth of the northern-most lands of the North American Great Plains and into the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. A recent poll suggested that the majority of Americans and Canadians, to an extent, support construction of the Keystone Pipeline project, because of their assumption that the U.S. and Canada will depend less on “less reliable” oil exporting nations such as Saudi Arabia. In a turbulent effort, the United States has displayed its public interest in protecting the domestic energy market first and foremost.³³ This massive pipeline will extend southward toward the Gulf of Mexico where it can be shipped off to international markets, creating a giant stimulus for the U.S. economy.

In effect, the United States will become less dependent on foreign oil imports from regions such as the Middle East – Saudi Arabia being the largest of the Gulf states in terms of oil exporting, which consequently would take on a substantial loss of revenue. Companies such as Exxon have begun to invest heavily in hydro-fracking, and in effect, have had relative success on the world economic stage, which has caused other oil companies to follow in Exxon’s trailblazing footsteps. Innovations in oil extraction techniques and refining has been changing the dynamic nature of the global oil industry and market presently. To extract, refine, and

³³ Jim Snyder, “Keystone Backed in Poll by 56% of Americans as Security,” Bloomberg Politics News, December 12, 2013, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-13/keystone-backed-in-poll-by-56-of-americans-as-energy-security.html>.

manufacture the Keystone oil within the North American territories will prove less costly from global economic standards. Furthermore, global concerns and initiatives over research and development over the usage of alternative energy will only damper Saudi Arabia's economy further. The unfolding of events taking place in the United States and Middle East will be significant in regards to the path the United States takes regarding diplomacy in the Middle East going forward.

The tendency to focus on Saudi Arabia during this research, in part, has resulted from the tremendous amount of available public information regarding special interests, international relationships, and other primary information that has existed between Saudi Arabia and the United States. For example, from 1946 to 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency issued and retained more reports on important Saudi figures, Saudi-U.S. business relations and entities, and regional events, than the reports on the countries of Qatar, Oman, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen combined.³⁴ Alongside Israel, an established ally with the United States, Saudi Arabia has been the one Middle Eastern Arab nation that we have had an overall constructive, lasting, and peaceful diplomatic relationship with. A major catalyst to the Saudi-U.S. relationship is its continuous big business partnerships and secular acquaintanceships – headed by the oil trade between U.S. and Arab leaders, important figures, and multinational companies. One very important Arab-U.S. relationship episode in the context of foreign policy that dates back several decades is the relationship between the Bush family and The House of Saud, alongside various oil sheikhs of the Persian Gulf. Kevin Phillips, who has extensively studied the Bush dynasty and its reaches of power, indicated that Charles Freeman, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and president of the Middle East Policy Council, declared that the

³⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, *Reports on the Middle East: 1946-1976* (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1983).

one Saudi business relationship that is “closely connected to the U.S.” via the Bush family is the bin Laden Group – the family of formerly infamous al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.³⁵ An opponent of both Bush’s foreign policies in the Middle East, Kevin Phillips displayed partly the reason for the Islamic-Arab resentment toward the West was due to the personal ties between the Bush family and the power elite of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.³⁶ Since the 1970s, historian Janice Terry explained further that the Saudi royal family established personal and political relationships with top U.S. officials and presidents since the day Prince Fahd visited Washington D.C. to help establish the U.S. Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation in 1979.³⁷

The nations of Iran and Israel will also play significant roles in this particular research as well. This is due to the fact that these nations remain ever so important to United States’ diplomatic goals in the Middle East – Iran playing the antagonist and Israel as the protagonist from an American standpoint. Not without mentioning that nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel contain the region’s embodiment of religious conflicts, which have taken precedence in the Middle Eastern conflict as the world continues forward on a path toward globalization. Religious fundamentalism, however, has played a major factor in dictating this course of conflict. Unfortunately this religious fundamentalism has portrayed and manifested itself as Islamic extremism carried out by various political circles and terrorist organizations within the region. Islamic fundamentalism, which inevitably leads to acts of extremism and terrorism, is the one and only major obstacle that stands between the violence and turbulence on the one hand, and peace and successful efforts to globalize the Middle East on the other.

³⁵ Kevin Phillips, *American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 315.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 314-9.

³⁷ Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 51.

Islamic fundamentalism, which has contributed to the recent uprisings in Syria and Egypt, has gained significant momentum, and will indeed halt any attempts by the Middle East to position itself into a globalized and unified system of a world order. This form of fundamentalism is composed of political, social, and religious animosities toward Western culture. In part, United States' foreign policy in the region has contributed to the overall Islamic fundamentalists' hatred of the West – especially in places like Chechnya and Afghanistan, where in the past, the U.S. intervened in one way or another to prevent Soviet expansion. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation today, at least 13 of the top 21 global terrorist organizations listed on their website are those composed out of an Islamic fundamentalist foundation.³⁸ However, globalization proponents view their efforts to change the Middle East as one that would bring about positive reform and eliminate Islamic extremist rationales and activities. With the coming of modernization and democratic reform, traditional and cultural norms such as religious fundamentalism will decrease, leading to less regional violence and global acts of terror. The United States has taken a strong stance against Islamic fundamentalist-based terrorism in its diplomacy in both, the current and previous, administrations. It is the goal of U.S. foreign policy to eliminate the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism, or deflect it for that matter, until the region organizes some form of peace arrangement between themselves and other various nations and groups around the world. This peace arrangement, as the United States would view it, has to begin or end, ultimately, with sustained and improved diplomacy with Iran. Whatever course the United States wishes to embark on toward regional peace in the Middle East, it will not come in a simple solution, nor will it be easily obtainable through peaceful negotiations or mediation processes. Ultimate peace will have to involve both sides of the

³⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, September 28, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

parties involved in the conflict taking steps and finding solutions that will eventually establish lasting peace, cooperation, and civil stability for future generations.

In sum, the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East today is an endeavor that has been presented new obstacles as the world heads toward an ever-changing and uncertain future. These obstacles differ from the obstacles the United States faced during the Cold War – as their goal is not to promote democracy in order to protect the region from the spread of communism as it was during the Cold War. Rather, Western goals, currently, are to instill democratic reform and contain Islamic fundamentalism throughout the developing world in the name of globalization. Defending American interests, as well as promoting and protecting democracy in Western Europe and elsewhere, seemed to be the underlying theme of U.S. foreign policy during the years of the Cold War. In order to protect U.S. interests overseas and establish Western ideologies in the Third World during the Cold War years, military and covert operations were necessary in engaging communist uprisings and deterring the spread Soviet influence. Once the late 1980s arrived, it seemed evident that Soviet Russia would fall and the West would reign as sole champions of the postwar world. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States arose as victors, the United States spearheaded as well as continued its Western agenda of cultural, economic, and political influence and reign in the Middle East. Yet, continuing a trend of foreign policy that defends national security interests, which was a common United States' theme throughout the second half of the twentieth century, should have ceased once the Soviet Union fell. This trend of foreign policy could not prevail in an evolving front of opposition toward the Americanization of the globe by traditionalist and extremist forces of Middle Eastern society as a new millennium approached.

From the time of the first Gulf War (1990-91), and into the first decade of the new millennium, the Middle East remained a hostile environment for which the United States desired to implement its globalization diplomacy successfully. American presence and influence in the Middle East, in general, as well as their cultural impact on Middle Eastern peoples, would prove to be a tedious and cumbersome venture. Resentment towards the United States increased and manifested itself through Islamic terrorist organizations, which embraced the anti-Western, conservative Islam, and pro-Soviet substructures of Islamic fundamentalism. It seems an accepted globalist view that in order to make progress toward a globalized world, the United States and other developed powers must reduce or remove the threat of Islamic (or for that matter any religious and political fusion of conservative ideals in defense of tradition) fundamentalism, as it was viewed as an impediment to social progression. U.S. policymakers began to realize that successful modernization and democratization would not be seen until, “the dogmatic rule imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini wears thin and the Iranian secular elite senses that the West sees a regionally constructive role for Iran.”³⁹

In addition to the growing threat terrorism imposed on the United States and its way of life, the U.S. was dedicated to protecting Israel from its Islamic neighbors at the highest cost through a military, economic, and cultural alliance. All while committed to preserving the peace between Israel and its aggressive neighbors, the U.S. stationed military personnel and established bases in Saudi Arabia to contain the turbulent and antagonistic nations of Iran and Iraq beginning just prior to the first Gulf War. This maneuver stimulated animosity towards the United States’ presence by the ethnically-based Saudi members of al-Qaeda. Ever since, further attempts by the U.S. in intermingling in Middle Eastern affairs have increased tensions for the United States in

³⁹ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 75; Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 117.

confronting this Islamic jihad. This aspect of U.S. foreign policy was known as “dual-containment.”⁴⁰ Following the tragic events of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. government began to realize that its outdated foreign policy, which had sustained for decades in the Middle East, had expired. This realization brought about a new era where American foreign policy had to evolve and expand to meet the demands of a changing world, especially meeting the demands of a rapidly changing Middle Eastern society.

Once George W. Bush left office and the Obama Administration took control of the United States’ executive branch in 2009, many transformations took precedence regarding Middle Eastern policy. The foreign policy agenda of President Obama and his staff began to exhibit its reach once his administration took power, and has continued implementing a more sustained and balanced diplomacy between the United States and Middle Eastern powers. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East today, however, displays the U.S. government’s lack of experience in the big business relationships with the Saudis and has removed itself intentionally from conflicts that are currently plaguing the region in order to allow a natural form of globalization to become established. U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration could be viewed as substantially similar to previous foreign policies under the Carter and Kennedy Administrations. The weakening of U.S. support for Israel’s and Saudi Arabia’s national inspirations could be regarded as the United States becoming the international frontrunner in bringing the region into a new era free of traditional religious values and extremist thought via moderate noninvolvement. Moreover, future world powers, like China and Russia, would have to allocate their opinions, strategies, and their overall concerns regarding the subject of globalization and its outlook in the Middle East. Whether or not the Obama Administration’s

⁴⁰ Walt, “Balancing Act,” 10.

strategy for carrying out Middle Eastern policy is an effective and efficient strategy is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, their foreign policy in the Middle East presents a strategy that has been transformed to accommodate their exclusive diplomatic goals of globalization and democratization – although these diplomatic goals might be in slight or large contrast to the goals of Russia, China, and other powerful nations that also coordinate international policy. Stephen Walt has even considered that it would prove beneficial for Washington and Beijing to consolidate their globalization tasks in the Middle East and South Asia. If the United States allowed China to take the principal position in guiding globalization policy in Asia, then it would “make it easier for Washington to maintain strong Asian partnerships, while the persistent exercise of Chinese soft power could convince some Asian states the Beijing was the wave of the future and that Chinese hegemony would not be all that onerous.”⁴¹

The Obama Administration seems very reluctant to stray from their pioneering and resurrected foreign policy of cooperation among various peoples residing in the Middle East. New developments and various transformations in Middle Eastern society have been taking place at a tremendous pace. Moreover, the appearance of the Arab Spring in North Africa, beginning in 2011, has raised further concerns that advocates of globalization need to consider. A rise of a new Muslim middle class and a rebirth of Muslim intellectualism within the growing pattern of global capitalism, an increase in Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, developments in the global petroleum industry and market, the BRIC nations’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) global search for resources like oil and their specific quest toward a globalized world has presented issues and circumstances that U.S. policymakers need to reckon with. An re-tooled U.S. foreign policy that focuses on improving relations with Iran, and in effect, weakening

⁴¹ Ibid., 14.

relations with Saudi Arabia, are other factors needed to be considered by policymakers as the world enters into a new age. Furthermore, Western Europe, including the European Union (EU), has presented an altered model of globalization – one that is more environmentally friendly and which presents more of a state-controlled economy than that of U.S. policy. Globalization will continue to be the underlying objective of United States' foreign policy around the world; but the U.S. must come to a solution for either driving, or encouraging, Middle Eastern society into the structure of globalization.

The question is how long it will take, if it ever does materialize, -- considering the various Middle Eastern nations, different sects of Muslim peoples, and various secular and religious leaders – for globalization to become a replacement of traditional and fundamentalist norms of Middle Eastern society? Moreover, will the United States be the lone power, or will there be an international coalition or power, that guides globalization's direction? Perhaps the rise of capitalism, an Islamic middle class, and Arab intellectualism will play a pivotal role in evolving the region into the trends of modernity and out of fundamentalism. The world is not bipolar as it was during the Cold War today, and diplomacy will continue to become more complex as time persists. U.S. leadership will be constantly challenged by its own public, private business interests, global organizations, and other nations and their people as they seek to bring stability, then change, to the developing world. The BRIC nations are becoming increasingly powerful and have assumed roles as actors on the global stage of political and economic affairs. These nations however, such as Brazil, India, China, and Russia, are becoming powerful in pushing their own geopolitical concerns. Globalization efforts will have to incorporate the interests of these nations, along with other powerful and developed nations such as Britain and others incorporated with the European Union (EU) and the UN. With the United

States leading the charge toward globalization as witnessed by the actions carried out through its foreign policy, only time and the willingness by the peoples from the Middle East to conform to a new governing system is yet to be seen.

Chapter Two will focus on the history of United States' foreign policy in the Middle East since the beginning of the Cold War until the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. The material that will be analyzed in the following chapter includes primary and secondary historical evidence. Much of the history on United States' foreign policy in the Middle East since the end of the Second World War has been thoroughly analyzed, yet must be once again reviewed to provide the reader with a historical context and basic understanding of the underlying notion that this thesis offers. United States' foreign policy surrounded the containment of the spread of Soviet influence initially that involved important factors still in existence in the current age of globalization.

Chapter Three will include the bulk of the thesis. It will pertain to the current trends of United States' foreign policy, dating back to the time of the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. Understanding the origins of the current trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will aid in understanding the complex matter of globalization in its entirety. The international oil trade of yesterday has transformed the direction of the domestic energy needs of the United States today. Furthermore, the world stage has become much more diverse regarding the players involved in the globalization's destiny and the ongoing events and global episodes have shaped and altered our diplomacy to meet the needs as seen best fit by the U.S. government. In the conclusion of the thesis, options will be presented to the reader concerning globalization and its implications and legacy on the Middle East.

Chapter 2

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A History of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East Following WWII

One of the biggest concerns in the American political atmosphere today has been the United States' entanglement with Middle Eastern society. American military and various occupational personnel, resources, as well as money have been channeled to and from that region of the world for decades. Many Americans want to withdraw its diplomatic presence from the region, as well as abandon former United States' interests and intentions within Middle Eastern society. On the other hand, others tend to agree that the United States should remain in the Middle East due to the social and political instability of Muslim culture, and the threat it poses on the rest of the world and globalization. The United States will, in fact, remain a pivotal player in the progression of Middle Eastern society for several various reasons. President Obama was elected by the American public in 2009, in part, because he stated on numerous occasions during his campaign that he would convene with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and formulate a "phased and orderly" plan to withdraw American troops from the Middle East as soon as he was elected.⁴² Only parts of his promise have come to fruition. Although efforts were, and have, been made to

⁴² "First Democratic Party presidential debate - FULL - Orangeburg, South Carolina 4/26/07," YouTube video, 1:29:52, posted by "Nick Morgan," March 9, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeuXD14hoa8>.

withdraw U.S. military forces from the Middle East since he and his staff took office, U.S. policymakers continue to construct and pursue a foreign policy that has allowed the United States to remain entrenched and involved in the Middle Eastern social landscape, in its economic structure, and in its political matters.

The fact that the Middle East remains an integral player in United States' foreign policy-making presents nothing unfamiliar to U.S. history. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East can be traced back to the discovery of oil in Persia (modern-day Iran) during the early-1910s. As the years progressed into an era of two disastrous world wars and a global economic depression, the Middle East eventually became a region pivotal for fueling the wartime economies of Europe, Russia, and the U.S. in the form of petroleum. In addition, Third-World regions -- such as the Middle East -- by the mid-twentieth century, "was abundant in land, labor, and natural resource potential, but what it desperately lacked was capital."⁴³ In 1944, one year before Japanese surrender, the World Bank was created to coordinate postwar reconstruction in Europe, and expanded its role to "investing in the infrastructure of developing countries."⁴⁴ The reasons behind the creation of Middle Eastern diplomacy in the mid-twentieth century could be traced back to important factors surrounding American imperialist interests and motives in the region. U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has involved a very complex and complicated series of factors, including: diplomatic and business relationships, international activities on a political-economic global scale, cultural conflicts, and the global demand for energy resources and the access to those resources. Another factor involved in this historic episode is the misunderstanding and misconceptions surrounding the socio-economic and cultural objectives

⁴³ Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 59.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 60-1.

between the various nations and peoples of Western and Middle Eastern society -- spanning the majority of the twentieth century and beyond.

To conceptualize United States' foreign policy in the Middle East, one must first understand the United States' global and domestic missions, as well as realize the permanent foundations of American expansionist thought. American Expansionism, as described by historian Frederick Merk, contained, "[a] sense of mission to redeem the Old World by high example... generated in pioneers of idealistic spirit on their arrival in the New World.... [G]enerated by the potentialities of a new earth for building a new heaven."⁴⁵ Also known as the idea of Manifest Destiny, the birth of the American expansionist rationale could be traced back to the foundations of British-colonial America of the seventeenth century. As soon as European settlers landed on the east coast of the present-day United States, the notion of manifest destiny preoccupied the rationale of these settlers from England. Religious motives in the form of Christian Protestantism and motives of cultural superiority over the Native Americans, and eventually, over British occupation as the American Revolution drew near, helped propel the ideal of Manifest Destiny into the future of American philosophy. By the time around Thomas Jefferson's presidency of the 1790s – the expansion of U.S. land and peoples westward became an inevitable event as the newly liberalized Americans attempted to seek new opportunities and prosperity elsewhere.

The dawn of the nineteenth century witnessed the United States' claim of a newfound sense of entitlement to its renowned ideals of freedom and liberty. This notion became manifested in the domestic policies and the mindset of the American public, as they began to migrate away from the east coast no more than two decades following the Revolutionary War of

⁴⁵ Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 3.

1776. In the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon's France in 1803, and expanding into the Jacksonian Era and the related federal Indian removal programs, government land sales west of the Appalachian Mountains, and later, west of the Mississippi River, consequently pioneered the Westward expansion era and instilled the ideals of a seemingly endless American expansion. The fertile lands of the Midwest proved an ideal location for planting crops such as corn. The vast and untapped western land also provided Americans with an abundance of natural and raw material, thus, a surplus of American crops were raised, farmed, and harvested. Once the American marketplace became saturated with agricultural production, farmers began to seek government assistance to coordinate with overseas markets regarding trading. New economic opportunities for Americans became abundant. Therefore, the opportunity arose for farmers and urban investors to trade America's crops and other various products to European markets and elsewhere in order to generate profits for themselves, which consequently supplemented the success of the United States' economy at home.

Historian William Appleman Williams, who trail blazed in the study of the United States' expansionist rationale, which has provided an academic basis for the American expansionist theory, suggested that the seeds of globalization were planted more than a century and a half ago. Following the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln at the end of the Civil War in 1864, Williams documented the American-collective mindset of the time, in that "[m]ost of the people believed in the principle of self-determination. [Americans] did not begin as imperialists. Their evolution into advocates of empire is not a story of the triumph of Evil, but rather a tale of tragedy caused by the fear of the Future."⁴⁶ Therefore, Americans anticipated and assessed their own trials and tribulations and viewed them as synonymous to everyone else's all around the

⁴⁶ William A. Williams, *America Confronts a Revolutionary World: 1776-1976* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976), 124.

world. Economic unease and social uncertainty gave way to a unique brand of collective American psychology. Williams added, in criticism of the psychology imposed on Americans by the marketplace, that:

[Americans] increasingly demanded that others exercise the right of self-determination in ways that furthered the economic expansion of America that they deemed essential for their own self-determination. Their compromise was made easier because the great majority of them also believed in their souls that America had evolved the best ideas and institutions of freedom.⁴⁷

Later events such as the U.S. annexation of Texas in 1845 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 proved to be a result of the United States' expansionist motives as well. By the turn of the twentieth century the United States was in the final process of securing and extracting resources from within their borders; working the land, time, and effort that was available to its fullest potential. Officially the United States had become a dominant global power by the closing years of the nineteenth century. The United States sought out foreign territories to imperialize and implement their unique doctrine of manifest destiny in an attempt to advance foreign societies and peoples' way of thinking to their own. Territories in the Pacific, South America, the Caribbean, and Central America proved to be valuable locations for American imperialism. The American economy would benefit from the cheaper raw materials and labor of these lands, as well as an ideal location for the spread of American interests, culture, and society into these so-called primitive societies. Although the United States had no intention of becoming malevolent imperialists, it did so subtly in an attempt to civilize foreign and non-modern cultures. President Woodrow Wilson's biographer, Arthur Link, noted in 1915 that the President did not allow for the Mexicans to follow their own course in civil history following their civil war in 1910. Rather, President Wilson "was determined... to teach the South American

⁴⁷ Ibid., 125.

republics to elect good men!”⁴⁸ Latin America, the Middle East, and the Pacific Island countries that the U.S. had once imperialized, by 1945, became ideal regions in further expanding the American Manifest Destiny doctrine to battle a relatively new and foreign threat. “Global developments, [such as the Cold War] rather than specific regional interests were decisive in shaping American policy....”⁴⁹

In the previous chapter, pioneering researchers such as C. Wright Mills and Kim McQuaid explained how the players who constructed our nation’s foreign and domestic policies were part of a unique group of individuals, who included the likes of elite politicians and powerful businessmen. Primary and secondary research indicated that the upper-echelons of American Industry and high-ranked federal government officials within America’s power structure seemed to be the two major groups who have formulated and carried out the directions and objectives in formally implementing American expansionism through a legitimate foreign policy. This elitist desire transcended into U.S. foreign policymaking for the bulk of the twentieth century – even during the two World Wars and the two intermediate decades of the 1920s and 1930s, which was the era that the U.S. federal government favored national isolationism and the bureaucratization of the U.S. political-economic sphere.

Yet during the isolationist period of the 1920s and 1930s, the United States remained active in economic trading with international markets, especially in the Middle Eastern oil business. New innovations in the energy and automobile industry in the United States brought about a great need for petroleum imports and supplies. The United States and Middle East remained adequate trading partners until 1938, when the oil trade and business activity substantially sped up due to the Allied war effort against the Axis Powers of the Second World

⁴⁸ Ibid., 146.

⁴⁹ Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism*, 145.

War. Once the United Kingdom acquired mining rights in Iran by the early 1920s, and mining and refining techniques became more technologically advanced, world powers such as the United States, were able to “reinforce their power over oil wells in the Middle East.”⁵⁰ Even though the United States was in the midst of a political isolationist policy during the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression, American opportunists had looked outside the nation in an effort to make money elsewhere and expand the American economic machine. Once World War Two arrived and passed, and the United States found itself in a diplomatic war with the Soviet Union, the Middle East and its oil-based relationship with the West became important aspects to the United States’ containment policy. Political partnerships were forged between the United States and Middle Eastern governments, such as the shah in Iran, to achieve a strategic position against Soviet expansion.

Today, the notion of Manifest Destiny within our foreign policy-making remains evident; however there now exists a more dynamic global landscape. The ever-changing and evolving historic episodes, combined with turbulent political and economic climates have caused the United States to evolve, adapt, and change its policy in order to reach its overall objective of expansionism - and eventually, the goal of globalization. Globalization, according to U.S. historical trends, is a continuation of its former policy of Manifest Destiny. However, to a greater extent and with the same objective of American expansionist theory, globalization proponents suggest transforming regions around the globe in an exclusive American system, which will bring about positive growth for global society and the planet as a whole. The United States has remained the world’s strongest nation with a dynamic and powerful capitalistic system in place. Previous political and economic leaders of the United States’ have played a gigantic

⁵⁰ Shi Yuanchun, *Biomass: To Win the Future* (United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2014), 13.

role in policymaking regarding the direction and path toward globalization. This will persist, and has, in affecting both those who live within America's borders, and foreign peoples as well.

The historical evidence gathered seemed to reveal a logical course, or pattern, that the United States has followed since the end of the Second World War regarding foreign policy in the Middle East. To be more specific, foreign policy in the Middle East has witnessed two major trends since that time, with the transitional phase occurring around the time of the first Gulf War (1990-91).

The dawn of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union following the Axis Powers' formal surrender in 1945, and the international circumstances surrounding the creation of a Jewish homeland of Israel within the existing land of Palestine three years later, brought about the first trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This initial trend in foreign policy (1945-1991) revolved around the notion of national security and protecting American interests abroad – the Cold War Trend. With the official collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and, simultaneously, Saddam Hussein's defeat at the hands of the U.S. led coalition, the United States welcomed its second trend in its foreign policy agenda with open arms. The Globalization Trend (1991-present), has presented the United States' economic, social, and political elite with the fragile opportunity to usher in a new global order in the image of American society. Although the global marketplace has existed for centuries and foreign peoples and nations might have their own visions of a global society, the undertakings by American policymakers to establish an official new world order had begun – which involved the political, social, cultural, and economic fabrics of Western society -- once their Soviet adversaries were defeated.

Three main factors dictated the direction of this initial trend in the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East, with a fourth factor becoming relevant in the closing decades of the Cold War - once it became evident to the West that the Soviet Union would not survive long with its communist principles at the helm. The three early factors included the overwhelming American support for a Jewish homeland in Israel, U.S. and Western access to Middle Eastern oil alongside its position in the global marketplace established in the late 1920s, containment against the spread of Soviet-driven communism, and finally, the initial seeds for the evolving goal of U.S.-led globalization during the Carter Administration era. All factors contributed to the overall goal and purpose by United States' foreign policymaking regarding a containment policy (the most important factor of the four according to United States' diplomacy during the bulk of the latter half of the twentieth century) which fought against the spread of communism and upheld the protection of the Free World. The need by the United States and the West for Middle Eastern oil, developing those international business relationships, and maintaining the support and alliance with the State of Israel were the three factors that played into the overall containment directive scheme early on as well.

In its global battle versus communism, the United States and its Western allies relied heavily on the capitalist systems their nations had long fostered, as well as the resources that had long powered the West's economic growth and reach. The one resource the United States needed that the Middle East possessed a lot of was petroleum. Business relationships between Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the United States dated back to the first couple decades of the twentieth century. It became imperative to U.S. policymaking that the United States expanded on and pursued business interests in the Middle East, which only improved upon their expansionist visions and deter the Soviet influence further. Although the benign

relationships that the United States had shared with various Muslim governments in the Middle East has seemed rather unusual, these relationships materialized, and endured, depending on the circumstances surrounding the vital trade of petroleum.

Oil was first discovered in the Middle East in 1908 underneath the desert land of modern-day Iran by the Anglo-Persian Company's Managing Director Charles Greenway.⁵¹ Around the time preceding the First World War, petroleum resources became the means of measuring global power and status. The United States entered the global oil scene once Charles Teagle's Standard Oil Company begun drilling for oil in the Middle East in 1919, since the U.S. national oil supply shortages following World War One became an imperative concern by government officials.⁵² But it was not until 1928, when American companies such as Exxon (Standard Oil of New Jersey) and Mobil (Standard Oil of New York), were admitted into Iraq to conduct their business ventures.⁵³ Exxon and Mobil, two member companies of the Seven Sisters, possessed ultimate economic control of the international petroleum market until the emergence of OPEC in 1960, and the economic recession of the early 1970s. From 1928 moving forward, American businessmen and politicians viewed the Middle East as a region that proved beneficial to the growing need in the U.S. for natural energy in the form of petroleum. Saudi Arabia would later prove to be the most important Arab State regarding the oil trade with the United States.

The fourth factor in this first trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was the pioneering principles toward a globalized society spearheaded by the United States, once it became clear during the Bush Senior Administration that the United States had a solid influence

⁵¹“The Prize: The Epic Quest for Money, Oil, and Power – (part 2 of 8) “Empires of Oil,” YouTube video, 52:59, posted by “WarCrime911,” December 17, 2010, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioazMpe1SHE&list=PLjkQwFG073ueJqF6q5AntrWoHrvlGiCLe>.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ John Blair, *The Control of Oil* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 31.

in the Middle East and the Soviet threat was just about diminished. Globalization, as stated previously, is the principal doctrine that still reigns as the precedence in U.S. foreign policy today. The United States, once engaged in conflict with the Soviet Union which held opposing viewpoints regarding the notion of globalization and/or expansionism, is presently and diplomatically more comfortable than it has ever been – yet nations like China are becoming a greater presence on the international stage with the capabilities to do so as well. But the United States' comfort in directing its globalist doctrine will change very soon. Other nations are gaining more international power as well as time persists, and the natural advancements in economic, social, and technological means are contributing to the evolution toward globalization.

The Cold War Trend in U.S. Foreign Policy

The emphasis of globalization did not take center stage until the defeat of Saddam's military offensive in Kuwait at the conclusion of the first Gulf War, and more importantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the purpose of upholding a historical narrative from 1945 onward, containment against the Eastern, Soviet ideology of government and economy was America's first and most important aspect of its foreign policy entering the conflict between the world's two global superpowers by the mid-late 1940s. To protect the United States and its invested global interests, foreign policymakers had a twofold solution: They needed to develop an ideology against communism and socialism, as well as protect pro-capitalist regimes in the Third World – such as the prior shah of Iran and the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia. These regimes, often merciless toward their own populations and suppressing in their own

methodologies of governing, were supported by the United States nevertheless, since they rejected the ideologies of socialism and communism.

In a global sense, the United States followed a policy of containment throughout the early stages of the Cold War. Discussed by President Truman in *The Truman Doctrine*, the policy of containment was designed by U.S. policymakers to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” and, “assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way...”⁵⁴ In hindsight, as well as ironically, U.S. interference in international dilemmas would have its related consequences and backlash by peoples of other countries who collectively viewed U.S. presence within their own lands as outside pressure and as a foreign invasion.

Containment and American expansionism, working synonymously within the structure of U.S. diplomacy, proved to be a tedious and conflicting course of action in terms of bringing about a peaceful resolution to the Cold War conflict and Middle Eastern society. This policy was designed to contain the spread of communism and keep the Soviet influence away from the surrounding, weaker nations of the Third World, as well as provide diplomatic security for nations teetering on the brink of social and political revolt. This meant that the United States, in contrast to its global symbolic mission of holding the moral high ground, supported corrupt and suppressing foreign dictatorships and regimes at times – such as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, and Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam to name a few – as long as they opposed Soviet and communist doctrine. The majority of time spent during this war of political ideologies by the United States was directed toward the Third-World countries of Latin America, South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. These regions primarily contained the

⁵⁴ Harry S. Truman, “The Truman Doctrine,” *Yale Law School: The Avalon Project*, accessed on January 31, 2014, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.

countries who were politically and economically unstable, and possessed vast resources that were of great importance to the First World, and geographically close to Soviet Russia and its satellite nations. Amidst the concern of the Soviet Union's goals, China was the other communist giant with which the United States had to contend with. But due to its own nationalistic nature, China was not as much of a global threat, in regards to containing the spread of communism, as the Soviet Union was.

The United States, alongside its Western allies, attempted to align themselves with many of, if not all, the governments and rulers they could in the Middle East in order to prevent the Soviets from advancing their influence southward. However and unfortunately for the United States, it was during this time – from the mid-1940s onward – in which the Middle East was in the midst of a revival of Arab nationalism and Islamic faith. This episode of nationalism, was brought about in part, by a sound Arab rejection of earlier European motives of imperialism and former military episodes during and before the First World War in the majority of Arab Middle Eastern countries. In general, Arab nationalism and Islamic ideologies opposed the West's accepted trends of society, culture, and religion. This trend swept across many of the nations within the Middle East and proved to be another obstruction concerning the diplomatic goals of U.S. foreign policy by 1945. When he proclaimed an Islamic State of Egypt in 1949, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, advocated that, “[l]uxuries only annihilate nations, and her comforts and coveted possessions have only convulsed [the West].”⁵⁵ It appeared evident from an American standpoint that in order to establish a functional presence in the Middle East and befriend the leaders and people within these Muslim lands, the United States had an uphill battle to fight against -- the renewed and heated animosities toward Western society.

⁵⁵ Akram Fouad Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 176.

These social upheavals, which spanned across national boundaries of the Middle East, created preliminary problems for the United States when attempting to implement their presence in the region. In a 1951 congressional hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs (CFA), Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian and African Affairs, George C. McGhee, was convinced that Soviet Russia was stimulating internal divisions and revolt within many of the Middle Eastern countries, specifically in the Arab community and the peoples within Iran and Turkey, based on feelings of “insecurity” and “nationalism in the light of the cold war struggle.”⁵⁶ Therefore, he added that:

[Uprisings] will go on and increase until the imbalance of power is redirected, until [the United States] gets stronger and Western Europe gets stronger, and [Middle Eastern nations] get some idea that Russia will be afraid to declare war because of [U.S.] strength, or that we might help them in the event of war and help defend them, or that we can assume a leadership in the world which we have not either because of our weakness or because we're not willing to do so.⁵⁷

Mr. McGhee's comments were of the fundamental and common belief held by the United States' government officials concerning the Middle East that had affected their foreign policymaking decisions of the time. He reflected the subtle, yet central, notion within U.S. foreign policy that without American intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, the Soviet Union was believed by U.S. officials to invade the region and inflict their communist doctrine upon it. The Soviet plan was to position itself as a barrier between the Western world and the Third World in order to restrict and deny the flow of resources, such as oil, to and from the West. In order to remain one step ahead of the Soviet undertaking, U.S. officials attempted to befriend as many Third-world nations as they could, emphasizing U.S. economic and social aid as selling

⁵⁶ George C. McGhee, “Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56 Vol. 16: The Middle East, Africa, and Inter-American Affairs* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), 23.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

points for their agenda. Chester Bowles, U.S. ambassador to India, advised President Truman to implement Western-style community programs within Nehru's India. Bowles believed that if India fell to communism and Soviet influence, U.S. strategic positions from "Cairo to Tokyo" would be in "grave danger," and the flow of resources and commerce in and out of the region would be jeopardized.⁵⁸ Countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Syria, and Afghanistan proved to be buffers to Soviet expansion as long as the United States supported and funded the ruling regimes of the abovementioned nations. Moreover, these countries remained a valuable asset to the United States throughout the entirety of the Cold War

With a diplomatic double-edged sword to confront between Arab nationalism, Islamic idealism, and Soviet containment, the United States had to form and plan their foreign policy very carefully and strategically throughout the 1940s and 1950s. When the U.S. Congress convened in the spring of 1954, the legislative body passed the Mutual Security Act. Essentially this legislation provided foreign governments, especially those located in the Middle East, with U.S. military personnel and public works contracts that were considered necessary to United States' national security interests. Upon approval of this act, Secretary of State John Dulles stated that the U.S. aid and money given to Turkey and Pakistan brought about, "a greater return to the United States in terms of its own security than if it were spent in some other way or if it were not spent at all."⁵⁹ In order to protect its own policy intentions, the United States had to persuade the governments of various Middle Eastern nations with money and assistance through the implementations of American personnel and planning to dissuade any Soviet advancements

⁵⁸ Richard Dauer, *A North-South Mind in an East-West World: Chester Bowles and the Making of United States Cold War Foreign Policy, 1951-1969* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 46-50.

⁵⁹ John Foster Dulles, "Mutual Security Act of 1954," *Committee on Foreign Affairs: House of Representatives, 1954* (Washington DC: GPO, 1954), 4.

into the area. This legislation could be seen as a policy similar to the Marshall Plan, which provided the powers of Western Europe with American aid in order to deter Soviet advancement into the region as well.

During the ongoing heightened Cold War tensions in its earliest years, U.S. support for the creation of a State of Israel in Palestine only intensified problems with the surrounding Islamic nations of the Middle East who were key in preventing Soviet expansion. The United States found itself in a cautious and complicated predicament. Not only did the United States have to battle the forces of Arab nationalism and Soviet communism, but they also had to ease the tensions of a cultural and religious war between the Jewish Zionists of Israel and the surrounding pro-Arab and other Muslim rulers, sentiments, and people. American support for a Jewish homeland in the middle of an Islamic-dominated region struck a discord with the surrounding Middle Eastern nations, likewise, in solidifying U.S. attempts to create alliances with many of those nations of the Middle East. It is important to understand that U.S. support for Israel played a gigantic role in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East concerning containment, and subsequently, forming alliances with the surrounding Arab, Palestinian, and other Muslim peoples who opposed the creation of a Jewish state. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report on the Arab States in 1947 laid out the dilemma which the U.S. was entangled in perfectly:

Arab determination to resist the partition of Palestine is such that any attempt to enforce that solution would lead to armed conflict, presenting an opportunity for the extension of Soviet influence. Any firm establishment of Soviet influence in the Arab states would not only be dangerous in itself, but would also tend to isolate Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, irrespective of the possibility of Soviet penetration of this area, U.S. support of the partition of Palestine might lead the

Arab states, on their own, to take steps which would adversely affect U.S. economic and strategic interests in their territories.⁶⁰

Foreign policy in the Middle East became a policy that the United States had to consistently develop, which quickly evolved into a tedious and cumbersome endeavor for U.S. policymakers. On the domestic front, the majority of the United States' population supported the idea of a strong bond with the newly-founded Israel. The United States contained an influential Jewish minority within its borders, as well as the fact that the American public had just witnessed the inhumane acts committed by the Nazis and their treatment of European Jews during the Holocaust several years earlier. Those factors created a collective national feeling of sympathy toward all Jewish people within the U.S. In May, 1942, resolutions of the Biltmore Conference in New York City strongly supported American and British political support for the creation of a Jewish homeland within Palestine. In the fall of 1946, President Harry Truman released a statement that indicated American support for Jewish immigration into Palestine. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, Truman essentially asked that the British government -- which had previously colonized Palestine and were in the process of abandoning their control there -- to lift its restrictions on Jewish immigration. In addition, Truman stated that his administration would do "everything it could to the end" in an ill-fated attempt to create an international agreement amongst various nations to "liberalize" all their immigration laws "with a view to the admission of displaced persons."⁶¹

For the United States, it took careful planning, much direct and diplomatic interaction between leaders from the United States and Middle East, support from American and Western

⁶⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, "Current Situation in the Mediterranean and the Near East, Oct. 17," *Reports on the Middle East: 1946-1976* (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1983), 2.

⁶¹ Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 243-6.

business entities in the Middle East, as well as maintaining the standing alliances with Islamic nations, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, in order to prevent the Soviets from expanding their mission southward. Yet there remained an apparent understanding between the United States and nations like Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. would not push for freedoms of commoners as long as the powerful sheikhs and Royal monarchy had continued to foster an American alliance. Thus, this served to protect the United States' bipolar vision of Western expansionism and an effective policy of Containment. President Eisenhower's State of the Union address in January, 1957, more commonly referred to as the *Eisenhower Doctrine*, declared that:

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations' goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.⁶²

Disregarding any element of Western propaganda, Eisenhower's message seemed to reflect that of a containment policy above all else. Eisenhower's doctrine, constructed immediately following the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, appeared unnerved or uninformed of Israel's militant actions in Palestinian territory during the crisis. Furthermore, Eisenhower's vision of a "world environment of freedom" seemed to contradict actions taken by U.S. officials and forces. Shortly after being elected president in 1952, Eisenhower approved a plan for the CIA to implement a propaganda campaign in Iran to foment protest against the Socialist reformer Mohammed Mossadegh. In consolidating their efforts with Great Britain's MI6 Intelligence Agency, their goal was to dispose of any potential communist threat. Dubbed "Operation Ajax"

⁶² Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960), 8.

(MI6 called this same mission: Operation Boot), the CIA did “all the heavy lifting for the coup” that removed Mossadegh from power and reinstating the Shah under control of General Fazlullah Zahedi.⁶³ Although the U.S. goal to remove the socialist ruler from power was achieved, the United States did so in the name of force, manipulation, and persuasion. In the wake of this nationalist movement, it was monumental that the United States used this type of elusive diplomacy in order to obtain its directive in American expansionist thought and denying Soviet expansion from occurring. American diplomacy had been implemented and pursued in the Middle East by the 1950s as a plan to discern any socialist expansion first and foremost before any plan for true freedom and liberty of Middle Eastern peoples was to be achieved.

The Western Powers, pertaining to Middle Eastern foreign policy, were in a tedious position by the late 1950s. The U.S. attempted to ally themselves with as many Middle Eastern governments, forces, and entities possible as long as Middle Eastern governments sponsored and supported the West’s global vision – all while rejecting the Soviet sphere of influence. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Soviet-backed nationalist regime in Egypt, and its control over the Suez Canal, served as a reminder to the West that making alliances with any Third-World leader was plausible and, in fact, necessary in protecting their own interests in the region and throughout the world. Western politicians, as well as big business leaders, would do whatever they could to make alliances with Middle Eastern governments even if it meant evading or squashing Arab and Islamic nationalist movements in the process.

The rise of social and political unrest in the Middle East in places like Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey irked the United States, as it found itself in a costly predicament years later against collective Muslim extremism and the intensified hatred by the Middle Eastern peoples toward

⁶³ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 124-5.

Israel and Western society. Despite its failure at Arab unity however, Arab nationalism had “succeeded in implanting the desire for inter-Arab cooperation and condominium, and it is not unlikely that this will become articulated in the form of increasing bureaucratization and institutionalization of inter-Arab economic, technological, and cultural relations.”⁶⁴ This increase in Arab communication and the transnational network of information sharing among various nations of the Middle East led to the rise of trade and diplomatic talks between countries rich in oil resources and the resource-hungry developed nations like the United States.

Following World War Two, seven Western dominant oil companies had complete control in directing and driving the international market prices of Middle Eastern oil. Moreover, these oil companies had held onto the control of the oil market in the Middle East since the 1920s. These companies were known as the Seven Sisters, and included the likes of Shell, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Texaco, British Petroleum, Exxon, and Gulf. Decades prior to 1973, the Seven Sisters completely controlled basically every business aspect on the development and distribution of crude oil found in the Middle East. But by the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the monopoly held onto by the companies that composed the Seven Sisters became decimated. With British Petroleum losing its access to petroleum in Iran in January of 1971, the Seven Sisters began to gradually lose their control over directing international oil prices. By the fall of 1973, Egypt and Syria invaded Israel to initiate the Yom Kippur War. OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) eventually took charge of controlling the energy market in 1973, as they wielded their control of the market forces along with oil prices, which sent panic throughout the international oil industry and the global market.

⁶⁴ Paul Salem, *Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994): 85.

Middle Eastern nations who spearheaded the formation of OPEC in 1960 included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, UAE, and Qatar. Other member nations included Ecuador, Venezuela, Algiers, Indonesia, Libya, Angola, Nigeria, and Gabon. The reason for OPEC's formation and existence was, according to their organization's PR statement, was "to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry."⁶⁵ OPEC was formed at a four-day conference held in Baghdad in September, 1960. Moreover, OPEC's underlying mission was, and continues to, emphasize "the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interest of their national development."⁶⁶

The United States had lost a considerable degree of influence and power in dictating oil prices and its market value on a global scale once OPEC gained international recognition. According to economic expert Philip Verleger, Arab states had lost control of their oil reserves in the 1960s, but once consumer demand from the West "suddenly caught up with productive capacity... producing nations were able to achieve success in their efforts to regain control over their reserves."⁶⁷ It appeared that the First-World was now at the mercy of Middle Eastern oil-producing countries. In their first ten years of existence, OPEC and their related Middle Eastern petroleum industrial firms failed to maintain any meaningful bargaining power, or have their independent firms compete alongside firms of First-World consuming nations. And to make

⁶⁵ Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, "About Us: Brief History," accessed on February 3, 2014, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Philip K. Verleger, "Prepared Statement on Energy Taxation Issues," *Subcommittee on Energy and Agricultural Taxation of the Senate Finance Committee, 1987* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987) 69.

matters worse for the international marketplace, consuming governments like the United States cut off negotiations with OPEC in October, 1973. This occurrence was due to the West's "virtually unanimous answer in the negative" over OPEC's sharp increase in the price of crude oil and to the unanimous objection over the Arab-Israeli conflict of the same year.⁶⁸

Beginning in 1938 and for the remainder of the twentieth century, the United States had to form a policy that would allow the United States to continue drilling for oil in Arab countries like Saudi Arabia. It was not until 1988 that the Saudi government took full control of the oil company's operations, officially entitled Saudi Aramco, once the company was nationalized. Today, Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabian Oil Company), originally a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company which formally operated in protecting American interests, earns just over an estimated \$1 billion a day in oil revenue.⁶⁹ The U.S. government, initially, had to resort to giving gifts to, and be granted permission by, the Kingdom's monarch and the appropriate prince of whose land they were drilling for oil on. For the United States government, this task in negotiating matters surrounding Saudi oil reserves eventually evolved into the complex diplomatic relationship that the U.S. currently shares with Saudi Arabia.

Aramco was established in January, 1944 when oil was discovered on the Island of Bahrain by a subsidiary company of Standard Oil of California. A 1948 CIA report on Saudi Arabia sent to Washington indicated that, although there was a "loss of cordiality following the recognition of Israel," relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia remained peaceful, affirmed by Ibn Saud's foreign minister.⁷⁰ From 1948 onward, the survival and growth of the

⁶⁸ Blair, *The Control of Oil*, 261-2.

⁶⁹ "Saudi Aramco – 12.5 Million Barrels per Day," *Forbes Business*, accessed on March 28, 2014, <http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mef45ggld/1-saudi-aramco-12-5-million-barrels-per-day/>.

⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, "Relations Between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabian Government," *Reports on the Middle East: 1946-1976*, 2.

relationship between Aramco and the United States was at the forefront of American concern during the Cold War. The importance of Aramco's business with the United States was demonstrated during altercations between Aramco and the Saudi Government in the late 1940s. The United States obliged King Ibn Saud's demand for "gold sovereigns and nothing else" in order to bring peace to the development of hostility between the state and the business entity in 1948.⁷¹ The U.S. could not afford to lose its position in the turbulent social landscape of the Middle East.

For years to come, oil producing nations such as Saudi Arabia viewed Aramco and other various petroleum corporations as the appropriate intermediaries through which to communicate their views and desires to Washington and to other various Western countries.⁷² Not only did the oil trade between Saudi Arabia and the United States prove beneficial to U.S. diplomacy, but this capitalist relationship helped continue to solidify a defense against the spread of communism throughout the Middle East. The Saudi sheikhs and the Saudis who were in positions of power benefited immensely from the oil revenues brought in from the United States. The wealth Saudi Arabia has accumulated over the decades from U.S. purchases of their petroleum exports has overshadowed Saudi resentment toward Israel. As long as Saudi Arabia was growing in wealth transferred from the West, its diplomacy would remain U.S.-friendly, depending on whether the House of Saud remained entrenched in power.⁷³ The anti-Israeli radicalism held by the majority of Islamic Arabs within Saudi Arabia had been silenced, to a degree. Through social welfare programs and holding onto supreme power of the state, the House of Saud was able to suppress many major and violent altercations against the State of Israel that have risen in the past.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁷² Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 50.

⁷³ International Business Publications USA, "U.S.-Saudi Arabia Diplomatic and Political Cooperation Handbook," *International Business Publications* 1 (February 2013): 56.

Another benefit the United States enjoyed in forming an alliance with Saudi Arabia during the Cold War was that both governments suppressed the spread of communism within their national populations, which was detrimental to their survival and their clamp on political power.

The first three decades of the Cold War proved burdensome to American foreign policymakers. Establishing a foreign policy agenda of Americanization and providing aid in the form of money, investment, personnel, and supplies for the underdeveloped nations of the Middle East, allowed the United States to become a regional force in protecting the Islamic countries from the influence of Soviet Russia. In addition, the alliance between Israel and the United States helped strengthen the United States' position of intermingling and entrenching itself in Middle Eastern affairs. However, this development proved troublesome when the United States attempted to implement peace and cooperation among the various Islamic nations of the Middle East. The rise in Arab nationalism and the rise of Muslim hostility due to the placement of Israel had become an increasing deterrent to America's overall objective of containment.

Yet America was willing to take the risk of supporting Israel. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and into the 1970s, Soviet influence in the Middle East was kept to a minimal degree from an American standpoint due to its containment policy. While American expansionism was presented in the form of social, economic, and political aid to Middle Eastern governments who assimilated with American goals of containment, American expansionism in the image of globalization did not take center stage in United States' foreign policymaking until the early 1990s following the end of the Gulf War. The various recorded rhetoric and documentation of government officials and personnel related to United States' foreign policy throughout the past several decades has proved this notion. The overall objective of American foreign policy from

the end of the Second World War through the early 1990s was two-fold. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East adapted with the intention to capitalize on the United States' need for oil, and the formation of a substantial diplomatic relationship with Israel and the surrounding Muslim populations. The Western crusade against the expansion of communism into the region succeeded for the time being, however, Western resentment by Middle Eastern Muslims had increased.

The Power of the Oil Economy during the Later Stages of the Cold War

From the 1960s onward, familiar and new developments to United States' foreign policy in the Middle East had occurred at a rapid pace that consistently changed the complexity of the U.S. mission. Vietnam and Southeast Asia became the dominant concerns in containment and the protection of American interests elsewhere heading into the 1970s. While the Middle East continued to be monitored and managed closely, it was a less menacing concern for the United States than it was a decade earlier pertaining to the Arab nationalist movements. Middle Eastern oil sources and OPEC persisted, however, in remaining the United States' primary source for imported petroleum imports from 1961 onward – no matter what global economic or political condition was rendered.

The 1960s and 1970s brought about a new and drastically increased demand for oil by the U.S. population. George Parkhurst, former Vice President of Standard Oil of California, reported that oil imports, primarily from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, increased from a little more than five million barrels a day in 1960 to about fourteen million barrels a day by

1970.⁷⁴ This increased demand for oil brought about a critical change to the international market. The formation of OPEC in 1960, and the rise in the global demand for oil brought about a new dynamic to international business and the geopolitical community. The oil producing nations of OPEC nationalized their oil drilling and refinery companies by the dawn of the 1960s in an attempt to hold a degree of influence and power in global politics and the international economy. Parkhurst added that from the evidence gathered, oil producing companies in the Arab states, such as Aramco, were earning substantially less than their governments were on sales per barrel of oil by 1974.⁷⁵ According to economic expert John Blair, OPEC and its Arab leaders had developed a “casual indifference to belligerent hostility” toward the United States, as Saudi King Faisal forwarded a message to Frank Jungers, then the President of Aramco, urging for “a simple disavowal of Israeli policies and actions by the U.S. Government.”⁷⁶ In short, there was no oil shortage in 1974. In fact, in the period of the oil embargo – the fourth quarter of 1973 – “output turned out to be virtually the same” as in previous quarters, in which OPEC and other major oil companies in the region “had shifted to a potential surplus.”⁷⁷ It appeared that the Western powers had lost considerable control over oil and its impact in the global economy by the early 1970s. Moreover, OPEC officials knew that and took advantage of the situation to stimulate their own national economies.

Shortly after OPEC took considerable control of the international oil market in 1973, an energy crisis plagued the First World beginning in the mid-1970s. The Federal Government, under the direction of the Richard Nixon Administration, proposed numerous economic controls

⁷⁴ G.L. Parkhurst, “Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, Part 7,” *Committee on Foreign Relations, 1974* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), 347.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 347-48.

⁷⁶ Blair, *The Control of Oil*, 268-75.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 275.

that the nation had not witnessed since FDR's New Deal programs. From 1969 to 1973, Nixon's first term in Office included numerous economic controls, as well as withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Vietnam, détente with the Soviet Union, and education reforms, which contributed to his success in winning a second term as president. However, Nixon's second term was haunted by an energy crisis centered on the international petroleum market. The energy crises, beginning in 1973, was not solely the result of spiteful Arab states versus the United States due to its support Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather the energy crisis was also stimulated by the launching of affirmative action and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 1972, and the prolongation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; these programs furthered the liberal regulations of the economy that materialized under Nixon's presidency.⁷⁸ The abovementioned government initiatives contributed to the evolving global economic patterns. Economic expert, Philip Verleger, explained to the United States Senate a decade later that:

Intervention by governments of consuming nations also contributed to the price increases of the 1970's[sic] and the artificial shortages. Imposition of more stringent environmental controls at a time of rapid economic growth contributed to an unexpected increase in demand. At the same time, price controls, allocation regulations and other programs prevented producers from finding and developing needed supplies in the United States and other producing countries. As a result, consumers were forced to turn to a limited number of suppliers, suppliers who then exercised their newly found monopoly power to boost prices.⁷⁹

A combination of animosities held by the Arab-dominated OPEC toward the United States for their support of Israel during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, as well as economic trends of the American economy played considerable roles in the oil embargo and energy crises

⁷⁸ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 46.

⁷⁹ Verleger, "Energy Taxation Issues," 73.

of the 1970s. In a letter to Saudi King Khalid in December, 1976, President Ford demonstrated his personal “admiration” for Saudi Arabia’s government in their ability to keep oil prices generally reasonable, and increasing oil production in order to have made an, “important contribution to the cause of international cooperation” for both nations, alongside a central goal of a lasting peace in the Middle East and cooperation in solving the global economic issues.⁸⁰ Ford’s wording seemed to indicate that although OPEC’s rise in the oil prices hurt the world economy, many other factors domestically and internationally also played an integral role in hurting the world economy. Historian Daniel Yergin described the 1970s as a decade of, “poor economic performance” by the United States.⁸¹ As with many episodes that have occurred over the course of history, there were several factors involved in the transfer of power from the West to the Middle Eastern powers regarding the control of oil during this era. The United States’ mission of containment in the Middle East became a foreign policy in which the United States lost a lot of power in steering the direction of the world economy. The early 1970s witnessed Arab leaders, including OPEC, take advantage of the opportunities the global economy and U.S. government actions presented them with. The West’s influence over Middle Eastern oil’s role in the global economy was diminished.

Part of the reason that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations involved with OPEC raised oil prices tremendously, indeed, was due to the United States’ support for Israel during its 1973 Yom Kippur War against Egyptian and Syrian forces. Six years earlier, the fourth Arab summit was held in the city of Khartoum, where Arab leaders dictated that there would be no definite peace between Israel and its Muslim neighbors. Former Secretary of State, Henry

⁸⁰ Gerald Ford, “Letter from President Ford to Saudi King Khalid,” *Foreign Relations of the United States: Energy Crisis, 1974-1980* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 402-3.

⁸¹ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 71.

Kissinger, described this summit as another new and strong wave of Arab extremism against Western practices and policies.⁸² Furthermore, Kissinger advised the National Security Council upon Israel's request for U.S. aid on the onset of their war. He advocated that if, "[T]he Arabs [could] swallow military aid decisions, but if [The United States executed] military aid to Israel decisions in the context of a stalemate in negotiations," there would have been a larger political and economic consequence regarding the United States' position in the Middle East.⁸³

It was inevitable that the United States needed to display its support for Israel. It had been doing so since Israel's birth. Likewise, the United States understood that the Arab states, specifically those nations that controlled the oil market as OPEC members, would be angered by the U.S. motives and aid to Israel during the Israeli-Arab war. By the mid-1970s the United States had to make the all-important decision to implement solutions that would satisfy both the Israelis and Arabs to a degree without upsetting the diplomatic balance too much. The direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was in its second decade, and the United States needed all the oil resources it could get from the Middle East in order to benefit the American cause. Around 89 percent of the oil used by the American forces in Southeast Asia by the 1970s had been exported from the Persian Gulf.⁸⁴

The United States had attempted somewhat tediously, to coordinate their foreign policy in a bipolar effort to satisfy demands, concerns, and desires from both the Israelis and the Arabs. And although the tensions were eased between the United States and the Soviet Union, important U.S. foreign policymakers such as Kissinger, according to U.S. diplomat Cyrus Vance, "brought home the need to look at Third World problems on their own terms and not through the prism of

⁸² Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 344.

⁸³ Henry Kissinger, "Minutes of a National Security Meeting," *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973-1976* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 215.

⁸⁴ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 46.

East-West competition.”⁸⁵ This course of action the United States took would prove more than costly in the coming years. While the U.S. sought for peace in the Middle East between hostile parties in the name of Soviet containment, Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians continued their acts of warfare, terrorism, and aggression toward each other. The altercation in Israel between the Jewish and Palestinians has been in existence since Israel’s creation in 1948. Even today, the conflict rages until some peaceful resolution is agreed upon by both Palestinians and Jews. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Arab coalition of Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed over ceasefire lines and invaded Israeli territory on the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, and Suez Canal. Meanwhile, Syrian forces invaded Golan Heights. The war lasted only nineteen days and ended in a stalemate. U.N. ceasefire agreements that were brokered during the war unraveled, yet both sides eventually agreed to end the altercation. In the aftermath of the war, Egypt lost its Soviet alliance, suffered many casualties, and was unable to recapture the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt, in theory, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel even though the war possessed no winner.

In the 1970s these tensions were at a high level, and to a point where it did not seem the violence would stop between Israel and its Muslim neighbors. Additionally, the American alliance with the State of Israel resurrected a heightened sense of Arab bitterness toward the United States and the West in general. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan would continue to receive U.S. aid as long as they defended against the Soviet threat from the north, provided the American economy with petroleum, and held no serious antagonistic endeavors toward Israel. In a 1979 letter to President Carter, Illinois Senator Paul Findley observed that if the United States failed to force Israel to stop using, “indiscriminate

⁸⁵ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1983), 24.

violence,” against their Palestinian occupants, then the United States could be subjected to violence from the Palestinians and their Arab supporters as well.⁸⁶ Findley concluded that, “[i]f that tragic time comes, the blood will be upon the hands - and the conscience – of all those who have the ability to prevent it.”⁸⁷ Unfortunately, that hypothesis has stood correct. Indeed, Arab and Muslim animosity toward the United States and the West had survived as a real threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy for the past thirty-five years.

Throughout this time period, the influence of Jewish lobbyism within America’s political landscape was significant. Propaganda campaigns, political rhetoric, public support -- especially from the Jewish-American minority and Christian political-right -- and the agenda of various interest groups in support for Israel’s survival and expansion within the Middle East was very strong. Years after his retirement, Illinois Senator and apparent political mainstream opponent Paul Findley documented this fact in his book, *They Dare to Speak Out*. Several years after the fact, Findley declared that his government colleague and former U.S. diplomat, George W. Ball, was rejected from a Secretary of State position by President Carter upon taking the Presidential Office. Furthermore, Ball had his advice on foreign policy constantly discarded by other presidents such as Lyndon B. Johnson, because of his oppositional views regarding U.S. support for Israel. The Israeli lobby also played a major role in selecting public officials pertaining to policymaking in the Middle East.⁸⁸ Historian Paul Charles Merkley advocated in his 2001 book, *Christian Attitudes Towards the State of Israel*, that since the birth of Israel in 1948, the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) has remained an active anti-Israel lobby. However by the 1970s, the AFME lost much credibility with U.S. politicians because the group

⁸⁶ Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 54.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Paul Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2003), 127-9.

“accept[ed] subsidies from Aramco.”⁸⁹ Moreover, Palestinians and “Arabs lost the contest for public opinion because of their unwillingness to compromise,” and, “their refusal even to talk to Israelis” over matters pertaining to lasting Middle Eastern peace.⁹⁰

The Jewish lobby within the United States has had the tremendous privilege over the years of influencing public officials and policymakers to overwhelmingly support Israel. While the majority of American people are sympathetic to Israel, they would be willing to withdraw American aid if Israel’s actions seem “to be contrary to U.S. interests.”⁹¹ Yet many experts on U.S. diplomacy, including Stephen Walt, have regarded the special relationship that the United States and Israel share as harmful to both nations’ security. The most influential pro-Israel lobby organization since the Cold War era has been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1963. Throughout the Cold War, this organization was seen as a strategic asset, and liaison, between Israeli and the U.S. officials and policymakers. Once the Soviet Union collapsed however, AIPAC used successful public relations and propaganda campaigns against common enemies of both nations, especially targeting Islamic extremism in the form of terrorism by the time the millennium approached.⁹²

Since the early days of the Cold War, there has been a tremendous support for Israel across various sects of the American population. In 1993, support for Israel by investors and the business community in New York City was enough reason for Arab extremists in the first bombing of the World Trade Center. Grassroots support for the Israeli cause included the right-wing of the Republican Party, individuals who fund academic and media institutions for the

⁸⁹ Paul Charles Merkley, *Christian Attitudes Towards the State of Israel* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2001), 6-7.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 10.

⁹² Ibid., 51-62.

Jewish cause, the Kibbutz parties, as well as fundamentalist Christian and Judaic religious groups and individuals. For example, Christian Zionism, which has resided in the theology of dispensationalism,⁹³ has caused evangelical Christians in the United States to view the special diplomatic alliance between the United States and Israel as being on the “right side [of] the Bible’s blueprint for the end times....”⁹⁴ Moreover, these Christian fundamentalists dangerously “support the settler movement and oppose a two-state solution,” with the Palestinians.⁹⁵

Influential Jewish lobby groups, especially AIPAC, have had the sole say in the abovementioned affairs until 1980, when Senator James AbouRezk established the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) in an attempt to give the Arab minority of the United States a voice in foreign policymaking.⁹⁶ However, the Jewish lobby has remained entrenched as the dominant lobby in persuading American officials in their foreign policy-making process. The Jewish lobby has infiltrated foreign policymaking through donations, personal connections, and business relationships between lobbyist members and U.S. government officials. In a Cabinet meeting between President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Pennsylvania Senator Hugh Scott, Kissinger explained Scott’s question on Jewish Americans’ knowledge of Israel’s troubling affairs, while describing the United States’ position on Israel’s security to him as well. Kissinger explained that the President was the “best friend” Israel and the Jews had, and added

⁹³ Dispensationalism is the evangelical, Biblical interpretation of Christianity that understands God as having relayed varied messages to human beings at various times in human history. Currently, dispensationalists view the U.S.-Israeli alliance as a God-given prophecy.

⁹⁴ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 133.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁹⁶ Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 61.

that the American government would be working with the American Jews directly and exclusively on issues involved in Middle Eastern diplomacy.⁹⁷

There were, and remain, critics to the unique relationship between the American government and pro-Jewish-American lobby and interest groups. Former Illinois Senator Findley remained a critic of the Israeli-United States diplomatic relationship. He stated in a speech in 1989, that he was, “ashamed” that the American government supported an Israeli government which forced harsh laws and hardened civil conditions for Palestinians living within Israeli’s borders. Findley, alongside renowned Sheikh Ahmed Deedat, ultimately compared the Jewish government in Israel and their harsh treatment of Palestinians within Israel, with Nazi treatment of European Jews in the early 1930s.⁹⁸ U.S. foreign policy experts, including John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, have declared that not only has the Jewish lobby hurt America’s overall goals of globalization in Middle Eastern diplomacy, but it has also hurt Israel’s national security and potential as well.⁹⁹ Jewish settlements in the West Bank and in Gaza, along with an “endless” supply of American money and resources into Israel to fund their wars and expansion, has aided the Arab’s overall hatred toward the United States and its Jewish ally.¹⁰⁰

Israel continues to remain a strong ally of the United States today. According to a recent news article, the United States has provided Israel with approximately \$3 billion annually since

⁹⁷ “Minutes of a Bipartisan Leadership Meeting,” *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973-1976* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 102.

⁹⁸ “Is Israel Set Up for Destruction – Debate – Paul Findley VS Ahmed Deedat,” YouTube video, 2:43:19, posted by “thesakeofallah,” December 14, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19ZZI9iMSak>.

⁹⁹ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 8-10; If globalization is to prosper in the Middle East, then the special relationship between the United States and Israel must transform to one of ‘normalcy’. If the U.S. treats Israel as an equal alongside its Muslim neighbors, than perhaps the violence between Jews, Palestinians, and Arabs may decrease or stop. The fact that the U.S. supports the Israeli cause has hurt attempts to find a lasting peace between both sides of the conflict.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

the millennium.¹⁰¹ According to recent patterns in foreign aid, Israel will continue to be tremendously aided due to the heavy support it receives from within the American population – where pro-Jewish special interest groups have considerable reach and influence with members of the U.S. federal government. As mentioned earlier, the special relationship between the United States and Israel will only hurt both countries as time unfolds. The United States has attempted to orchestrate a foreign policy of globalization in the Middle East in recent years and will continue to evolve and mold this policy moving forward as they see it best fit. Since the Obama Administration took control of foreign policy in 2009, the favoritism the U.S. formerly shared with its Israeli ally in previous administrations has decreased to a degree. If the Middle East is to be included within the wave of globalization, peace and/or cooperation must be demonstrated and exhibited by Arabs, Palestinians, Jews, and Americans alike. This peace must be sought with no great animosities held toward each other’s religious, cultural, social, and political backgrounds and identities. Moreover, each group’s exclusive vision of self-determination and promotion of their respected traditional and cultural goals must be adaptable or replaceable if globalization is to become a reality. These factors, which can be placed within the context of contemporary Middle Eastern policy, will be analyzed further and in greater detail in the following chapter.

In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, President Nixon addressed Congress and the rest of the nation on the United States’ energy policy. In doing this, Nixon conceptualized the main goals of American foreign policy of the day, which survived throughout the 1970s and into the following decade. These goals focused primarily on global economic issues surrounding

¹⁰¹ Steven Strauss, “Israel Has Reached Childhood’s End – It’s Time to End U.S. Aid to Israel,” The Huffington Post, November 10, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-strauss/us-aid-israel_b_4251742.html.

energy resources in the Middle East. He indicated that “the strength of self-sufficiency” should have been the United States’ only concern moving forward. Moreover, Nixon addressed the energy crisis and economic recession by stating that, “[America’s] ability to meet [its] own energy needs is directly limited to [its] continued ability to act decisively and independently at home and abroad in the service of peace, not only for America but for all nations in the world.”¹⁰²

The 1970s were a decade of turbulent economic discourse for the United States. It was also an era that witnessed a resurrection of Muslim resentment of the Jews within Israel. These two issues proved to be of primary importance to the U.S. cause – especially to those who dictated the direction of foreign policy. The Soviet Union and the related containment of the spread of communism remained an American concern. The 1970s were an era, as indicated by President Nixon’s address to the nation, when the United States sought to achieve peace and/or cooperation diplomatically by any means necessary. The Vietnam War was nearing its conclusion and the United States and the Soviet Union were in the midst of a policy of détente. The SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty between high-ranking political officials of the United States and Soviet Union was ratified in 1971. These long and tedious negotiations of SALT I between President Ford and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev resulted in the reduction of nuclear weapons by both superpowers. SALT II and the continuation of this program would abruptly end in 1979 due to the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, causing the United States’ Congress to vote against ratifying the treaty in the following year.¹⁰³

¹⁰² “Editorial Note,” *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973-1976* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 96-7.

¹⁰³ Vance, *Hard Choices*, 387-9.

As the 1970s reached its final years and the Carter Administration gained control of the federal government, the U.S. diplomatic climate focused on the global economic and social condition of Third-World peoples. It was during the 1970s, as correctly stated by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, that the United States, in light of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab oil embargo, and rising prices of OPEC oil products, “became acutely aware of the perilous dependence of the West on Middle East oil.”¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and overthrow of the shah, including the ensuing hostage situation at the American embassy in Tehran, proved to display a whole new set of problems for U.S. policymakers. As the White House Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, related to Carter that, “[i]n many respects, this would appear to be the worst of times;” the United States was in the midst of another Middle Eastern oil crisis, a lasting legacy of public bitterness toward the government following withdrawal from Vietnam, the rigidity of foreign markets, more inflation, and a new wave of Islamic fundamentalism raging across the social landscape of the Middle East.¹⁰⁵ If the people of the United States could find a means to solve the crises that plagued them by the late 1970s, they had to alter their foreign policy dramatically, as it appeared the Soviet Union was becoming more aggressive toward the West. The 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rekindled a new United States’ concern toward containment of Soviet influence and forces. The events of the 1970s planted the seeds for globalization, which were beginning to take form, as a new set of circumstances, occurrences, and problems surfaced regarding the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East. But globalization efforts by U.S. policymakers were placed on hold as an increase in aggression toward the West by new and familiar enemies had taken form.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 23.

¹⁰⁵ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 46-7.

The United States eagerly sought international support toward economic understanding and prosperity in an attempt to fix the global market. In the frenzy to establish worldwide peace, especially in the Middle East, the Carter Administration was about to face a diplomatic nightmare. This primarily centered on an Islamic-fueled revolution in Iran, and the trade of Middle Eastern oil resources and formulating an international agreement on prices. The United States appeared to be working itself out of economic hardship by the end of the decade. But the high hopes did not last long. With the lingering conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the economic problems surrounding the global oil market, the United States would have to implement quick and effective solutions within their diplomacy to offset these serious problems.

The Final Years of the Cold War and its Effect on Middle Eastern Society

From the time around Carter's presidential victory in 1976 to 1980, the United States found itself in a diplomatic and an economic crisis. By the end of his first and only term in office, the economy remained in a recession and United States' foreign policymakers had to face a series of new and regenerated animosities aimed at the U.S. and its Western allies. Not only were the issues surrounding the oil trade and Muslim animosity toward Israel and its Western alliance a redundant episode in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, but a resurrected confrontation with the Soviets and a new enemy in Islamic fundamentalism became more problems that the United States had to solve. A treaty signed between Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Israel's Manachem Begin at Camp David in March, 1979, softened the bitterness and altercations between Israel and its Arab neighbor to the south for the time being. This event became known as the Camp David Accords. This agreement temporarily solved Israel's national security and

sustainability in the hostile region to a degree. Unfortunately for the United States however, El-Sadat was assassinated a year later by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. If it was not apparent already, there remained an increase in animosity within the Islamic populations across the Middle East toward Israel and its Western ally. Arab hatred and rejection of the agreement was widespread, to an extent in which the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, called the treaty a "false peace" and claimed that their organization would eliminate any peace and sympathizers to Israel's cause.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the assassination of Egypt's leader showed the world that Islam and the Arab world would not settle, side, nor negotiate peace with the West or Israel, as this conflict would persist.

Throughout the period of détente in the 1970s, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was manageable, somewhat cordial, and not as tense as the diplomatic relationship was in previous Cold War decades. Other than weapon sales that occurred between the Soviet Union and a couple of the Arab states, the United States enjoyed relatively open negotiations and no threat of military conflict with the communist antagonist. Even during the Israeli-Arab conflict, both superpowers were in diplomatic discussions in order to construct a resolution of lasting Middle Eastern peace. Eventually however, the lingering global economic disparity and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 sent the region and the rest of the world into another period of diplomatic strife and heightened tensions.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution ended the warm diplomacy the former Shah's government shared with the United States. In the days preceding the overthrow, several actions committed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had contributed to the transformation to an Islamic Republic, in which the revolutionaries resented the West – especially the United States. "Political

¹⁰⁶ "1979: Israel and Egypt Shake Hands on Peace Deal," BBC News, March 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/26/newsid_2806000/2806245.stm.

repression, the presence of the SAVAK (the shah's secret police force),” censorship of the press, failed agricultural policies led to the displacement of the rural poor and their migration into the cities, were all contributing factors that led to the Iranian revolution.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the Shah's “perceived dependence on America and the favoring of American interests,” especially in the months of inflation and recession due to the 1973 oil crisis, raised concerns over social justice and increased the disingenuous image of the United States in the minds of revolting Iranians.¹⁰⁸ About two months before Khomeini's succession to power, the U.S. diplomat in Tehran, Victor Tomseth, sent a telegram to the State Department. In his correspondence, Tomseth observed the evolving political and social atmosphere of Iranians alike, as well as the surge of Islamic fundamentalism. He declared that, “[Islam] is the only institution familiar to them in their new surroundings, and they are thus highly susceptible to the religious emotionalism that surrounds the cause such as Khomeini's.”¹⁰⁹ The people of Iran began to view their shah and his ties to Western governments and companies as the source of all their civil, social, and economic problems. The United States, alongside its Western allies, became viewed by Iranian revolutionaries as enemies to their Islamic and national aspirations.

The Iranian hostage situation was another dark moment in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. A mob of young Iranian revolutionaries seized the American embassy in Tehran and took around sixty Americans hostage in November, 1979. This event left a haunting legacy for the Carter Administration. By the end of his term in office, the final hostage was released minutes after Reagan entered the Oval Office, which added a final element to Carter's humiliation. Retired foreign service official and former Iranian hostage, Donald Cooke,

¹⁰⁷ Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 147-8.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 300.

explained years later that the hostage situation could have been avoided if the United States' government realized the dangers they were facing in Iran with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, rather than trying to, "regularize [the] relationship" the U.S. formerly had with the shah.¹¹⁰ Whether or not the United States could have avoided the hostage situation, the Iranian overthrow of the shah marked an era where the United States had to begin to monitor extremist activities more effectively - such as those committed by the *Shia*¹¹¹ Muslims in Iran and around the Middle East, as this occurrence proved to add a new dimension to the American foreign policy problem.

Within the overall policy of Cold War containment, the United States had to contend with the threat of a resurrection of social and political unrest across the Middle Eastern landscape. The international, internal, and economic power of the Soviet Union had decreased considerably by 1980. Although the Soviets were still a force to be reckoned with, they were in dire need of oil from the Middle East and were about to encounter their own diplomatic, as well as internal, problems with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Soviet republics. In the midst of economic strife, centered on the search for petroleum resources and problems of disunity within their empire, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December, 1979. This dilemma would be one of the several series of conflicts spanning the length of the 1980s between the United States and various international forces that would consequently and negatively effect the U.S. position in the Middle East years following the Cold War.

¹¹⁰ "Former Iranian Hostage: Obama Showing Same Ambivalent Foreign Policy as Jimmy Carter," YouTube video, 2:44, posted by "jim hoft," November 4, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=60TbmID0MZs>.

¹¹¹ *Shia* and *Sunni* are the two central branches of Islam. Today, these two denominations are in constant conflict over which one should bare the religious testament over the Muslim nation. The main argument centers on political power; Sunnis believe that Islamic leadership should be based on religious merit, while Shi'ites believe leadership should be based on those who are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

The long and gruesome Afghan-Soviet War lasted from the time Russian paratroopers landed in the Afghani capital of Kabul in December, 1979, to Gorbachev's withdrawal from the conflict in 1989 due to the war's crippling effects on Russia's stagnant economy. Like in Iran months earlier, Afghanistan was in the midst of their own Islamic-fueled revolution. The rebel forces within Afghanistan, the *Mujahdeen*, sought to overthrow the Soviet-backed communist government of Hazifullah Amin amidst an ongoing civil war. By 1989, after years of bloody and tedious guerilla warfare in the mountainous regions around Afghanistan, Gorbachev withdrew the Soviet military, which were unable to defeat the Mujahdeen forces. Much like America's prior experience during its invasion of Vietnam and its military campaign against Ho Chi Minh's Vietcong forces, fighting on Third-World soil and confronting unfamiliar battle styles proved too challenging for the military forces of the Soviet Union. The war became too expensive to fund and too unpopular to continue. What remained, however, were the guerilla militants, including members of the Taliban, who eventually would use the U.S. weaponry sold to them by the U.S. government to battle Soviet forces, against the West when the United States waged war in Afghanistan in late 2001.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution had altered the diplomatic course of the United States. The U.S., alongside its Western European alliances, provided financial and military aid to nations such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, in a consolidated attempt to "deter further [Soviet and Arab] aggression," as well as, "finding a solution to the Palestinian problem."¹¹² U.S. political leaders understood that these foreign conflicts would prolong and increase problems associated with the oil trade out of the region – creating a cautious sense of urgency for the West to resolve these foreign issues efficiently.

¹¹² Vance, *Hard Choices*, 392.

The days of survival for the Soviet Union had become numbered. The United States became aware of that fact and attempted to stimulate reform, peace, and stability throughout the region. The rise in trade between the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies and the increase in global economic activity helped the U.S. cause in defeating Ronald Reagan's Evil Empire. It was during the 1980s, under the Reagan Administration, that the United States increased their economic and trade activity with Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia contained a majority population of Sunni Muslims, who were statist above all else, and despised the Shia Muslims for their views on pan-Arabism. Moreover, a majority of Sunni Muslims within Saudi Arabia helped maintain and secure the monarchy's rule. Yet, there remained a minority of Shia Muslims within Saudi Arabia. Events like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the terrorist attacks on Mecca's Grand Mosque that same year by Islamic extremists frightened the Saudi regime and national stability.

Shia Islam jeopardized the Sunni's powerful hold on their nation's people, and threatened their healthy political and business disposition with the West. Several years earlier in 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by a disgruntled nephew, and Faisal's successor, King Khalid, became the nation's leader who by a few years into his newly accepted role as king, had to deal with the issue of social disorder and unrest within Saudi Arabia. Although King Khalid died a few years later in 1982 due to illness, he initiated domestic social reforms from the oil wealth Saudi Arabia accumulated during the oil embargo. The Saudi monarchy knew that in order to calm the tensions of their own minority Shia population and protect their position of power, they needed to improve their people's standard of living. Most of the reforms initiated by Khalid were improvements made to Saudi Arabia's infrastructure. The infrastructure improvements that were made during the 1970s included the development of a paved highway system, construction

of schools, power plants, airports, and hotels. A decade later, the government spent money on social services, education, and on an improved healthcare system.¹¹³

Moreover, the Saudi government improved upon their international relationships via a cooperative foreign policy. In 1981, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf States, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This council coordinated political and economic policy regarding the modern Gulf-Arab society. This group was formed in response, as well, to the growing influence and aggression of Shia Islam and its threat toward Middle Eastern established governments – especially those governments endorsed by the West. Member states of the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, “sought to sympathize their military forces while providing millions of dollars in aid to the Iraqi war effort,” against Iran during the viscous Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s, all while, “continuing to invest in modern weapons.”¹¹⁴

The threat of Iran and its Shia rulers and population horrified Middle Eastern political stability and security in the surrounding Middle Eastern nations. The Saudi government, alongside the American government, both pursued to protect their national and diplomatic security in the early 1980s. Since 1979, the United States had earned more than \$50 billion off of Saudi purchases of modern weaponry and the newest military technology.¹¹⁵ During the 1980s however, this arms trade between the United States and Saudi Arabia had been rejected and detested by many within the U.S. Congress and by supporters of Israel. In 1985, Congress declined a sales proposal designed by Reagan that included F-15 jet fighters, anti-aircraft guns,

¹¹³ Public Broadcasting System, “Saudi Arabia Time Bomb?,” *Frontline*, accessed on January 19, 2014, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/cron.html>.

¹¹⁴ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 54.

¹¹⁵ Public Broadcasting System, “Saudi Arabia,” *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/cron.html>.

missiles, and Blackhawk helicopters, in fear that one day these weapons could be used against Israel.¹¹⁶ In fact, there was much congressional opposition regarding the arms sales to Saudi Arabia since 1979, because it jeopardized Israel's national security. Yet, Saudi Arabia's reason for the purchase of American weaponry was directed at Iran and its emergence as a threat to the Sunni kingdom, as well as to the entire region.¹¹⁷

However, the White House, State Department, and Pentagon were not opposed to the idea of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. When Ronald Reagan entered the presidency in 1980, he met with the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan, regarding a trade arrangement involving the purchase of American weaponry. Reagan stated that he did not oppose the notion as long as the Saudi government was in total disfavor of the Soviet Union and communism.¹¹⁸ Additionally, the major oil companies favored this exchange since it secured their role in the geopolitical economy.¹¹⁹ Eventually by the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia favored arms negotiations with Britain to purchase U.S. arms more so since the Arabs found it extremely burdensome and "bruising," when confronting much opposition from members of Congress and the pro-Jewish lobby within the United States.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, Congress's rejection of arms sales to Saudi Arabia had its valid argument. Senator Carl Levin from Michigan argued in the mid-1980s that if the Saudis needed American, "antiaircraft and antiship missiles in order to deter an Iranian threat," then why were the sales of those specific weapons not scheduled until 1989? In addition, why did, "[Saudi Arabia] refuse to even use their [sic] influence to work

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ PBS, "Saudi Arabia," *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/cron.html>.

¹¹⁸ Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 111.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 111-2.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

toward the cessation of terrorist activities in the Middle East[?]"¹²¹ Federal government officials argued, however, that weapons were sold to Saudi Arabia and "other moderate states" in an attempt to, "augment [American] military power in the region and strengthen [American] security ties" with those pro-Western Arab nations.¹²²

Alongside the arms sales to Saudi Arabia, oil production increased in the Gulf that transformed the Middle East into a more pivotal global region than ever before with the greater demand for energy within a rapidly expanding and technologically advanced world. By the end of the 1980s, the United States had witnessed the bloody and exhausted conflict between Iraq and Iran come to its conclusion, and Iraq had become a closer trade and diplomatic partner to the United States once former Soviet-Iraqi ties began to weaken. But the newly-formed benevolent relationship between the United States and Iraq would not last long. Iraq earned around \$13 billion dollars from oil revenues, but its postwar debt accumulated to \$20 billion by 1989.¹²³ Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, demanded that the surrounding Arab Gulf governments aid Iraq in the form of financial reparations for defending them against the hostility of Iran. The Iraqi dictator quickly became an enemy of the U.S. and the West when he invaded Kuwait in 1990, once Kuwait refused to share its oil revenue with Iraq. The GCC, "had few viable options for dealing with Iraq in 1990 other than working with Washington."¹²⁴

By the time the Gulf War was underway in late 1990, the United States was interacting with Middle Eastern governments on a constant and consistent basis. A new series of relations began between Saudi Arabia and the United States, as Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. and U.N.

¹²¹ Carl Levin, "Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia - 132 Congressional Record: H-1031," March 12, 1986, *ProQuest Congressional*, accessed on December 3, 2013, Lockwood Library, <http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t17.d18.9e922b493b6fac01.htm>.

¹²² Vance, *Hard Choices*, 386.

¹²³ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 93.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

forces to establish numerous military bases and command centers on Saudi soil. The presence of U.S. military forces on the Islamic Holy Land stimulated even more resentment by Shia peoples who resided on the Arabian Peninsula toward the West. Approximately fifteen percent of Saudi Arabia's total population practices Shia faith – a threatening minority to the Sunni leadership of the Saudi Kingdom.¹²⁵ In part, Shia resentment of the Western presence on the Holy Land would eventually lead to the terrorist attacks on the United States and its Western allies several years later. Surrounding Gulf States who disfavored Hussein's regime followed suite in aiding the West in their best interest. With personal encounters, interaction, and open communication with the United States on all levels, Saudi Arabia's economic and cultural landscape was becoming more sophisticated and modern – for example, ARABSAT (Arab Satellite Communications Organization) merged with CNN (Cable News Network) to revolutionize global television; which broadcasted the war and provided viewers all over the globe around the clock news coverage and footage.¹²⁶ As the years progressed toward the end of the millennium, a much larger and diverse number of business and political relationships formed between various parties from the United States and various parties from Saudi Arabia. United States' diplomacy with Iran, on the other hand, has remained stagnant since the revolution in 1979.

Other than oil imports received from Iran over the last several decades, it remains to be seen whether or not diplomacy will ever return to favorable conditions as it was prior to Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. However, as Vali Nasr pointed out -- a current member on the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and native Iranian:

[f]undamentalism has gained footholds – and won in Iran – due to the failures of authoritarian leaders to execute on promises of economic progress for the masses,

¹²⁵ Lionel Beehner, "Shia Muslims in the Mideast," *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed on February 4, 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/religion/shia-muslims-mideast/p10903>.

¹²⁶ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 100.

and crucially, due to the abdication by the state-sponsored middle class of a leadership role in bringing about robust economic growth and political liberalization.¹²⁷

As emphasized, the Iranian theocracy has failed economically on a global scale. Iran's economic instability, brought about by its corruptly managed public policy, will be discussed further in the following chapter.

In December, 1991 the Soviet Union officially collapsed. Furthermore, the American-reinforced offensive against Saddam Hussein's forces during the Gulf War proved victorious earlier in February of that year. Ultimately, the United States remained the only global superpower to emerge a Cold War champion. The containment policies America held onto throughout the decades were no longer relevant, especially in the Middle East. What remained in the Middle East, however, were nations that had succumbed to Islamic extremism toward the West and its 'evil' mechanisms of modernity, as well as its godless nature. This Arab-based Islamic extremism would manifest itself in various Islamic terrorist organizations that would haunt the United States and the West for years to come. The United States needed to remain in the Middle East, however, if it wished to bring about the political, social, economic, and cultural reforms needed for its version of globalization to work. The region was socially and culturally diverse, filled with Western and religious animosities, and was politically turbulent. In its nature of harboring expansionist thought, the United States had to modernize and democratize Middle Eastern society as well as protect one its biggest investments and assets regarding geopolitics and global economics – support for Israel and Gulf oil.

In order for foreign policy to work effectively, The United States needed to transform its outdated Cold War foreign policy into a more adaptable and modern policy by 1991. The Soviet

¹²⁷ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 117.

threat was dismissed by the early 1990s, and although Israel continued to receive aid from the United States, it consistently sought for foreign protection from its hostile Arab neighbors and Palestinian nationals within its borders. Israel has appeared to be the one nation in the world that the United States has shared a special diplomatic relationship with – more so than the relationship the United States enjoyed with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. Jewish Americans have, according to researcher Janice Terry, “a single issue orientation that enjoys support from all levels of government from the White House and Congress down to city and state levels.”¹²⁸ Christian Zionists, who make up a large portion of the base of the U.S. Republican Party, have made the debate over support for Israel as a central focus to their decision making in the American voting system. Moreover, small voter turn outs in American elections and the “influence of Jewish Americans far exceeds their proportion of the general population.”¹²⁹ For example, only 56.5 percent of the total American population eligible to vote turned out to the polls in the Presidential Election of 2012.¹³⁰ As long as U.S. policymakers and certain instrumental sectors of the American public continue to tremendously support Israel, then the U.S. will remain an enemy of the Islamic extremists who viciously attack the West because of that reason. The United States had to continue to support and defend Israel from hostile Islamic extremist groups and terrorist cells from various sections around the Middle East as it entered into a new era of diplomacy. The United States’ determination to put an end to Islamic fundamentalist activities at home and abroad further aligned with Israel’s diplomacy as well.

¹²⁸ Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 120.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 122.

¹³⁰ U.S. Census Bureau, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2012 – Detailed Tables*, November, 2012, <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/tables.html>.

As globalization became the central doctrine of United States' foreign policy in the Middle East, the decision had to be made whether or not to include Israel in the overall goal of global assimilation into a new world order. Muslim nations, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, continued to remain allies with the United States, and have appeared to embrace the idea of globalization, which can be seen through their modernizing motives and reforms pushed onto their national populations. Those aforementioned Islamic states seem willing to accept the American model of modernity as they believe a global community will eventually be achieved. Yet, the legacy of states dominated by a strong Shia presence, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, have remained developmentally stagnant and will continue to oppose any notion of globalization unless initiated by a foreign entity like the United Nations, or by a revolutionary occurrence within their own national borders.

As the world headed toward the millennium, the United States understood that something had to be done regarding the chaotic and complicated nature of the Middle Eastern society. Globalization seemed like a viable prospect as early as 1991 due to the fall of the Soviet Union and its communist system. American elitists, including businessmen and politicians, began speaking ever so eagerly of taking on the incredible task of transforming the Middle East into a functional representation of Western society – the blueprint for the prospective global society constructed by a nation whose historical track record seemed to indicate an eerily similar trend via expansionism. But a region, so deeply rooted in its religious and cultural foundations, would not cooperate or agree to assimilate to an American-made globalist agenda. The next chapter will ultimately address this concern. Furthermore, there arose a new combination of factors, players, aspects, and a new set of circumstances unique to history, which provided a series of new complex and dynamic obstacles that U.S. policymakers had to confront. The globalization

mission, spearheaded by the United States, would ultimately fail or succeed in the Middle East depending on the simple fact of whether or not Middle Eastern society wanted to be assimilated into a global system.

Chapter 3

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Establishing a New Precedence

Globalization is a broad term that is frequently used in the political arena today. Traditional globalization, like trading goods and services between peoples from different nations or cultures, has occurred over the course of many centuries, and as early as 1200 BC, when Mycenaean Greece was trading with populations on the Baltic coasts.¹³¹ An official international and organized system of globalization, however, has been conversed about frequently by various academics, politicians, media outlets, and multinational business people globally. So what is globalization specifically? It has a broad definition, especially when defined by various nations, leaders, and cultures – each one defining globalization according to a basic understanding of one’s own culture, ethnicity, national identity, social norms, and traditional norms. In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined globalization as “the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows... the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders.”¹³² Other aspects not covered by the IMF publication included the cultural, political, and environmental dimensions of globalization. Another aspect, which is especially important for the poor living within developing nations, is the establishment of an effective human rights policy. Basically, as the world becomes more interconnected through advanced forms of technology, electronic media,

¹³¹ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 384-5.

¹³² The International Monetary Fund, “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?,” *Publications*, accessed on April 6, 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm>.

communications, and transportation, the prospects for a unipolar world will become clearer. The flow of resources, in which a capitalist world economy would provide the mechanisms to do so, is what many globalists want to happen sooner than later. But where globalization seems to be a probable reality in the developed nations of the world, it is yet to be established in the developing nations around the world – including the majority of the nations that make up the Middle East.

With globalization on the future's horizon, many people worldwide will benefit from this major development. There are others, however, who do not see globalization as beneficial to their own individual cause, and to the development of their own society. Proponents for globalization, such as Western political leaders and multinational capitalists, view it as a system that will increase the standard of living for all under its umbrella. Globalists advocate that with an effective system in place, globalization will increase trading within a world economy, therefore, stimulating social reforms, increasing economic progress, increase universal civil and human rights, and generating wealth in the poorest and underdeveloped regions of the planet. Individuals, including religious fundamentalists, nationalists, and hardline conservatives view globalization as a threat to their way of life and to the society in which they live in. They fear that a unified global community will eliminate their cultural, religious, national, and ethnic identities. Moreover, opponents of globalization “regard it with hostility, even fear, believing that it increases inequality within and between nations, threatens employment and living standards and thwarts social progress.”¹³³

Yet one cannot deny that human progress does not exist, no matter what the future holds. Therefore, it appears a natural human condition that with the increase in communications between peoples of different ethnicities, religions, and nations and a rise in the technological

¹³³ Ibid.

ability to do so, globalization may be an inevitable and permanent episode. According to historians Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, the contemporary form of globalization began once the Soviet Union weakened beyond the point of no return (1989-91). It was on the eve of the 1990s that the world had witnessed “the failure of the closed economies and their reintegration into the global market economy.”¹³⁴ Developing countries felt the urge to embrace global trade, establish capital markets, and welcomed foreign investment and corporations in order to generate global prestige, power, and wealth. More importantly, these developments, which occurred during the demise of the Soviet Union, exemplified that these poorer nations longed to be admitted into the universal system of globalization. Many who resided in these developing nations, like Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East for example, came to see this incidence as one which harbored Western imperialistic motives on foreign people’s social, cultural, ethnic, and religious norms and identity. With opposing opinions on the consequences or rewards of globalization -- many of these viewpoints are based on ignorance, fear, and past occurrences of international strife and conflict, with some points justifiable than others based on historic evidence -- there began a resistance against the changing world landscape.

On September 11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the nation on matters concerning the Federal Budget deficit and the Persian Gulf crisis, which involved the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In his speech, the President condemned Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait in August, 1990, and regarded the incident as one that was opposed to America’s diplomatic goals. In his speech, President Bush established a new doctrine of globalization, one based on the American tradition, to implant within the overall objective of United States’ foreign policy.

¹³⁴ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 387.

The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- [sic] freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.... Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.¹³⁵

Among other national interests in his State of the Union Address, President George H.W. Bush appeared to prioritize a national concern toward foreign policy. His remarks appeared to suggest a unipolar world, led by the U.S., acting to bring about globalization through its diplomatic and other foreign actions. During the latter half of 1990, it appeared evident Soviet Russia would succumb to Western influence. Once the Soviet Empire officially fell one year later, the United States was left as the lone world power with the ability to transform its foreign policy into one that could potentially affect everyone around the globe. This allowed the United States to orchestrate and spread its doctrine of a unipolar world system to the remainder of the globe, without interference from Eastern society. Containment of Soviet forces in the Middle East became irrelevant by the early 1990s, although new and familiar enemies to U.S. policy would soon yield their strategies to combat globalization. The United States' novel purpose was to eliminate the threat of any dictator or foreign leader, or force -- such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism -- standing in the way. The directive was globalization,

¹³⁵ George H.W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, September 11, 1990," *George Bush Presidential Library and Museum*, accessed on February 15, 2014, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9.

which seemed to evolve from the centuries' old notion of the American Manifest Destiny. It appeared that a hopeful idea had become a U.S. duty. Instead of sharing its interest and responsibility with other nations, the U.S. intended to lead the rest of the world into its version of a better future.

Globalization, with its U.S.-centered origins, was a notion widely-accepted by political leaders of the First World and many other developing nations in Asia, Eastern Europe, South America, Central America, and Africa. It also gained powerful momentum within the highest echelons of the Soviet political realm. Just fourteen months before President Bush's speech on the prospects of an American mission of globalization, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev echoed similar sentiments. Yet, Gorbachev's remarks seemed to indicate a system of globalization that focused on shared international interests and human rights. In a December 7, 1988 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Gorbachev remarked on the prospects of a globalized world:

We are witnessing most profound social change. Whether in the East or the South, the West or the North, hundreds of millions of people, new nations and states, new public movements and ideologies have moved to the forefront of history.... The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a powerful socio-political force. At the same time, the scientific and technological revolution has turned many economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population problems, which only recently we treated as national or regional ones, into global problems. Thanks to the advances in mass media and means of transportation, the world seems to have become more visible and tangible.¹³⁶

As the Soviet Union breathed its final breath and Gorbachev made his speech before the U.N., the foundation for globalization was established. Yet, the actual blueprints for one global system remained a topic of debate. The dawn of a new age had seemingly come. However,

¹³⁶ C-SPAN, "December 7, 1988: Gorbachev at the United Nations," accessed on February 15, 2014, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?5292-1/gorbachev-united-nations>.

implementing globalization effectively to the rest of the world would prove to be a much more difficult endeavor, especially when its promoters had slightly varied implementations alongside different desired outcomes.

The idea of American expansionism remained prevalent in the dying days of the Cold War. The United States was more than willing to expand upon this reoccurring central doctrine behind the mask of globalization. The U.S.-traditional emphasis on human rights, individualism, individual freedom, and less government regulations became key issues, which transpired onto the world stage. Moreover, the United States had support from the U.N., its former rival in Russia, and other developed nations around the globe to defend “common interests,” whereby President George H.W. Bush heralded that, “[i]n the pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.”¹³⁷ From this point forward, the United States government, its foreign and domestic alliances, along with other proponents of globalization, had begun to take on the responsibility of developing a policy that would bring about a new world order. This new world order would send shockwaves throughout a Middle Eastern society that was divided between the acceptance of a global doctrine and the rigid boundaries and differences between Muslim ethnicities, national aspirations, and Islamic fundamentalism.

United States foreign policy in the Middle East had altered its course around the time of the Gulf War into one that sought to transform, or evolve, the region in the name of modernity and liberalization. A new trend in foreign policy was brought about with the goal to eventually instill a technologically advanced society and evolve the culture in developing nations around the globe – especially in the Middle East. The Globalization Trend (1991-current) took priority. This trend in United States’ foreign policy has had to change its directive at numerous stages in

¹³⁷ Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress,” http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.

time due to international conflict, while simultaneously retaining its former international relationships. The United States' special alliance with Israel and U.S. big business relationships linked to the Middle Eastern petroleum trade remained relevant factors within American diplomacy. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism, with its crusade against Western culture and its lasting presence in varying regions around the Middle East, had evolved and presented itself as a monumental challenge for American foreign policymakers.

With globalization as the goal for most United States policymakers, foreign policy in the Middle East had retained its familiar historical themes. In recent years, new concerns arose that U.S. officials had to encounter or accept. Four factors stand out as integral parts of the dilemma involved in United States' foreign policy in the region. The first factor for analysis is the special diplomatic relationship that existed between the United States and Israel (1). John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have argued that the special interests that the United States had possessed for Israeli national security and for its overall wellbeing had to change if the course of globalization were to be successful. According to this view, the generous treatment Israel had received over the decades by the United States had to cease if the United States was to move forward with a more progressive, bold, and unilateral policy. This does not mean that the United States had to break off its alliance with Israel, however, the treatment of Israel as a normal international state by the U.S. seemed to be the most logical course of action by advocates of Israeli-Palestinian peace. In addition, "no longer pretending that Israel's and America's interests are identical, or acting as if Israel deserves steadfast U.S. support no matter what it does," had to stop immediately if globalization in the Middle East was to materialize.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 341.

A second factor to contemporary U.S. policy in the Middle East was that petroleum continues to play a major role even as the world becomes more globalized (2). Big business entities and U.S. political leaders understood that Middle Eastern oil reserves and exports affected the global market considerably. For decades, relationships and special interests between U.S. and Gulf oil parties involved in the petroleum trade and other big business activities have grown into a complex and wealthy network, which has generated much wealth and consists of powerful and influential global figures. These American and Muslim individuals involved in the oil business also happened to play an important role in U.S. diplomatic policymaking throughout the decades. For example, upon becoming Vice President under Ronald Reagan in 1981, George H.W. Bush possessed about two decades' worth of experience in the Arab-oil business, in part, by efforts made by his business-savvy father, Prescott Bush. The formation of these business acquaintances and relationships between his offshore oil-drilling business, Zapata Offshore, and "friends along the Gulf Coast" proved to be a monumental strategic advantage for President Bush during his position in the federal government during the 1980s.¹³⁹ Today, innovations in the oil industry, such as the hydro-fracking, willingness by the federal government to approve of modern fracking techniques, and the proposed construction of the Keystone Pipeline in the United States have decreased the dependency the United States has had on Middle Eastern oil exports. This development will be talked about in further detail later in this chapter.

Yet, big business relationships between the Persian Gulf states -- Saudi Arabia being a major player -- and the United States still remains strong and consistent. In addition, capitalist activities such as the world trade for Gulf oil could present the positive global change the U.S. seeks out in globalization. Capitalism and a growth of a modern Arab middle class can serve to

¹³⁹ Kevin Phillips, *American Dynasty*, 154.

decrease fundamentalist social and political ferment as well. Therefore, globalization and the growth of the Middle Eastern peoples' standard of living promises social change and "telling measures of success" to developing nations of the region, which includes clean drinking water, electricity, and reliable transportation.¹⁴⁰ The push by the West for globalization in the Middle East has met very strong resistance. Islamic fundamentalists have long centered their animosities on Western capitalist activities, mainstream Western culture, and Western social behavior, which has fueled their damnations of capitalism and its exploitations of the Middle Eastern labor and its coveted resource. The big business relationships between the Middle East and the West are tangible and will continue to exist. Time will tell if this factor will either aid or hurt the United States' diplomatic mission in the Middle East.

The third factor vital to globalization in the Middle East and the United States' foreign policy in that region is the rising intellectualism and Islamic fundamentalism of the Muslim people (3). The larger the effort the United States has made in democratizing the Middle East, the more resistance the United States has received by acts of terrorism committed by Islamic fundamentalists-turned-extremists. A Western political leader could forecast that if globalization is to be eventually achieved in the Middle East and the overall living conditions for the bulk of the Muslim population improves, Islamic fundamentalism will lose its mass appeal and become a backwards element of the Muslim peoples' past. For example, in 1995 general secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Willem Claes, declared in defense of globalization that, "Islamic fundamentalism [was] at least as dangerous as communism was."¹⁴¹ Forcefully instilling a fast-track plan of globalization in the Middle East through the vehicle of United

¹⁴⁰ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 409.

¹⁴¹ Ray Moseley, "Islam is Not the Threat NATO Makes it Out to Be," *The Chicago Tribune*, February 12, 1995, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-02-12/news/9502120298_1_fundamentalism-islamic-world-islamic-salvation-front.

States' diplomacy, however, would prove not be a wise initiative conducted by U.S. policymakers. The Muslim peoples must accept and desire the modes of modernity that globalization is destined to bring. According to the Iranian intellectual, Vali Nasr:

The prospect of launching... one's society out into the competitive, globalized economy has increased rather than decreased interest in tradition.... In time, the embrace of tradition may give way to a broader and more vigorous movement for reform, but Western efforts to promote reformism are unlikely to be the impetus. Indeed, they may be even counterproductive, feeding fears that the West wants to subvert Islam.¹⁴²

If the United States wishes to implement globalization motives within their foreign policy in the Middle East, then U.S. policymakers must become aware of the parameters, impact, and complex nature in attempting to alter another people's cultural and social identity. Curbing Islamic extremism and terrorism should be of utmost priority today. Moreover, ending the religious tensions and the violence caused by varying ideals of a righteous lifestyle by Muslims will give way to advancements in intellectualism and modernity of their own culture. Yet, the Middle East's path toward globalization must be accepted naturally by the region's population, rather than instilled upon it by foreign entities and unfamiliar institutions of Western society. Additionally, the United States must make a concerted effort to eliminate any element of their Middle Eastern diplomacy that would be viewed as undesirable by the Muslim peoples.

Other developed and developing nations would have to promote and accept the responsibility of globalization as well, since it is to be effectively manifested within the arena of a unified international community (4). This element presents the fourth factor within U.S. foreign policy if it seeks to bring about globalization. Nations with the capabilities to promote and work to bring about modernity and peace in the Middle East -- such as the nations of Western Europe, Japan, Australia, the BRIC countries, and the other developed nations around

¹⁴² Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 184.

the world – must align themselves on a certain path and work to aid developing the nations of the Middle East into a global system. The United States cannot lead the path toward globalization alone. Desired change will not come to fruition if the United States acts as the sole provider of this global doctrine. “America has still to give a meaningful definition to its role in the world, one that transcends the conflicting pulls of globalization, democracy, and preponderant power.”¹⁴³ The United States will be faced with a challenge in the days ahead. The U.S. must decide whether or not to follow its own engineered course of globalization evolved from American expansionism, or to unite in an international coalition (Perhaps allying themselves with other U.N. member nations) to establish globalization initiatives in the developing Middle Eastern countries.

U.S. Globalization Policy before 9/11

As the United States entered the decade of the 1990s, the federal government began to alter its course in its implementation of foreign policy in the Middle East. It seemed apparent that the Soviet Union would soon crumble and the U.S.-U.N. coalition against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait would more than likely end in Iraqi withdrawal or surrender. It was during these sequences of events and in this timeframe that the George H.W. Bush Administration and its international alliances formulated a plan of action in carrying out a foreign policy that fostered globalization. A policy that was heralded by the developed nations of the West would be met with great resistance from theocratic and secular leaders of the developing Middle

¹⁴³ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 135.

Eastern nations however. Fundamentalist Muslims from varied regions around the Middle East would greet globalization with animosity as well.

Although many intellectuals and secularists from the Middle East welcomed the Western initiative with open arms, many of them were either silenced, fled their home country in exile, or were assassinated. For the most part, their viewpoints of condemning Islamic fundamentalism and its crippling effects on Muslim social advancement was more than enough reason for rigid political and religious leaders to rid these individuals from Middle Eastern society. An outspoken Egyptian critic and editorialist, Farag Foda, was assassinated in 1992 by *al-Jihad* for his criticisms against Islamic fundamentalism and his support for globalization's promises of bringing about positive change. For example, Foda claimed that Islamic fundamentalist political movements in Egypt during the early 1990s, "compelled the young and inexperienced to drop out of university because its modern sciences [were] secular," yet, according to Foda, Islam had always been, "a religion of knowledge and wisdom."¹⁴⁴ Likewise, Iranian reformer Abdul-Karim Soroush advocated a "Protestant version of Islam" in his native country, free from the confines of strict fundamentalist leadership. He used modern technology and rationalism to his advantage in pioneering a trend of Islam that would submit to democracy, universal social norms, and pluralism during the 1990s. However by end of the decade, Soroush fled in exile to the United States once he came under siege by the Iranian theocratic government and Ansar-e-Hizbullah vigilante groups who supported the Ayatollah.¹⁴⁵

Throughout the decade of the 1990s, there were many other Islamic reformers throughout the Middle East who supported a more secularist form of government alongside a progressive version of Islam. Simultaneously, Islamic fundamentalism remained strong and had gained

¹⁴⁴ Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 352-4.

¹⁴⁵ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 186-8.

momentum within the Middle Eastern populations because of the settlement of Western influence in the region. Muslim populations across the Middle East viewed U.S. foreign policy in the region as a threat to their way of life due to ignorance and the condemnation of Western society as claimed by influential religious clerics. The United States continued to channel military personnel and resources into the Middle East before, during, and after the First Gulf War. In fact, the U.S. flow of armaments into the region since the early 1970s, which was “menaced by religious and resource conflicts,” only created more hardship for the U.S. in dealing with its attempt to globalize the Middle East.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the U.S. presence in the Muslim Holy Land around Mecca and Medina during the First Cold War stirred tempers even more. This dilemma would manifest into a hatred aimed at the U.S. that was harbored by Islamic fundamentalists and ultra-conservative sects of Islam. The hatred exhibited by these Muslims patented itself into acts of terror and violence against Americans at home and abroad by fundamentalists-turned extremists in the coming days and years.

Animosities between the United States and Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalists increased following the First Gulf War’s conclusion in 1991. U.S. foreign policymakers began to adapt security measures against the growing number of Muslim extremists. Moreover, Israel was under similar circumstances as it began to witness a newfound and resurrected hatred by its surrounding and internal Muslim populations. According to Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman, just a few months following Saddam Hussein’s defeat, Baghdad reportedly became a sanctuary and home for Islamic terrorist organizations, including “members of Abu Abbas’, the

¹⁴⁶ Phillips, *American Dynasty*, 247-8.

Palestine Liberation Front and the Arab Liberation front.”¹⁴⁷ The United States’ government, alongside the Israeli government, developed a grave concern toward national security interests in the Middle East by defending themselves against Islamic radicals. In light of the supposed Iranian-backed terrorist attack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the United States government had a newfound sense of awareness in managing, battling, and “preventing loss of [American] life and limb” due to Islamic terrorist actions against the United States, Israel, and its Western allies.¹⁴⁸ By 1994, under the direction of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. federal government had provided approximately \$5.2 billion in economic and military aid to Middle Eastern nations – the top three recipients of this aid money included Israel, Egypt, and Jordan in that order -- in an attempt to bring about social peace, economic reform, and to curtail Islamic extremist activities.¹⁴⁹ Additionally in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, which in recognition to the benign gesture by Jordan’s government, President Clinton asked Congress to forgive Jordan’s \$702.3 million debt to the United States.¹⁵⁰

The Israeli government had taken similar actions to deter terrorism. But Israel’s government had received tremendous help from the American government in doing so. Dating back to the 1979 Camp David Accords, where a peace treaty was founded between U.S.

¹⁴⁷ Joseph Lieberman, “Terrorism: Interagency Conflicts in Combating International Terrorism,” *Committee on Governmental Affairs: United States Senate, July 15, 1991* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), 2.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁴⁹ Warren Christopher, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations,” *Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 206.

¹⁵⁰ Jeremy M. Sharp and the U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request,” *Congressional Research Service, 2009* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 22, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CE0QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpc.state.gov%2Fdocuments%2Forgaization%2F128331.pdf&ei=641IU-r9Go_LsQTiroKQDw&usg=AFQjCNF3ggiCuaSJTj1w1OeoI5yQZ390Bg.

President Carter, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Israel and Egypt both initially received \$7.3 billion in economic and military grants. Those two nations have been steady, and the two pinnacle recipients for that matter, of U.S. aid money channeled into the Middle East since the Camp David Peace Treaty.¹⁵¹ In 1994 alone, the United States granted Israel an estimated \$3 billion dollars in military and economic aid in, “reaffirming solid United States’ support for Israel’s security and for Israel’s qualitative edge,” as indicated by Neal Sher, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).¹⁵² U.S. policymakers viewed Israel’s national security and U.S. national security against the threat of Islamic-fueled terrorism as one in the same. Yet since the days following Israel’s birth -- amplified following the wars of the late 1970s -- U.S. support for, and aid to, Israel has steadily increased over the years. The U.S. backing of Israel has, indeed, done more harm than benefit to both nations’ security interests and has only stunted the development of globalization in the Middle East. The U.S. foreign aid policy to Israel has, consequently, led to radicalization among the Palestinians and increased Palestinian resentment toward Israeli and U.S. efforts to keep Palestine’s national aspirations at bay.¹⁵³ This fact had presented itself since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, where Egypt, Palestine, and Syria attempted to capture territories believed to be theirs. Overwhelming United States’ support for Israel over the span of decades has adversely affected the globalization process, especially once the Cold War came to its conclusion. The current of bitterness held by the Muslim world and Muslim extremists persisted and manifested itself into tangible terrorist activities with an eye toward Western targets.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 21.

¹⁵² Neal Sher, “Statement of Neal Sher, Executive Director, American Israel Public Affairs Committee,” *Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 918.

¹⁵³ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 16-7.

Alongside the supposed Iranian involvement in the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy, the United States witnessed Islamic-spawned terrorism on its own soil. On February 26, 1993, Ramzi Yousef and fellow members of *al-Qaeda* planted and detonated a truck bomb underneath the northern tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Although the ultimate plan in collapsing the tower failed, the bomb killed six people and injured thousands of others, and would later prove to be a “deadly dress rehearsal” to the more catastrophic attacks at the same location on September 11, 2001.¹⁵⁴ The United States appeared to have an enemy that was not afraid to attack U.S. targets at home or abroad. Moreover, terrorism in the name of Islamic extremist motives continued to haunt and stall the United States’ attempts at waging a globalist agenda. It became apparent to U.S. policymakers that this enemy needed to be eliminated completely, or substantially, if globalization was to be established in the Middle East. Every time an American person or object became a victim of Islamic terrorism, the United States encountered a setback in their diplomatic aspirations. Policymakers became reactionary instead of proactive in attempting to destroy anti-American extremism in order to accomplish its goal of globalization. The constant targeting of American passenger airlines abroad, combined with the first World Trade Center attack in the early 1990s, ignited an uphill battle that needed to be won against the waves of Islamic fundamentalism if globalization in the Middle East was to succeed. National security became an issue of primary concern for the United States government. Developed nations’ pathway to instill democracy in the Middle East encountered a major obstacle that needed to be removed.

The United States persistently took measures to implant democracy in the Middle East during the 1990s. Democratic values were viewed synonymous with globalization by globalists

¹⁵⁴ The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “First Strike: Global Terror in America,” accessed on February 22, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.

around the globe who pushed for human rights and individual freedom. In pursuing these reforms, a strong resistance formed from within the region's conservative population sects and areas inhabited by Islamic fundamentalists. In a constant battle against traditional Muslims who were uneager to cut ties with their cultural and religious foundations, U.S. officials knew that it needed to retain their presence in the Middle East. The lasting petroleum relationship between business and political parties from the U.S. and various Middle Eastern entities seemed to exhibit itself as an advantage to U.S. foreign policy goals. U.S. foreign policymakers believed that as long as oil flowed in and out of the Middle East, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Israel remained healthy and protected, the United States government maintained its other Middle Eastern alliances, continued to import an ever so important energy resource, and upheld civil reform, globalization would eventually materialize. Religious fundamentalism, as U.S. officials began to view it, could not stand in the way of the waves of universal big business activities and global order.

But religious freedom was not tolerated by many Middle Eastern leaders, including friends of the United States. In the early-mid 1990s, the *Mutawwa'in* (the Monarchy's secret religious police in Saudi Arabia) sought out anti-Sunni activities. Hidden church services were discovered and dismantled, and its members were arrested, and some even executed, for practices of religious extremism among the millions of Filipinos, Korean, and other foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. This was done by the Saudi government in order to discourage others from taking up other unwanted activities, and prevent these individuals from abandoning their position as foreign contractors employed in the Saudi oil industry.¹⁵⁵ The abuse of civil and

¹⁵⁵ Phillips, *American Dynasty*, 235.

human rights by the Saudi government has only recently, under the Obama Administration, taken a position of importance in the layout of U.S.-Saudi relations.

For the developed world to enter the age of globalization, the economy and economic resources needed to become vast and evolved; a world where international business relationships were encouraged and necessary for the advancement of a global marketplace. If an increase in universal free trade occurred more frequently, perhaps vast economic development would prove to escalate globalization's culmination sooner than later. Therefore, according to U.S. officials and policymakers, the encouragement of business activities with Islamic entities in the Middle East was seen as a benefactor to globalization's cause. As George H.W. Bush exited the Oval Office in 1993 and William Clinton entered as the next American president, he too supported an international business community. Unlike the Bush families' lasting business venture with Gulf petroleum and relationship with foreign oil companies, Clinton promoted "free markets" and "strategic trade" as an essential objective to American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.¹⁵⁶ The Bush connection to Gulf oil was originally pursued for strictly monetary reasons first, which became a political matter once the Bush family grew prominent on the American political stage. President Clinton, on the other hand, used this relationship as a political strategy to promote globalization. Worldwide trade and the international business community working in accord was necessary if the globalization system was to emerge. The continuing petroleum trade with Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia was an encouraging sign for globalization as seen by U.S. policymakers. Also, working to compliment Israel's best interests in the name of democracy was seen as a benefactor to globalization.

¹⁵⁶ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 376.

However, in order for globalization to work, and for the free flow of goods and services across national boundaries to become established practice, peace and cordial communication needed to exist between different cultures and societies. The Arab League boycott of American and Israeli products, which had officially existed since the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, posed as an obstacle against globalization and Western efforts to implement free trade in the region. Throughout the Cold War, the Middle Eastern Muslim community, especially the Palestinians, kept its stance of not doing business with Israel in an attempt to isolate Israel economically; Palestinians and Arab alliances also discouraged other nations around the world from adding to Israel's economic and military strength. Once globalization came to the forefront of American diplomacy in the 1990s, U.S. foreign policymakers made a serious push to end this boycott.

The economic relationship between the Muslim Middle Eastern states and the United States became even more fragile once the Saudi oil giant, Aramco, absorbed the state marketing and refining company Samerac, which became the world's largest fully integrated oil company at the time.¹⁵⁷ U.S. officials understood that if they wished to hold onto a degree of influence in Middle Eastern economic matters, they needed to persuade Middle Eastern political and economic leaders that distancing itself from international business was detrimental to globalization and disadvantageous to the Palestinian and Arab communities engaged in the boycott. By the mid-1990s, government officials in Washington understood that a positive resolution to end the Arab League boycott needed to come to fruition. In November, 1994, a resolution was introduced by New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg in Congress, along with seven other U.S. senators, to urge President Clinton and his Secretary of State, Warren

¹⁵⁷ Michigan State University, "Saudi Arabia: Economy," *global EDGE*, accessed on February 23, 2014, <http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/saudi-arabia/economy>.

Christopher, to find a “forceful” end to the boycott and demanded that the, “Arab League... put the diplomatic chess board away, take a confidence-building step, and support the peace process by dismantling the boycott.”¹⁵⁸ Although Lautenberg’s tone had suggested that the United States would remain strong alongside its longtime ally in Israel, the United States seemingly encouraged the positive flow of international, capitalist trade within and outside of the Middle East.

Capitalism, as it appeared to U.S. policymakers, was a vital tool that the United States used in order to bring about globalization to the developing world. Following victory against Iraq in 1991, and later following the 2003 campaign, America eliminated one of the hostile and major military powers of the Gulf region (Iran being another major military threat) at the time. The U.S. victory “firmly established the United States as the sole external arbiter in the area.”¹⁵⁹ It was to nobody’s surprise that U.S. power globally, and its stationary placement with Middle Eastern affairs, proved too much for Muslim leadership to contend against. The boycott, which had existed for about five decades prior, finally ended following the Oslo Peace Accords where Arab states within the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)¹⁶⁰ withdrew their participation from the boycott. The boycott not only failed at dissolving Israel’s economic strength and cohesion with outside markets, but it negatively impacted the Arab states’ economy by limiting trade activities

¹⁵⁸ Frank Lautenberg, *Arab League Boycott*, accessed on November 20, 1993, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin /query /D?r103:30:./temp/~r103vRQ14c::>

¹⁵⁹ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 69.

¹⁶⁰ The Gulf Cooperation Council, which was explained briefly in the previous chapter, was a council made up of Arab Gulf States, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. The objective of this organization, in which its member states share common characteristics and systems founded on the creed of Islam, is to act as one power in reinforcing and serving the Arab and Islamic causes.

and the diversity of products and competition within their own markets.¹⁶¹ The end of the boycott signaled a positive step toward globalization in the Middle East for U.S. officials. Lebanon and Syria remained decisive in prolonging their economic crusade against Israel however. As for the GCC nations, the end of the boycott manifested softening tensions against its Jewish neighbor and an increase in economic activity across national borders.

Ethnic tensions between Muslims and the Jewish inhabitants of Israel played out in the background regarding U.S. foreign policy and its quest for international peace and cooperation during the bulk of the twentieth century's final decade. Hundreds of miles northwest of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, a serious military crisis unfolded. From 1992 until 1999, the Balkan states of southeastern Europe encountered violent political and ethnic turmoil that the U.S. and its NATO and UN allies intervened in. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and its control over the Eastern Bloc in 1991, Balkan society faced numerous issues over how to govern its own ethnic populations while silencing its political dissidents. When Macedonian, Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenians attempted to declare independence from Yugoslavia, which was controlled by communist and Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, a civil war ignited. The "ethnic cleansing" committed by Milosevic's Serbian forces on the Muslim populations in Bosnia drew in American, U.N., and NATO forces to the conflict in an attempt to settle a peace arrangement five months after the war began. UN and NATO intervention, initially, was weak until much later in the conflict. In 1996, it was revealed that a Croatian

¹⁶¹ Joyce Sharon, "The Arab Boycott Against Israel and its Unintended Impact on Arab Economic Welfare" (MA thesis, The Fletcher School at Tufts University, 2003), 34-9.

soldier pled guilty in an International Criminal Tribunal to executing more than 1,000 Muslim civilians in Bosnia.¹⁶²

However, these acts of genocide, and the Serbian individuals who committed these atrocities, went unpunished by the international community. Slobodan Milosevic was eventually arrested by Yugoslavian authorities in March, 2001, on charges of embezzlement, political corruption, and abuse of power. He was then tried by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague on charges of genocide and other various war crimes.¹⁶³ He died in a prison cell in The Hague during his five year-long trial, which ended with no verdict given. The United States and 40 other nations pledged, at a special summit conference in July, 1999, to work for stability and prosperity in the Balkans after a decade marked by unrelenting war.¹⁶⁴ The accounts of Muslim genocide committed by Yugoslavian soldiers, though, have yet to be confirmed by the United Nations and the United States alongside much controversy. This occurrence, along with other historical events that involved violence against Muslim peoples in the Middle East, has added to the amplified Islamic resentment toward the West in recent years. It seemed that if Muslims, in general, came under attack and became victims of war and violence, the United States and the West became the suspects of blame.

Middle Eastern Muslims are no strangers to acts of violence, and have been victims of war and genocide in previous decades. But whether the violence is instigated and acted out by other Muslim sects and their secular leaders, or by infidels foreign to the Middle East has been an ongoing debate; one which has presented numerous accounts of misinformation and biased

¹⁶² "Time Lines: Balkans, 1940s to 1999," The Washington Post Online, 2000, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/timeline.htm>.

¹⁶³ Stephen Frazier and Alessio Vinci, "Breaking News: Slobodan Milosovic to Stand Trial in Serbia," CNN News Transcript, accessed on March 31, 2014, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0103/31/bn.03.html>.

¹⁶⁴ "Time Lines: Balkans, 1940s to 1999," The Washington Post, 2000.

accounts of these atrocities. What is reality and what is perception has become the ongoing question of this issue. Phillip Crowley, former spokesperson for ex-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, stated that since the 1980s, “more and more casualties [have been] inflicted by Muslims against Muslims,” but the prevailing narrative held by the Islamic extremists today has been the “faithful waging war against crusaders.”¹⁶⁵ It seemed evident that throughout the 1990s, unfortunate undertakings like the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia by non-Muslims were perceived by Islamic fundamentalists as conspired attacks by non-Muslims on Muslims in whole. This notion was not taken lightly by Islamic fundamentalists, and caused more harm to the perception of the West. In fact, it spurred future terrorist attacks on Western targets. Since 1980, it is a presumed belief held by the West and the U.N. that a little more than four-million Muslims have been killed by non-Muslims, including the Soviet forces who murdered millions of Muslims during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. However, Western forces have done very little, in reality, in contributing to the large number of Muslims killed by non-Muslims.¹⁶⁶ Whether this fact is based on real evidence or it is based on speculation, the reality is that millions of Muslims have fallen victim to conflicts imposed on them by forces distant from Muslim society. Steven Simon, the former head of the Middle East Desk on the National Security Council, stated: “Nonetheless, the perception that non-Muslim global powers are targeting Islam has become so widely accepted in the Arab world and beyond that it is now a consideration in U.S. foreign policy.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ “How Millions of Muslim Deaths Feed the Cycle of Terrorism,” NBC News, October 21, 2013, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/how-millions-violent-muslim-deaths-feed-cycle-terrorism-v21026837>.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

In the closing years of the twentieth century, the United States and the United Nations sustained a policy that encouraged economic growth and activity within the Middle Eastern social landscape where Islamic fundamentalism ran amuck, opposing the Western modes of change. Islamic fundamentalism and the juxtaposed religious rift between itself and Judaism, however, have remained obstacles for overall economic, social, and political progress. As long as popular conceptions existed that framed the United States and its global alliances as perpetrators and enemies of Islam who were more than willing to murder Muslims, the hatred would persist toward America and its globalization mission. Non-Muslims worldwide became the potential targets of Islamic radicals – especially those affiliated with the West in some way or another. Prominent Islamic clerics today, such as Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have consistently preached against Israel, encouraging suicide bombings against Israelis, and regularly upholding his fatwas, “urging Muslims to avoid contact with Israel.”¹⁶⁸ The persistent and staunch attitudes of religious fundamentalism will remain an absolute deterrent to globalization’s formulation and growth. The United States has worked tediously to end these misconceptions held onto by the fundamentalist Muslim populations of the Middle East through the valid media campaigns in the Middle East. However, these flawed ideas remain vibrant in the minds of Islamic fundamentalists. U.S. policymakers have come to recognize that constructing a policy to battle this mislead logic has become a vital component of U.S. foreign policy.

Hope in ending Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East came into existence during the final decade of the twentieth century. This hope came in the form of an emerging Muslim middle class, a rise of capitalism, and an increase in global trade within the Middle Eastern

¹⁶⁸ Edward Husain, “End the Arab Boycott of Israel,” *The New York Times*, March 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/opinion/global/end-the-arab-boycott-of-israel.html?_r=0.

marketplace. Advocates who believe that capitalism and a free market could bring the Middle East out of a fundamentalist mind frame include prominent political officials and academic theorists, like former President William Clinton, CFR member and academic Vali Nasr, economic historian Daniel Yergin, and Edward Djerejian, formerly a key official in the U.S. Department of State.¹⁶⁹ This encouraging development has grown more prominent upon the stage of Middle Eastern affairs today. But in order for this development to give way to globalization and modernity, the founding doctrine of theological authority and secular power must be analyzed to determine if secular rulers and Islamic clerics are open to the idea and promises of a globalized world brought together by a global marketplace. Beside the point, many Muslim extremists who resided in the poorest regions of the Middle East never encountered or experienced these encouraging economic activities. Islamic fundamentalism remained a force to be reckoned with as terrorist cells began to form and conspire raids against the West.

As the year 2000 approached, Islamic fundamentalism remained alive amongst Arab, Chechen, Palestinian, Afghan, and Bosnian populations. The Middle East, as a whole, had a small middle class, conflicts within the interpretation of Islam and conflicts between Shia Muslims and their secular rulers, which included the conflict between the Saudi royalty and its Shia subjects, proved to be factors that fueled Islamic extremist activity. Only small pockets around the Middle East have experienced the waves of globalization. The city of Dubai, by 2010 for example, increased its GDP 267 percent since 1995, and has rivaled the splendor of other

¹⁶⁹ Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Poverty and Defeating Militant Islam," *Gatestone Institute: International Policy Council*, December 6, 2010, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1713/poverty-militant-islam>.

major world cities such as Shanghai and New York City.¹⁷⁰ This encouraging sign could be viewed today as a positive sign of globalization and its appearance and expansion into Middle Eastern society. Yet, if one travelled just several miles across the Arab deserts or the Persian Gulf waters, one could witness the poverty and social disparity of many within the region who view Islam as a staple of existence. Islamic fundamentalists, especially the Shia Muslims, viewed, and continue to view globalization as a deep-rooted enemy to their political, social, cultural, and religious values. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalists, and consequently the terrorist organizations tied to this brand of religious fundamentalism, would come to interpret globalization as an American invasion of Muslim life – a redundant theme pioneered by Iranian revolutionaries of the late 1970s who dubbed the United States and its former imperialistic motives with Iranian oil as the “Great Satan.”¹⁷¹ It was believed by Islamic fundamentalists, such as Osama bin Laden in 1998, that the United States had, “spearheaded the crusade against the Islamic nation.... [And offered] support to the Jews in Palestine who are in need of their Christian brothers to achieve full control over the Arabian Peninsula.”¹⁷² The leader of the terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, and eventual mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Osama bin Laden and his fellow Shia brethren truly convinced themselves that they were fighting a jihad against the evil mechanisms of the West. They turned to guerilla warfare tactics against Western forces and targets to defend Islamic life in the name of Allah.¹⁷³ Globalization filled these Islamic extremists with feelings of paranoia over the future survival of their own culture, and spurred them to greet this liberal development with much hostility. The United

¹⁷⁰ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 29.

¹⁷¹ Abbas Milani, *The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America's Relations with Iran* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution at Leland Stanford Junior University Press, 2010), 32.

¹⁷² Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 360.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 359.

States' government and its foreign policymakers had a revitalized foreign enemy that was determined to wage an all-out holy war against the West by the late 1990s.

The United States suddenly became aware that the global terrorism front was a very serious concern regarding national security. A June, 2000 National Commission on Terrorism¹⁷⁴ report advised members of Congress on combating and countering the changing threat Islamic radicals posed on the United States at home and abroad. Following the arrest by a Customs Agent at the U.S.-Canadian border of Ahmed Ressam, an Islamic radical who had conspired to perform a terrorist bombing of a millennial celebration in the United States, the commission created a report to advise U.S. government officials on the evolutionary motives, techniques, ideologies, and adaptations used by international terrorists.¹⁷⁵ With al-Qaeda highlighted as the prominent threat to U.S. national security, members of the commission evaluated and warned U.S. officials that terrorism had become more dynamic at home and abroad. Terrorists had adapted to the modern times, and had become, "less dependent on state sponsors, were harder to disrupt with economic sanctions, objectives more deadly," and made effective "use of widely available technologies to communicate quickly and securely."¹⁷⁶

What appeared evident was that the United States had a gigantic problem that needed to be confronted immediately. As long as leaders of the United States were committed to carrying on their agenda of globalization, terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists needed to be silenced and

¹⁷⁴ Also known as the Bremer Commission (named after Ambassador L. Paul Bremer who served as chairman), the National Commission on Terrorism was a report furnished in June, 2000 for the U.S. Congress. The report's purpose was to present the increasing dangers international terrorism, in general, posed on the United States. In addition, the report presented data on how to seek out and combat international terrorism, as well as confronting states that supported and harbored terrorist organizations.

¹⁷⁵ The National Commission on Terrorism, "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism," *106th Congress, House Document* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), 12-3.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

destroyed in the process. But how were U.S. leaders going to carry out their plan to combat this evasive and covert enemy? Efforts by U.S. intelligence agencies to combat international terrorist organizations begun immediately in 2000, but it was too little, too late for government officials once September 11, 2001 approached, arrived, and passed. The massive terrorist attacks spearheaded by Osama bin Laden and his group of jihad extremists, *al-Qaeda*, wreaked havoc on United States' society. It became quickly clear to newly elected President George W. Bush, his administration, and other government officials of the day that 9/11 was a game-changer to foreign policy in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda, its Islamic jihad against the West, and Osama bin Laden became a household name in the United States. Foreign policy was altered to fight a foreign enemy, rather than encourage globalization's growth in the Middle East.

Al-Qaeda's origins could be traced back to a meeting between the wealthy Arab bin Laden, Egyptian militant Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Cairo intellectual Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, held in Peshawar, Pakistan.¹⁷⁷ Al-Qaeda's history, however, could be traced back to the Carter Administration's anti-Soviet policies in the Middle East during the late 1970s. Once the first Gulf War begun, bin Laden offered his Mujahideen forces to the Saudi monarchy to help defend the kingdom against Saddam Hussein's potentially dangerous military forces. However, the House of Saud declined bin Laden's offer, and invited U.S. forces, instead, on the Muslim Holy Land, which deeply angered the al-Qaeda founder.¹⁷⁸ From that point forward, al-Qaeda began to attack Western targets and any target that was Sunni or secular for example, which affiliated or befriended itself with the West.

¹⁷⁷ Andrew Wander, "A History of Terror: Al-Qaeda 1988-2008," *The Observer*, July 12, 2008, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida>.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Once 9/11 became a reality, al-Qaeda appeared to have upped the ante by taking the battle to the American homeland. The collapse of the World Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon, and the scores of Americans killed on domestic soil, had altered the course of foreign policy in the Middle East which the United States had abided by since 1991. In response to this tragedy, President Bush would wage a war against the terrorists and any Middle Eastern nation that harbored members of al-Qaeda, weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, or any other related terrorist organizations for that matter. Americans at home would experience a trade-off between their personal freedoms for security, and the Middle Eastern landscape would come to experience drastic violence, warfare, and social and political upheaval.

The direction of U.S. foreign policy altered its course, initiated by the George W. Bush Administration, following 9/11 to a resurgence of American interest, military forces, resources, and aid into and with the Middle East. A pro-Israeli policy surfaced once again between the United States and Israel – begrudgingly by George W. Bush who came under attack by pro-Israel lobbyists, the mainstream media, and other government officials initially for his withdrawal of foreign investment and minimal support for America’s longtime ally. In the aftermath of the 2001 tragedy, the U.S.-Israeli diplomatic relationship became very erratic, as President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon either totally disagreed or strongly agreed with each other on issues concerning the “Arab-Islamic world” -- in spite of the fact that the United States had longed “adopted many of Israel’s justifications for these [anti-Palestinian, anti-Iranian, anti-Arab, and anti-Shia] policies.”¹⁷⁹ The Sunni and secular governments of the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, once again became an important ally to the United States beginning in 2001 as they had been during the First Gulf War. The United States, involved in a military

¹⁷⁹ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 202.

conflict following the catastrophic terrorist attack on their own soil, renewed its view that the petroleum resources and political assistance of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were vital in fighting Islamic terrorism in the Middle East. Surely, the Bush family found its oil-based relationship with the Royal al-Saud family helpful to U.S. diplomatic objectives, uniting to defeat the extremist Muslim populations of the region.

As mentioned previously, the rise of the Islamic middle class, Arab intellectualism, and the increase in capitalism within Middle Eastern society held the key to defeating Islamic extremism. Once the Muslim world came to view economic progress as an improvement to their own selves, culture, and society, they would come to view Islamic fundamentalists as backwards and corrupt element of their society. Globalization, and the prospects of its regional reforms on Muslim society, promised to cement a legacy of global harmony through an integrated marketplace and bring an end to the ultra-conservative and outdated customs and beliefs that Islamic fundamentalism encompassed. However, “[r]eform is more likely to come when Muslims by and large begin to believe that it would play a role in solving the problems they want solved.”¹⁸⁰

Globalization Policy Following the September 11th Attacks: Old Habits in a New Era

The infamy of the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States proved to alter the entire dynamic of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. With thousands of American citizens killed in the terrorist attacks that wreaked havoc in New York City, Washington D.C.,

¹⁸⁰ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 186-7.

and rural Pennsylvania, perceptions of Arab Muslims would forever be altered by the millions of people who lived outside of the Middle East. Not only had the United States underestimated their vulnerability to the serious violence and disorder caused by Islamic extremists, but the economic and political elite of the United States were forced to revise their strategy of engagement and diplomacy with entities from the Islamic society as well. The Bush Administration's globalization policy, as it would come to be following the 9/11 catastrophe, contained elements of an exclusively American-Christian crusade against Islamic fundamentalism, while undermining the natural social growth of Middle Eastern society. If many Middle Eastern peoples viewed the U.S. in an unfavorable light before September 11th, this perception was only magnified through the measures of a revised U.S. policy. The United States embarked on a mission against the malevolent Islamic radicals and the regimes that fostered these terrorist organizations responsible for 9/11. In later months, the U.S. would confront any Middle Eastern entity that opposed U.S. policy – including Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the PLO.

Just two months following the 9/11 attacks, the World Trade Organization (WTO) held a summit in Doha, the capital city of Qatar. The World Trade Organization “is the international organization whose primary purpose is to open trade for the benefit of all.”¹⁸¹ This organization's member body, made up mostly of political leaders and economists, includes 159 nations, in which “117 are developing countries or separate customs territories.”¹⁸² With tight security measures and protestors running amuck in the streets of Doha - condemning the trade ministers, their delegation, and representatives of various international organizations of the WTO of selling out individual freedoms and liberties of people around the world – the socio-economic aspect of

¹⁸¹ The World Trade Organization, “About the WTO — A statement by former Director-General Pascal Lamy,” *About the WTO*, accessed on April 11, 2014, http://www.wto.org/english/hewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm.

¹⁸² Ibid.

globalization became the primary topic of debate at the conference.¹⁸³ In light of the newfound anxiety over international terrorism, the members of the WTO agreed that if globalization was to proceed as originally planned, failure in implementing its security and survival measures was not an option. The delegates of the WTO summit in Doha, moreover, needed to rebuild the confidence of the global marketplace during the final quarter of 2001, when it “was essential to heading off a deep and protracted global recession.”¹⁸⁴

For the United States, it was necessary for the political and economic elite to consider an innovative and updated foreign policy to deal with the abrupt changes it faced. The special U.S. alliance with Israel, the economic investment the United States had with the Middle East – specifically regarding the Gulf States’ petroleum resources - were important aspects considered in the ever-changing dynamic of the world’s political climate and U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. The rapid current of Islamic fundamentalism, and relatedly, extremism – as well as the Islamic extremists’ agenda to halt efforts of globalization - were obstacles that U.S. policymakers had to manage in their revision of foreign policy. The end of the Cold War brought about the mission to involve the Middle East within the structure of globalization. Efforts were made throughout the 1990s and up through the millennium and beyond to implement a system of global assimilation. However, 9/11 had caused a serious setback to U.S. foreign policy goals. It became quickly apparent that United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East was about to undergo some minor and major adjustments to its longtime and existing relationships, and to its overall objective of globalization in the Middle East.

The September 11th attacks by Islamic radicals did little overall in changing the special relationship shared by Israel and the United States. In fact, once the United States declared war

¹⁸³ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 379.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 380.

against Afghanistan and global terrorism in late 2001, the U.S.-Israel bond became much stronger because of an increased and synchronized need to diminish Islamic extremist forces in the name of national security. If the alliance between the two nations was ever so strong before the tragedy, it became even more solidified soon thereafter. Israel had always been a strategic asset to the U.S. in the Middle East since its birth in 1948. In the age of globalization, the United States could not afford to favor one ethnic group or culture over another – which included the contrast between Jewish and Arab cultures – especially in the socially turbulent Middle East. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, advocated that as time progresses toward global hegemony, “the American mosaic could become a contest among groups, each of which will claim (and try to assert) its special expertise, as well as its right, to define policy in a universe of conflicting foreign interests.”¹⁸⁵ Globalization will, in fact, break down cultural favoritism and ethnic barriers in return for global hegemony. If globalization is to breach Middle Eastern society, containing a variety of Muslim and Jewish ethnicities, the United States cannot favor Israeli interests over the interests of, per se, Sunni Arabs. Globalization not only tested the United States’ ability to develop a policy that is bilateral and universal, but one that was fair and balanced across national boundaries as well.

However, numerous sources and primary evidence indicated that the United States heavily favored the Israeli position on political matters in the Middle East following 9/11. Even when policy was directed toward an issue involving the Arab world, Israel remained an integral player in determining solutions and outcomes of those Middle Eastern diplomatic issues. Tremendous support for Israel’s prominence by large portions of the American domestic population and special interest groups continued to play a major role in persuading policymaking

¹⁸⁵ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 196-7.

and decisions directed toward Middle Eastern diplomacy. This development remained a prominent and deciding factor in recent years during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies regarding Middle Eastern policy. It could be argued that since Israel's creation following the Second World War, the United States always aligned itself with Israel's goals and purpose, no matter at what diplomatic cost or price. The question moving forward was to decide on what stance the United States took toward Israel's national interests in the ongoing efforts for Middle Eastern peace and globalization.

Upon oil's discovery in the earliest years of the twentieth century by imperialist nations and companies from those nations – including the United States, the Middle East had quickly developed into a region of utmost economic importance to global society. The petroleum trade between the producing Arab states and consumer markets, such as the United States, had been a pivotal episode in global affairs ever since. As recently as 2013, 13 percent of U.S. total gross oil imports came from Saudi Arabia. In addition, “net imports from OPEC countries accounted for 55% of U.S. total net imports” that year.¹⁸⁶ After 9/11, this oil trade, in order to meet global demands, had to remain in existence between the U.S. and the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. Big business and the political elite had a major stake in this economic development, and Islamic extremism was certainly not going to pose a threat to this decades-old relationship. Plus, Saudi assistance and help from the surrounding Gulf states became essential for the United States in managing its war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the light of globalization, the petroleum trade remained a vital topic of debate. The extraction of resources from the sands of countries like Saudi Arabia, and the injection of those

¹⁸⁶ U.S. Energy Information Administration, “How much petroleum does the United States import and from where?,” *EIA*, last updated June 3, 2013, <http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=727&t=6>.

resources into the global marketplace, fueled the Islamic fundamentalist anger toward the West. Yet, Gulf oil was so vital to the livelihood of all developed and developing nations of the Gulf and other parts of the globe, as well as to the overall well-being of the global capitalist system. For example, in 2009, Chinese imports of Saudi Arabian petroleum exceeded those of the United States for the first time in history.¹⁸⁷ Globalization had forced Middle Eastern nations, “to address aspects of their past that had long been ignored or hidden.... Such problems will continue to vex scholars for years to come as the Gulf diversifies economically and becomes a region in which oil will play a significant but less vital role over time.”¹⁸⁸ Saudi Arabia, more specifically, will have to consider its own national security measures in the midst of the flexing of Iranian power and the momentous Arab Spring revolutions which have now found a place in plunging Syria into civil chaos. Will Middle Eastern society accept its new responsibilities within the scheme of globalization in return for modernity and democratic values, or will the animosities held by Islamic peoples toward the West’s petroleum needs plunge the region further into an arena of conflict and chaos?

George W. Bush’s Policy Surrounding Gulf Oil and Israel

Just a few months following George W. Bush’s ascent to the Oval Office, newly appointed Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In his speech, he detailed the new administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East and its dedication to globalization. Powell was adamant about reducing the hostility

¹⁸⁷ Yousef Gamal El-din, “Do Saudis have a New Best Friend? Don’t Bet on it,” CNBC News, November 11, 2013, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/101179670>.

¹⁸⁸ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 9.

exerted by regimes in places like Iraq and Iran – the reinstatement of a dual-containment policy, and additionally, weakening Russia’s aggressive push on the region’s political structure. The central goal of the administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East was, “the need to consult and work closely with friends and allies...” such as Israel.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, the ties between the Bush Administration and Gulf Oil became a central and viable factor of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as before and during the American crusade against the Islamic jihadists.

It appeared that the foreign policy agenda of the early Bush Administration centered on existing diplomatic relationships, while attempting to seek out new and broader alliances with other nations and international organizations. Yet, the alliance between Israel and the United States remained a complicating factor for the West’s globalization effort. Because Israel and the United States shared a common interest for democratic values as well as “vital economic and strategic interests at stake in the region,” Powell, as stated in his March, 2001 speech, believed that, “these interests and concerns will be served best by a peace that both Israelis and Palestinians can embrace.”¹⁹⁰ With a new sense of urgency in curbing Islamic extremism in the Muslim world following 9/11, Washington and the American business elite relied heavily on their former relationships with entities in the Middle East to assist the U.S. in the crusade against terrorism. The Bush Administration came to the conclusion early on that in order to bring about the fruits of globalization and offer peace to the peoples of the Middle East, the special alliance with Israel was absolutely essential. Also essential was the continuation of big business in regards to the oil trade between the West and Middle East.

¹⁸⁹ Colin Powell, “Address of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee,” *Congressional Record* 147 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 442.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 443.

The Bush Administration attempted to persuade the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon to “show restraint in the occupied [Palestinian] territories” and dissuade the Palestinian population via political policy of committing further acts of terror against the West in the months following 9/11. In response to Washington’s desires, Sharon became angered with Washington, and claimed that the U.S. wished to “sell out” the Jewish state in order to win favor with the Muslims in late 2001.¹⁹¹ After Israel’s leaders refused to work with PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, while engaged in constant communication with the United States, alongside tremendous attempts by the Jewish Lobby to win favor in the eyes of U.S. citizens and officials in Washington, the Israeli position won its case.¹⁹² They had pressured the United States’ government enough to reverse its post-9/11 policy from one that sought reconciliation with the Muslim world, to one that remained more favorable to Israel’s position toward Muslims. Although Bush initially attempted to normalize the U.S.-Israel alliance after 9/11, propaganda campaigns and public pressure persuaded the American president to regress back to the internationally unpopular special alliance with Israel.

President Bush and his administration would fail to reconcile with the Muslim populations and nations within the Middle East from 9/11 moving forward. Years later in 2005, Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal voiced his complaints to the [Council on Foreign Relations] (CFR), – an American non-profit, nonpartisan membership organization that specializes in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs – and declared that the Arab-Israeli conflict was the root cause of Middle Eastern extremism and terrorism, as well as the “chief factor dividing the Muslim world from the United States.”¹⁹³ Failing to gain support from Israel

¹⁹¹ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 204-5.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 206-15.

¹⁹³ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 136.

in creating a unipolar policy in the Middle East between Israel and its Muslim neighbors, the Bush Administration had to follow through with its intentions alone. U.S. officials had no choice but to flex its diplomatic muscle and to lead a crusade against al-Qaeda and other perpetrators and threats to U.S. national security. Thus, Bush's global War on Terror began on September 20, 2001. By December, 2001, Yasser Arafat had bowed to pressure from the U.S. and Israel to arrest and dismember Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile, Ariel Sharon and his government took a hard-lined militaristic stance against Palestinians residing in Gaza and West Bank.¹⁹⁴ The United States, remaining true to its traditional diplomatic tendencies in the Middle East, began a series of military campaigns against Islamic terrorists and antagonistic Middle Eastern regimes: Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, and intervening in the affairs of the decade long NATO-American intervention in the war between Israel and Palestinian forces within Israel. Although no weapons of mass destruction were ever found, nor was Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, the ongoing damage to American reputation, its global image, and the battle lines between the West and Middle East had been established.

It is not a secret that the Bush family had decades-long personal connections with Middle Eastern petroleum. Although the Bush family had developed strong connections with the Gulf States, George W. Bush now balanced these alliances with a public campaign against hostile Islamists. Since the Great Depression era of the 1930s, oil men like Prescott Bush worked closely than ever before with the Roosevelt Administration through the Second World War, in which Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia became "vital to the defense of the United States."¹⁹⁵ By

¹⁹⁴ Derek Brown, "Middle East Timeline: Part Two," *The Guardian*, November 28, 2001, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/28/israel>.

¹⁹⁵ Phillips, *American Dynasty*, 152-3.

the turn of the millennium, the Bush family maintained their affluence in the economic sphere and in the American upper-political sphere as well. Their involvement in the global energy industry for decades prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, and inclusion into the realm of the American political elite allowed the Bush's to direct foreign policy as they saw best fit once they took positions in the executive branch. A CIA report published in 2000 indicated that Washington had much at stake regarding Middle Eastern oil supplies. With the Bush Administration's sight on geopolitical power and overt concerns over U.S. imported oil supplies, its ambitions became centered on U.S. hegemony in a globalizing world.¹⁹⁶ Therefore, in gaining major support from American Christian fundamentalists and evangelists, right-wing groups, and the Jewish lobby, George W. Bush invaded the Middle East in an effort to defeat hostile Islamists who threatened the American establishment. Nevertheless, Bush began to, unwittingly, jeopardize his families' history in the Middle Eastern oil trade while publically aligning himself with the abovementioned domestic groups – unlike his father, who “tailor[ed] his war coalition building to include many Islamic nations in addition to the oil sheikhdoms.”¹⁹⁷

The outrage by the American people over their nation's Arab alliance who supplied the U.S. with oil over the decades seemed to manifest itself in an ill-fated legacy. The oil trade and the diplomatic relationships between the United States and countries like Saudi Arabia continued to live on. Yet, the Bush Administration's ties to the Saudi royal family was a relationship that the American public remained uneasy about. Out of the 19 September 11 hijackers, 15 of them were of Saudi descent, which was also the homeland to the 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia possessed a large minority of Shia Muslims hostile to U.S. influence. As mentioned earlier, Arab society had actually benefited economically from an oil boom as

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 313.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 316-7.

partly resulting following the events of 9/11. During a 2007 Congressional testimony on U.S. diplomacy in Saudi Arabia, University of Vermont professor F. Gregory Gause declared that, “Washington still value[d] the relationship with the Saudis, for oil and security reasons.”¹⁹⁸ Moreover, the diplomatic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States, since its origins, “operated most smoothly at the elite level.”¹⁹⁹

George W. Bush had numerous connections with Middle Eastern petroleum. Not only had he and his family done business with oil sheikhs and businessmen in the Gulf region for decades, but much of his executive staff also had prior experience in this undertaking as well. In addition, there was little doubt that much of the U.S. occupancy in the Middle East following 9/11 had much to do with the U.S.-Arab oil trade. A number of government officials have stepped forward since in revealing a part of George W. Bush’s foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. Former Federal Reserve Chairman during Bush’s presidency, Alan Greenspan, General John Abizaid, former head of Military Operations in the 2003 war against Iraq, and Defense Secretary Charles Hagel (who was a Senator from Nebraska during the bulk of the Bush presidency), have all unanimously declared that the U.S. takeover in Iraq and occupancy in the Middle East were largely attempts to control oil.²⁰⁰ During George W. Bush’s two terms as president of the United States, he provided executive branch positions and appointments to elite individuals heavily involved in the Middle Eastern oil business. Bush “brought a new set of dominant corporations, power alignments, and overseas entanglements” to the aspect of

¹⁹⁸ F. Gause, “U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia: Oil, Anxiety, and Ambivalence,” *Committee on Foreign Relations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), 13-4.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁰⁰ Antonia Juhasz, “Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil,” CNN News, April 15, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/>.

policymaking.²⁰¹ Vice President, Richard Cheney, alongside National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, were both heavily involved in executive roles of the Texas-based oil service corporations, Haliburton and Enron, and more importantly to the task of foreign policymaking, had “ties to Bahrain, Kuwait, and shadowy Saudi Arabian families.”²⁰²

The positive effects of globalization began to take shape in Middle Eastern society due to the U.S. war effort against terrorism and aggressive Middle Eastern Islamic leaders. Once American military forces arrived in the Middle East to battle the jihadists beginning in Afghanistan in 2001, oil and American security became vital to U.S. interests and success in carrying out its foreign policy and war effort. In effect, the American war effort in the Middle East had fueled economic prosperity for the Gulf States as well. The GCC cooperated with the U.S. military following its invasion, and later victory in Iraq in 2003, because “they recognized that it would have enormous influence over the region’s politics and commerce after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government.”²⁰³ The tremendous impact oil had on the Arab economy in the Middle East continued down a perplexed path during the George W. Bush years. Although Saudi Arabia remained a “problematic ally” to the United States (in regards to combating al-Qaeda’s terrorist cells and Islamic radical intelligence networks and organizations in years leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks), the 9/11 Commission²⁰⁴ warned that the U.S. government should “build a relationship beyond oil” – one that fostered a policy of “shared commitment to reform” and a relationship dedicated to a shared interest of their nations’

²⁰¹ Phillips, *American Dynasty*, 149.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 150.

²⁰³ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 135.

²⁰⁴ The 9/11 Commission, formed on November 27, 2002, and contained five republican and five democratic members of Congress. This commission, created by Congressional legislation and signed into law by President George W. Bush, was to analyze, examine, and create a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks.

peoples.²⁰⁵ Upon President Obama's ascendance to the presidency, his administration would not have the advantage of a personal and existing relationship regarding the oil industry. The Obama Administration would lack the personnel involved in the business aspect of American power-politics, as well as prior involvement in the petroleum trade with the Gulf Arabs.

By the closing of Bush's second term in office, it was 'politics as usual' in the Middle East. Despite the Bush Administration's somewhat successful efforts to globalize the Middle East, the U.S. retained a pro-Israel policy and had failed at curbing the Islamic extremist networks in the region. A decade-long military campaign to eliminate Islamic enemies of Israel and the United States went unfinished. The objective of the United States during the Bush presidency included democratizing the Middle East, which was also a "core goal of many groups in the [Israel] lobby."²⁰⁶ In the end of his two terms in Office, Bush amplified the animosities that many Muslims retained toward the United States and the West. The war effort in the Middle East became a doomed legacy, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda survived, and an economic recession hit home by 2008.

It appeared evident to the American political elite that globalization would come sooner than later to the Middle East. The Bush Administration had made a sufficient effort to revise U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East to one that was less slanted toward Israel following 9/11. But that attempt at removing the Israel bias ultimately failed. Following the administration's failure in effectively managing the 2006 Lebanon crisis, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement on instilling democracy and support for Israel in the region as, "the birth pangs

²⁰⁵ The 9/11 Commission, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: Recommendations," *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, accessed on March 11, 2014, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm.

²⁰⁶ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 228.

of the new Middle East,” the administration had lost more favor with their Arab alliances – including Saudi Arabia, where foreign minister Faisal scoffed at the American viewpoint that Saudi Arabia wanted “to go back to the old Middle East.”²⁰⁷ Political officials within the American government, grassroots and professional support from fundamentalist Christians and Jews within the United States, and the powerful Jewish Lobby had persuaded Bush and his government to remain true to the decades’-old Israeli favoritism. Furthermore, the constant American military presence in the Middle East had bolstered the anti-American animosities held by Islamic radicals. The Gaza offensive, beginning in the summer of 2006 by Israeli militants, had been considered and challenged by some in the U.N., including American diplomat Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, as an act of genocide against the Arab occupants in 2009. However, the United States continued its tremendous support for Israel even in the wake of the Gaza crisis.²⁰⁸ Washington’s support for Israel continued on as the tragic events in Israel had lingered on. Years later in 2011, support for Israel by U.S. officials remained substantial, as Massachusetts Representative Edward Markey advocated that, “Israel... take decisive action in the Gaza Strip to protect its population living under the daily threat of rocket attacks” and to finally defeat the Palestinian nationalists and inhabitants.²⁰⁹

The Bush Administration’s popularity among Americans was at an historic low, with much disfavor coming from the failed and costly Middle Eastern military conflict. Additionally, oil prices were high in the midst of a national recession, while the Arab Gulf States had experienced an economic boom at the same time. Once Illinois Senator Barack Obama won the

²⁰⁷ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 142.

²⁰⁸ “Israel Accused of Genocide in Gaza,” Al-Jazeera, January 14, 2009, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2009/01/200911321467988347.html>.

²⁰⁹ Edward J. Markey, “Reaffirming Commitment to Negotiated Settlement of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *157th Congressional Record*, 2011 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), 1295.

presidential election in November, 2008, his administration would adopt a foreign policy that had continued to remain favorable to Israel to a degree, but would begin to mediate tensions between all the peoples of the Middle East furthermore.

Obama's Policy Surrounding Gulf Oil and Israel

Before President Obama took office, foreign policy experts from the CATO Institute advised his administration that, “the better option would be to chart an entirely new course,” by: “drawing down the American military presence in the Middle East, embrac[ing] a policy of constructive disengagement... by deemphasizing U.S. alliances in the Middle East, especially with... Israel” among other suggestions.²¹⁰ Another emphasis important for globalization in the Middle East was the economic development surrounding the global supply and demand for petroleum. If progress toward globalization was going to be accomplished in the Middle East, then the Obama Administration had to steer away from a conflicting foreign policy, one that had fostered a sincere and long term predisposition toward Israel and one that relied heavily on Gulf oil imports. In the final year of George W. Bush's presidency, Israel had received around \$2.38 billion in U.S. aid – which trumped any other Middle Eastern Arab state by more than \$800 million (In comparison, Afghanistan had received \$1.058 billion in U.S. aid that same year to battle against jihadist terrorist sects within its nation's mountainous lands).²¹¹

Rrelations with Israel gradually became overly-accepting, yet still remained favorable toward that nation. Conservative segments of American society, alongside pressure by the

²¹⁰ CATO Institute, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” *Cato Handbook for Policymakers*, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2009), 539-40.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 540.

Jewish lobby, had persuaded and “discouraged” the previous “Bush Administration from exercising independent judgment and influence” regarding foreign policy in the Middle East.²¹² When the current administration rose to power in 2009, a foreign policy in the Middle East was constructed that attempted to advance the mechanisms of globalization rather than one that sought after public support. Key figures in Obama’s foreign policy team in 2009 included former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, and former National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, They encouraged a Middle Eastern policy that harbored a lesser military presence, and a more evenly-balanced diplomacy with every nation within the region. Moreover, they advocated human rights and free trade on an international scale.

In the continuous and fragile crusade toward globalization, the Obama Administration had to revise its special relationship with Israel. Unlike the Bush Administration, which came under heavy pressure by groups who favored pro-Israeli policy, foreign policy in Israel under President Obama would seek an alternative path. On June 4, 2009, President Obama delivered a speech on U.S.-Muslim relations, entitled *A New Beginning*, before hundreds of Muslim peoples at Cairo University in Egypt. In support of globalization, Obama desired a foreign policy with Muslims as one “not focused on oil and gas,” rather a new relationship that sought, “a broader engagement” through the implementation of a policy that sponsored economic and social development in the Middle East as a whole.²¹³ This speech was labeled by the majority of the American journalist and academic community as an attempt to modify a constructive path toward globalization. The president sought out a “fresh relationship based on mutual interest and

²¹² Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 334.

²¹³ “A New Beginning: President Obama Speech to Muslim World in Cairo,” YouTube video, 58:41, posted by “C-SPAN,” June 4, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_889oBKkNU.

mutual respect... [B]ased on the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition.”²¹⁴

For many observers, this speech signaled a new hope for the future of U.S.-Muslim relations and a lasting peace. However, many listeners came to view *A New Beginning* as a diplomatic tool used to “brighten the image of the United States.”²¹⁵ Moreover, Israel viewed Obama’s new policy in the Middle East as threatening to their current position with the United States and the surrounding Muslim world. An anonymous spokeswoman for Jewish settlers in West Bank, in the midst of a war with the Palestinians, declared that the new American president was, “out of touch with reality” and ignorant to the realities between Muslims and the Western world.²¹⁶

In comparison to former relationships between the United States’ government and Israel, the usually comfortable diplomacy between the U.S. and Israel relationship had seen better days. Uneased by the growing ideological rift between the two governments, Israel recently and openly criticized the Obama Administration’s lack of support for its national security in the Middle East. Groups such as AIPAC, peoples associated with the Jewish Lobby, Conservatives, and Judeo-Christian fundamentalists have criticized the Obama Administration for its separation from the former and the distancing from the special bond that the United States had shared with Israel for past generations. Illinois Congressman, Randy Hultgren, attacked President Obama in front of Congress for blaming Israel for stalemating the peace process in the Middle East during a speech

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Todd Holzman, “Obama Seeks ‘New Beginning’ with Muslim World,” NPR, June 4, 2009, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104891406>.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

at the U.N. General Assembly in 2011.²¹⁷ As recently as February, 2014, a serious discord was struck between the Israeli and U.S. government. Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his Minister of Strategic Affairs became outraged at Secretary of State, John Kerry, when it was suggested by the American diplomat that Israel continue negotiations and cooperation toward a frame-worked Middle Eastern peace plan – all while various pro-Arab groups threatened a boycott of Israeli products because of Netanyahu's policies toward the Palestinians.²¹⁸

In the fiscal year of 2013, the U.S. federal government granted Israel with approximately \$3.115 billion in aid toward the ongoing peace process.²¹⁹ The prospects of international unity have been skewed by the notion that the U.S. had supported Israel for decades. The Obama Administration's foreign policy goal in Israel currently is to establish a plan of permanent peace and stability between the Palestinians and Jews by an April, 2014 deadline. Yet, violence and destruction continues to thrive. President Obama and his administration aim toward globalization through international cooperation, however, disapproval by international groups and forces over U.S. involvement in Israel have carried on. The special interest groups and the powerful individuals within the U.S. who devote their efforts in affirming the overwhelming support and unique position with Israel must understand the consequences of their actions. The overdue process of harboring a slanted policy in favor of Israeli national security over the Palestinian cause for nationalism, and the overall violence between the two peoples must come

²¹⁷ Randy Hutgren, "President Obama Must Stand Up for Israel," *Congressional Record* 157 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), 6418.

²¹⁸ Isabel Kershner, "Netanyahu Criticizes Kerry over Boycott Remarks," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-criticizes-kerry-over-boycott-remarks.html>.

²¹⁹ Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East,"²⁶, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>.

to its 66-year halt. More pressing matters, such as the civil unrest in Egypt, nuclear development in Iran, the Syrian Civil War, and the Arab Spring movement of 2011 are issues that the U.S. has evaded but must be dealt with first and foremost in order to come to a rational solution. Instead, the fact that Secretary of State John Kerry has primarily focused on the Arab and Palestinian conflict suggests that the Obama Administration is focused on what the Clinton Administration failed to do in the 1990s, which was to find a permanent peace between the Judaic and Muslim peoples.

Peace, modernity, and democracy will not arrive to the Middle East if the West consistently aligns itself with a pro-Israeli agenda – an agenda demonized by Israel’s Muslim neighbors. “A country as rich and powerful as the United States can sustain flawed policies for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored.... Israel’s well-being is [an American] interest – on moral grounds – but its continued presence in the Occupied Territories is not.”²²⁰ Today, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become outdated. Globalization has transformed the social landscape of Israel as of late though. The global economy has caused many Israeli skilled workers and professionals to leave their homeland in search of better occupational opportunity, while migrant and unskilled workers into Israel in search of opportunity is increasing, “from which it is apparent that Israel is actually engaged in a process of redefining its social boundaries.”²²¹ The pluralization of Israel’s population, a change in Israel’s demographic landscape, and the effects of a global economy could bring about changes necessary for peace to become established in Israel.

²²⁰ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 355.

²²¹ William Berthomiere, “Foreign Workers: Faces of the Globalization of Israel,” *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel* (2013): 8, accessed on April 12, 2014, [http://www.academia.edu/3530308 /Foreign_Workers_Faces_of_the_Globalization_of_Israel_2013](http://www.academia.edu/3530308/Foreign_Workers_Faces_of_the_Globalization_of_Israel_2013).

Throughout his two terms in office thus far, the Obama Administration has experienced friction over the trade centered on Middle Eastern oil. Unlike the personnel and international business relationships within the Bush Administration, government officials within the ranks of the current administration lack the business expertise, experience, and knowledge in the oil diplomacy with Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia. Moreover, hydro-fracking has gained much attention and popularity within the United States as of late – which would allow the United States to become less dependent on Gulf oil imports. This developing reality has, to a minimal degree, damaged the lasting relationship with the Arab Gulf states and its ties to the United States. For decades, the relationship between the U.S. and countries like Saudi Arabia have focused primarily on petroleum. These newest developments within the global energy industry and international socioeconomic network will change, as well as challenge, the dynamic of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East moving forward.

Ever since the current president took office in 2009, Obama has not had similar personnel in executive branch positions with prior knowledge and experience in dealing with the Middle Eastern oil business that Bush had. The lack of experience and knowledge in diplomacy with the Persian Gulf states by the foreign policymakers and officials under President Obama has been evident. As recently as February, 2014, Deputy Secretary William Burns (also a former official under Presidents George W. Bush and William Clinton) urged the Persian Gulf nations to “overcome their differences with Washington.”²²² He declared that the United States would offer the greatest protection to the Gulf leaders who have feared an overthrow from the restless Shia Muslims in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, which had begun in 2011 and have brought

²²² Paul Richter, “U.S. Aims to Bolster Ties with Persian Gulf States,” Los Angeles Times, February 20, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-us-gulf-states-20140220,0,3257310.story#axzz2w48gZvxE>.

about considerable turmoil to nations like Syria and Egypt. The administration's efforts to soften tensions with the theocratic government in Iran has not fared well with the Sunni Gulf governments of the Middle East as well. Meanwhile, the Obama Administration, alongside the U.N., has launched a major effort at sanctions against Iran, so much so that it squeezed Iran's population to elect a new leader, Hassan Rouhani, in 2013 to carry out negotiations with the West and the United States.

Developments in the oil industry at home have had an important impact on U.S. energy policy in the Middle East. Hydro-fracking is "the process of injecting liquid at high pressure into subterranean rocks, boreholes, etc., so as to force open existing fissures and extract oil or gas."²²³ This newly refined innovation that revolutionized ways of extracting oil from the earth has proved to have major consequences on the existing relationship between the United States and states like Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Canada and Mexico have been very active in hydro-fracking for oil to bolster their own economies. Most of the world's natural oil is in the form of tar sands, and Alberta, Canada has contained the largest deposit of these tar sands.²²⁴ In 2012, Edward Morse, a former U.S. official and current economic analyst, asserted that, "North America is becoming the new Middle East," regarding the prospect of becoming the world's largest producer of natural oil and gas.²²⁵ The prospect of the United States not remaining so dependent on the Arab oil producers of the Middle East has created mixed emotions of nervousness and frustration among various Arab Gulf state officials.

²²³ *Oxford Dictionary*, s.v. "fracking," http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/fracking.

²²⁴ U.S. Department of the Interior, "About Tar Sands," *Oil Shale and Tar Sands Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, 2012, <http://ostseis.anl.gov/guide/tarsands/>.

²²⁵ Michael Levi, "Think Again: The American Energy Boom," *Foreign Policy Magazine* (August 2012): 55, accessed on March 3, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom.

Suppliers such as OPEC, which has included Saudi Arabia, have been left in a curious position. Sunni Gulf nations, who depend on the generous revenue created by the oil trade in the global marketplace, have remained skeptical and fearful about losing their positions of power and influence over their nation, its economy, and political stability within the Middle Eastern realm – especially in the wake of the widespread Arab uprisings. Fracking and the subsequent increase in the global supply of oil, along with a smaller market, could leave OPEC producers battling for market share and “pumping far more crude than expected.”²²⁶ Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations whose economy, civil stability, and political well-being depend on oil currently, cannot take any chances on jeopardizing their own national security interests alongside the revelations fracking has revealed to the United States’ economic potential. Technological advances in the energy industry have not eased diplomatic tensions among Gulf governments, however it has definitely not been the root source of angst toward U.S. foreign policy decisions as of late. In fact, reopening diplomatic talks with Iran has been the main source of angst by Saudi officials towards the U.S. government. The United States, however, view the willingness to communicate with Iran necessary due to Iran’s determination in pursuing nuclear development, while maintaining its feelings of angst toward Western society.

The Obama Administration, contrary to popular belief, has publically reinforced the benefits of fracking. President Obama has claimed on numerous occasions that the oil boom caused by fracking has “led to cleaner power and greater energy independence” for the United States.²²⁷ Other members of his administration have reflected this notion as well, including EPA Administrator, Gina McCarthy, and former Secretary of the Department of Energy, Stephen Chu,

²²⁶ Ibid., 58.

²²⁷ “Obama White House Explains the Importance of Hydraulic Fracturing,” YouTube video, 3:30, posted by “EnergyInDepth,” November 19, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uVGY3sIBsA>.

who argued that techniques currently used in fracking allowed for oil to be extracted from the earth with minimal to no environmental consequences.²²⁸ Fracking remains in its infancy, however, in weighing its environmental risks as well as implementing its full potential at home and abroad may take more time and investigation.²²⁹ Environmental problems associated with hydro-fracking, including the contamination of drinking water sources, release of trapped methane into waterways and the atmosphere, and a rise in fracking-related earthquakes, have been recently confirmed by numerous environmental scientists.²³⁰

The United States, in recent years, has been divided on the issue of environmental safety and the positive economic impact fracking has proposed. This topic of debate found its way to the forefront of the federal government's overall agenda and policymaking moving forward – domestically and internationally. In promotion of the passage of the American Energy Security Act of 2013, several members of Congress, including Senator Michael Hastings (D-IL), promoted fracking in the American Midwest and criticized the Obama Administration for, “attempting to block new energy production, keeping energy prices high and hurting middle class families.”²³¹ Even though hydro-fracking has been used by major and independent oil

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ With the early problems associated with the infiltration of trapped natural gas beneath shale rock, and even sometimes miles beneath the surface, fracking and its means in extracting that gas is an ongoing pursuit by government officials and other groups in weighing the costs and benefits. The energy industry has adopted new casing techniques that is good for the environment in the short term, however, there is no long term or permanent fix guaranteed as of yet.

²³⁰ Mark Schrope, “Fracking Outpaces Science on its Impact,” *Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies*, accessed on April 2014, <http://environment.yale.edu/envy/stories/fracking-outpaces-science-on-its-impact>.

²³¹ Michael Hastings, “Protecting States’ Rights to Promote American Energy Security Act,” *Congressional Record 159, 2013* (Washington, DC: GPO via ProQuest Congressional, 2013), 7280, <http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/ppqdocumentview?accountid=14169&groupid=96875&pgId=ba8a5b94-3809-4acd-9626-112a5e7adc7b&rsId=1443BCC09ED>.

companies in the U.S. effectively in the short term, which has helped stimulate some aspects of the local and national economies, the Obama Administration must adopt a long term solution to the impact fracking has imposed on the environment – which partly explains the delay by the administration to delay the construction and implementation of the gigantic Keystone Pipeline project.

If hydro-fracking eventually is to be encouraged by members of the U.S. government, studied and supported by environmental analysts (If safety measures are implemented that reduce fracking's negative impact on areas surrounding wells and if environmental problems caused by fracking are ever solved.), and continues to build support and gain momentum within certain business and social arenas of American society, then the United States will eventually view nations like Saudi Arabia as a less influential ally regarding their position in the international market. The United States would become a major oil producer for its own expanding population and could rely less on Middle Eastern oil imports. This possible scenario might give the U.S. more leverage in Middle Eastern diplomacy, however, the U.S. would not want China and other foreign powers to move into the region and claim the Middle Eastern oil market for themselves. Moreover, the United States might come to view Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia as a lesser strategic political asset if the Saudi government does not encourage domestic changes of their own. Abuses of civil liberty, civil rights of all of its inhabitants, censorship, and promotion of aspects related to globalization have been viewed with distaste by the international community on the Arab monarchy. Saudi prince Alaweed bin Talal published a letter to OPEC in July, 2013, warning Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister, Ali al Naimi, and other Gulf government officials that the region's reliance on oil revenue was in serious decline, and should implement "swift

measures to diversify its economy.”²³² Diversifying the Saudi economy, though, is an undertaking that exhibits many impediments. According to researcher Matthew Simmons, Saudi Arabia “has not built an economy that generates enough professional jobs for a rapidly growing population.” Instead, the Saudi kingdom restricts the “freedom of women severely,” the “Wahhabist²³³ clergy enforce strict Muslim law and impose criminal punishments considered barbaric” by Western standards.²³⁴ The harsh enforcement of Sunni Islamic practice, strict social regulations of its inhabitants, and “economic contradictions” have combined in Saudi Arabia that encourages Muslim discontent and terrorism against the Saud family and its Western allies.²³⁵ Perhaps this could explain one of the factors surrounding the frustrations that have formed recently in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The discovery of oil in Canadian tar sands and innovations in hydro-fracking has allowed for more of the world’s natural gas and oil supply beneath the water table to become extracted from the earth. Therefore, it has increased the global supply and demand of this natural resource. Although oil-business people have been apoplectic over Obama’s delay of a permit for the Keystone Pipeline, supposedly his administration has “worked to craft regulations that keep production going while also protecting the public.”²³⁶ Gulf governments, such as the Saudi monarchy, will have to seek out a broader international market to sell their largest economic

²³² “Saudi Prince: Fracking is Threat to Kingdom,” Sky News, July 29, 2013, <http://news.sky.com/story/1121610/saudi-prince-fracking-is-threat-to-kingdom>.

²³³ Wahhabism is an ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam, which happens to be the official religion of Saudi Arabia. Its eighteenth century founder, Muhammad ibn Abdal-Wahhab, advocated a strict and fundamental following of the Quran and Islamic faith, and condemned practices of idolatry, political weakness, and the moral decline of Muslim society that lived on the Arabian Peninsula.

²³⁴ Matthew Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Oil Shock and the World Economy* (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 2.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Levi, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom:” 61.

asset, or diversify its economy in order to hold onto power and survive. Furthermore, if globalization is to be breached in the Middle East, the Gulf governments must accommodate Arab social demands and diversify their own economies, which will allow them to continue generating sustainable revenues for their national economies and provide stability for their nations' wellbeing moving forward. Sean Foley examined that these oil producing governments, in light of the 2008 global recession, put an economic strain on the Gulf nations, yet, "there are signs that [the recession] may accelerate social and technological trends that will reduce the petroleum industry's importance to the Gulf and the world economy in general."²³⁷ The latest technological innovations, including the Internet and the innovations relating to computer technology, hybrid vehicles, solar and wind technology, and improvements to digital communications by the Millennial generation has spawned a tide of change across the Arabian Peninsula. The increase in demand for the region's oil by China and other developed nations worldwide is another factor that will heavily impact the Saudi economy in the near future.

As the Arab governments work meticulously to increase the global prestige of their nations, which will place their societies into the scheme of globalization, they must fight off heavy opposition in the meantime. This opposition includes Islamic extremism carried out by Arab Shi'ites, the Arab Spring movement of 2011, other Sunni opposition within the ranks of their own government, and foreign enemies like Iran – which has strongly opposed the Western model of globalization. Under the cloak of Islamic fundamentalism, these abovementioned problems and outcomes currently plague Middle Eastern secular leaders and are preventing positive change from occurring in the region.

²³⁷ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 275.

In the era following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, foreign policy in the Middle East witnessed episodes and events that have changed the entire dynamic of the globalization process. Both administrations under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have fought for stability, modernization, and democratic values within Middle Eastern society. Yet the Middle East continues to be a region of the world riddled in constant political disarray, social upheaval, and violence at the hands of Islamic extremists and corrupt secular governments. Former trends in U.S. foreign policy, however, have presented a problem to the current trends and natural developments in the Middle East.

The United States has maintained its general diplomatic position, beginning in the late 1940s, toward international sponsorship of the State of Israel and maintaining the oil trade with the Arab Gulf states. Following 9/11, President George W. Bush realized he needed to stray away from the overwhelming support that the U.S. had displayed and offered Israeli national security for decades. However, Bush faced strong opposition to his plan from members of his own government, the Jewish Lobby in Washington, and certain and various sects of the American public. U.S. foreign policy in Israel quickly returned to one which resurrected a newfound Muslim rejection and nonalignment with U.S. policy, while displaying unusually strong support for any endeavor Israel found itself in thereafter. The Obama Administration continued to support Israel as its closest Middle Eastern ally, although recent attempts by the administration to mediate and find common ground between the Muslim and Jewish peoples of the Middle East has aroused immense frustration by supporters and government officials of Israel. If globalization is to spread its reach throughout the region, the special alliance between the United States and Israel must transform to a normal alliance – one similar to all other nations and peoples of the Middle East harbored by the United States. Eliminating cultural bias from

U.S. foreign policy toward Muslims, Jews, Arabs, non-Arabs, and other cultures native to the Middle East alike must materialize if American-formed globalization is to take root.

The oil-based diplomacy between the United States and the Arab-Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, has existed for decades as well. In fact, the somewhat benign relationship the U.S. has shared with the al-Saud monarchy dates back to the earliest half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, this relationship has centered on the petroleum resources found in the deserts around the Arabian Peninsula and shipped off to consuming countries like the United States. Petroleum is a very important resource regarding the global economy, and it has dramatic implications for the globalization policy set forth by the U.S. and the West. The two Bush Administrations' personal ties with Saudi princes and sheikhs involved in the oil business was perceived by the Arabian people as an act of imperialism carried out by the impure motives of Western expansion on a society keen on defending its own. Moreover, George W. Bush's Second Gulf War in the aftermath of 9/11 harbored a legacy that could not be reversed. Fighting a spirited war against Islamic terrorists who were enemies of the West, Saddam Hussein's irresponsible regime, and Middle Eastern groups who supposedly possessed weapons of mass destruction, built up even more animosity toward the U.S. than ever before. These Middle Eastern Muslims who held little political power and detested the Western forces alongside their Sunni counterparts, opposed the American military occupation and were convinced that the United States had moved into the Middle East to render its economic might selfishly. America's reliance on Middle Eastern oil was no mystery to the Arab Gulf regimes and companies who had been so willing to reap the profits of the oil trade in the past. The damage done to American trust and its perceived duty in heralding in an era of modernization, peace, and democracy to the developing world was seen by many in the Middle East as an American-made charade. Instead,

increasing America's own political and military power, while retaining its global dominance economically, was seen by many Middle Eastern Muslims as the primary motive of Western policy in the region.

The Obama Administration continued to rely on Middle Eastern oil imports without the closer ties with Gulf-Arab elites like the Bush Administration maintained following 9/11. Recently, hydro-fracking and its innovated transformation of the petroleum industry has caused the United States to tremendously increase its crude oil and gas supply, increase its exporting capabilities, and in doing so, is on pace to becoming a top oil and natural gas-producing nation of the world. These two factors have led the United States to decrease its dependency on Middle Eastern oil imports, and begin to rely more heavily on its domestic supply. The United States is the world's leading producer and exporter of liquid natural gas currently. Natural gas asserts only half of the carbon dioxide that coal does and is pushed by the Obama Administration for that reason, as well as increasing U.S. fuel independence.

In May, 2013, the Obama Administration approved a \$10 billion facility in Freeport, Texas, named Freeport LNG, which serves as a major exporting facility of natural gas. Freeport LNG's Chief Executive, Michael Smith, stated in defense of world economic progress, that, "[the United States] needs these exports for jobs, for balance of trade and for geopolitical reasons...."²³⁸ Taking on the task in creating peace by diplomatically working as mediators in developing a lasting peace between various groups within the Middle East, decreasing U.S. military occupancy in the region, and relying less on special interests like Saudi oil, the Obama Administration has altered the means by which globalization is achieved. This has forced

²³⁸ Keith Johnson and Benjamin Lefebvre, "U.S. Approves Expanded Gas Exports," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 18, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324767004578489130300876450>.

Middle Eastern societies to change their economies in order to include themselves in a global system, yet these Muslim societies have remained skeptical and paranoid over the rise of hostility demonstrated by Iran, as well as the willingness by the U.S. to allow Iran to gain “unparalleled influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories” since 2003.²³⁹ As the Gulf governments attempted to restructure their economies to fit within the structure of globalization, one major problem continued to thrive as the U.S. took on a more neutral position in confronting Middle Eastern altercations.

Islamic Fundamentalism and the Prospects for Globalization

It is extremely difficult to predict whether or not globalization will reach Middle Eastern society given the chaotic and dividing nature of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism, like many other religious fundamentalist trends found worldwide, is deeply rooted in an individual’s consciousness and psychology. It is not fundamental, nor original Islamic doctrine as one may be led to believe, however, Islamic fundamentalism evolved from a mixture of political, religious, and social philosophies prevalent during the initial stages of the Cold War in the mid-twentieth century. The Middle East, in the years prior to the buildup of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, had been a region of the world coveted by Western powers for its natural resources and strategic location for carrying out a policy of containment versus the Soviets. It did not take long for Muslim society to resent Western influence, interference, and presence in their social, economic, and political systems. Vali Nasr described Islamic fundamentalism as “seething with anger... anti-Americanism, and vulnerable to extremist ideas”

²³⁹ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 279.

that are different from traditional Muslim lifestyles.²⁴⁰ With a mixture of Western animosities and pro-Soviet social sentiments, which were popular movements in developing nations during the 1950s and 1960s, Islamic fundamentalism became a popular ideology for the disenfranchised Middle Eastern Muslim populations. Soviet ideals of social empowerment of the poor and abused, combined with an ultra-conservative translation of Islamic doctrine formed what is now referred to as Islamic fundamentalism.

In the current Muslim world, there is a growing section of the population that have fallen victim to this distorted religious and cultural rationale, which has too often resulted in violence, destruction, death, and tragedy. Some Middle Eastern Muslims support the prospects of globalization, however many oppose globalization out of the fear that it will dispose of their own culture and traditions while indoctrinating Western political, economic, and social trends. Meanwhile, U.S. leaders view their own agenda to bring about globalization as one that is universally right, disregarding the Muslims' claims of American imperialism and political corruption within the historical context of Middle Eastern society.

As the 9/11 Commission orchestrated their official report on the outcomes and facts in the months following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, one thing was clearly interpreted: the enemy, Osama bin Laden's *al-Qaeda*, "use[d] cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur'an and some of its interpreters.... [Appealing] to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they confront modernity and globalization."²⁴¹ *The 9/11 Commission Report* received much criticism for not stating all necessary information surrounding warnings of a grand terrorist plot, although a certainty was revealed in this report: The United States government had officially declared a

²⁴⁰ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 1-3.

²⁴¹ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 48.

war against the Islamic jihad and its religious doctrine that yearned to halt America's globalization project in the Middle East. Tragedy had hit home, yet the United States was more than willing to continue its globalization agenda. To policymakers, Islamic extremism was not going to pose as an obstacle for globalization efforts.

Following 9/11, eliminating Islamic fundamentalism became of utmost importance by U.S. officials in order to protect American society from this threat while successfully implementing their globalization policy. Iran, the nation built upon the foundations of Islamic fundamentalism, has been a distant and hostile nation toward U.S. diplomacy in the region until recent. The willingness by Washington to open up negotiations with Iran's Islamic theocracy is an initial step in working out some form of lasting peace and possibly assimilation of Iran into the globalization system. However, Islamic fundamentalism has not been exclusive to just Iran. Throughout the desert lands of the Middle East, pockets of Shia minorities exist within all of the secular nations. Middle Eastern Shia populations, as of recent, have been more vocal and active in expressing their religious and social desires, which contributed immensely to the appearance of the Arab Spring in 2011.

The Arab Spring movement, which begun as civil protests in Tunisia in December, 2010, has since resulted in social uprisings against the corrupt secular and Sunni regimes across the Middle East. Egypt and Syria have been the nations to fall victim to this social uprising recently – as Syria continues to be riddled with warfare and tragedy in the wake of the overthrow attempt of Iranian-backed Bashar al-Asad's regime. The Arab Spring today is a byproduct of the Arab-Muslim peoples' resentment toward Western occupation of their lands and oppression of their lifestyle by corrupt elites and governments in recent years. The Islamic backlash against U.S. and other Western foreign policies in the region for the previous several decades had gained

momentum and manifested itself into the present civil unrest that the world is currently witnessing. Even in the outcome of Obama's 2009 speech at Cairo University – where he promised a new and fruitful beginning with Arab Muslim culture – and the steady U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, over three-quarters of the Muslim population in Jordan, Egypt, Palestinian territories, and even in its major Middle Eastern ally, Turkey, “held an unfavorable view of the United States” by the time the Arab Spring commenced.²⁴²

It had become clear to U.S. policymakers in the Middle East that Islamic fundamentalism was not solely isolated to terrorist organizations and certain sects of Shia radical Muslims. The United States' irreversible military actions in both Gulf Wars, the suspicious oil policy with Saudi Arabia, and “America's relationships with authoritarian regimes, and in particular their intelligence services... used equally against political dissenters as [well as] against terrorist suspects,” had culminated into a widespread hatred of U.S. policy among the Middle Eastern peoples.²⁴³ Even after U.S. Special Forces had captured and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May of 2011, the U.S. government understood that they still had a powerful enemy in Islamic extremism to defeat. The United States has persisted in backing corrupt and unpopular Middle Eastern governments – Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah of Bahrain, and Pakistan's recently removed Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf just to mention a few – and with that reality, Islamic fundamentalism remained alive and well in the Middle East. In addition, bin Laden's death was viewed as a symbol of martyrdom regarding Islam's jihad

²⁴² Nicholas Kitchen, “The Contradictions of Hegemony: The United States and the Arab Spring,” *The LSE IDEAS United States International Affairs Programme* (2014): 55, accessed on March 19, 2014, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQ.FjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lse.ac.uk%2FIDEAS%2Fpublications%2Freports%2Fpdf%2FSR011%2FFINAL_LSE_IDEAS__UnitedStatesAndTheArabSpring_Kitchen.pdf&ei=EgorU4i2PIeC2wW6sYDACA&usg=AFQjCNHhByej0xtcgod_LX2mIAv9RWBDbw.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 54.

against the Western Satan. This event further stimulated a sense by Islamic extremists to avenge his death through more acts of terrorism against the U.S. and its Western alliances.

It should be of no surprise then that the majority of people residing in the Middle East view the United States as a foreign foe. U.S. foreign policy, since oil's discovery in the early twentieth century, has centered on America's self-interest, rather than on the general interest of the Arab populous. This fact had been realized by officials of the United States' government in recent history. Even while occupying Iraq and other parts of the Middle East in the summer of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted to an audience at the University of Cairo that U.S. foreign policy in its target of globalization had failed. She declared that, "[f]or sixty years....[T]he United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region... and [the United States] achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people."²⁴⁴ Globalization has, and will, continue to be a goal of U.S. foreign policy in the region, but it will be extremely difficult to correct past mistakes and change the mindset of an entire foreign culture. In the subsequent federal administration, President Obama remarked with similar sentiments similar to Rice's. In the aftermath of bin Laden's capture and death, within the undertow of the early stages of the Arab Spring, President Obama offered a new course of direction in U.S. foreign policy due to the irreversible rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the hostility it forced upon the United States. In a memorandum he published for the State Department in May of 2011, President Obama advocated the need for change in the way his nation directed foreign policy in the Middle East:

Yet we must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind. Moreover, failure to speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people will only feed the suspicion that has festered for years that the United States

²⁴⁴ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 203.

pursues our interests at their expense. Given that this mistrust runs both ways -- as Americans have been seared by hostage-taking and violent rhetoric and terrorist attacks that have killed thousands of our citizens -- a failure to change our approach threatens a deepening spiral of division between the United States and the Arab world.²⁴⁵

Indeed, foreign policymakers needed to meet a new demand by the Arab people who would reject any attempt of globalization through political action. But when and how can globalization be instilled in a region where this system is viewed synonymously with U.S. corruption and imperialism? The solution may reside in a natural course through use of free market principles, which capitalism enables.

Many experts on global policy agree that the mechanisms of social mobility, which capitalism provides people with, may be the only way globalization plants itself in the Middle East. Oppression of the Arab-Muslim masses by domestic and foreign forces for decades has engineered the present episode of Islamic extremism. Additionally, “[t]he bulge in their populations of unemployed and underemployed young men has proved a fertile ground for extremism and terrorism and raises larger questions about the future of the region.”²⁴⁶ The growth of a free market in the Muslim world could aid in solving this complex problem. Removing the government restrictions and guidelines forced upon the Muslim business community and middle class by various Arab regimes, per se, would provide more opportunity for modernization and democracy to flourish throughout the Middle East. From 2005 onwards, Iran’s business community, with its fruitful economic relationship with neighboring robust business-savvy cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi across the Persian Gulf, has begun to demonstrate their discontent with Hassan Rouhani’s pro-nationalist government. Iran’s powerful

²⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa*, May 19, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa%20>.

²⁴⁶ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 413.

theocracy have restricted the privatization of business activities since the 1980s. Although a Shia Islamic state, Iranian entrepreneurs and other capitalists have come to disfavor their government for its condemnation on Iran's growing middle class and their "constraints imposed... on the capitalist private sector."²⁴⁷

Global economic powerhouses in the Middle East, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have triumphed in paving the way toward globalization in the Middle East. These two cities' "capitalist renaissance" and their mass growth of wealth have not been threatened by corrupted secular leadership, but rather can attribute their economic success to "enlightened leadership" that has allowed the natural forces of capitalism and its free market to dictate the UAE's wealth and prosperity.²⁴⁸ Oil wealth, however, has also contributed greatly to the UAE's economic triumph. Furthermore, "Dubai's boom has been driven primarily by large conglomerates that are government financed but not government run."²⁴⁹ Perhaps if other Middle Eastern peoples come to realize that they can freely partake in capitalist activities while remaining devout Muslims, globalization may become a rampant force in the region that will replace fundamentalism in years to come. Nations like Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia could also champion positive economic reform like the UAE has since the early 1990s. If the Middle East's secular leadership allows for more social freedom for their people, as well as integrating their devout Muslim faith with a modern economic-techno-political model, then globalization in the Middle East may take form.

If globalization is to come to the Middle East, and for Islamic fundamentalism to be defeated, it will have to occur naturally and self-imposed by Muslim society. The establishment

²⁴⁷ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 50-2.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 42-3.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

of globalization cannot be imposed upon the Middle East by U.S. foreign policy nor any other foreign policy for that matter. “Genuine and enduring democracy is nurtured best in conditions that gradually foster spontaneous change and do not combine compulsion with haste.”²⁵⁰ U.S. officials and proponents of globalization must let the natural forces of capitalism, civil reform, and democratic-representative government take precedence, and not interfere with imposing its desired will on Middle Eastern society. Following the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11th, the 9/11 Commission suggested that U.S. foreign policy should focus its primary concerns toward the promotion of individual educational and economic opportunities. Instead of implementing democratic values forcefully into the Middle East by U.S. officials and policymakers, the United States should define its global role in “moral leadership,” abiding by the “rule of law” in judgment of global outcomes and circumstances.²⁵¹

Efforts to completely withdraw U.S. influence from the region, on a substantial level, is yet to be seen. In 2005, Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister since 1975, testified to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations that he disagreed with President Bush’s assumptions, that “tyrannical governments in the Middle East were the source of Muslim extremism.” Rather, in the Saudi prince’s opinion, “the Arab-Israeli conflict was the root cause of Middle Eastern extremism and terrorism.”²⁵² A year later in 2006, a Gulf Arab intellectual, Jamal al-Suwaidi, published a series of articles articulating the conflict globalization posed on the Arab states. As a staunch nationalist living in the UAE, he lamented that, “Emirati culture might soon vanish in a society comprising people who are neither Arabs nor Sunni Muslims.”²⁵³

The U.S. government must rely on trustworthy and factual evidence in creating an effective

²⁵⁰ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 225.

²⁵¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 376.

²⁵² Foley, *The Gulf Arab States*, 136.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 152.

foreign policy that implements stability and peace in the Middle East. The government and its policymakers cannot rely on personal and administrative assumptions and a strict American perspective in formulating a foreign policy of globalization.

Iran remains one of the major opponents to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This nation, led by a Shia theocracy who manages the country as an Islamic republic, has openly detested U.S. influence and society in general. In his controversial visit to Columbia University in September of 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad referred to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East numerous in his speech. In Ahmadinejad's defense of Islamic fundamentalism and the "God-given gift of science," he condemned the "Big [global] powers," such as the United States, for its "monopoly over science" and knowledge, which does "not want to see the progress of other nations."²⁵⁴ The following day, he made similar remarks at the U.N. General Assembly in New York City. His case for modern-day Iran was established for the global powers. Basically, he condemned the most apparent factors in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East – for its continued support for the Israeli cause over the Palestinian cause, and reinstatement of the American imperialist notion that, "In [the United States'] view, human rights are tantamount to profits for [U.S.] companies and friends."²⁵⁵

Today, the relationship between the United States and Iran remains in poor condition. Nevertheless, there is a willingness by the U.S. government to initiate, at least, the beginning of the diplomatic process needed to rebuild a friendly alliance with Iran. Islamic fundamentalism,

²⁵⁴ "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Speech to Columbia University 24 September 2007," YouTube video, 59:35, posted by the "wesawthat," October 23, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OD1PnbJwfSw>.

²⁵⁵ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Sixty Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 2007" *Council on Foreign Relations Primary Sources*, accessed on March 20, 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/president-ahmadinejads-address-un-general-assembly-2007/p14305>.

which runs rampant throughout Iran's society, will prevent modernization and U.S. interests to do so in the foreseeable future. The State Department recently classified the Iranian theocracy as a government that, "has not recognized Israel's right to exist, has hindered the Middle East peace process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hizballah, and [the] Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and continues to play a disruptive role in sustaining violence in the region, particularly Syria."²⁵⁶ If a lasting peace is to be established between the United States and Iran, the underlying psychology of Islamic fundamentalism must be eliminated from those who hold executive power and influence in Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has had, at least, a 35 year legacy in the Middle East, and currently this nation is wealthy and large enough to develop nuclear technology, and possibly weaponry. Unfortunately, Iran has long supported Shia populations and Islamic radicals in its eastern neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Iran have had a bitter relationship as of late, while the relationship between Iran and Pakistan has come into conflict, too, as of late. The reason being is that there has been multiple reported national security breaches between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and sects of Islamic terrorist groups throughout all three nations who are unified under the ideal of a jihad against secular power and the West. In May, 2012, Afghan authorities arrested two suspected terrorists who confessed that, "[Iran's] Revolutionary Guards recruit young people for terrorist activities in Afghanistan and try to revive the Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan led by... Taliban groups."²⁵⁷ Meanwhile, "given Pakistan's cultural shifts and the financial lure of the Gulf Arabs, a return to

²⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Relations with Iran*, August 28, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm>.

²⁵⁷ Khwaja Basir Ahmad, "Alleged Spies say Iran's Revolutionary Guard Trained Them," Pajhwok Afghan News, May 7, 2012, <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/05/07/alleged-spies-say-iran%E2%80%99s-revolutionary-guards-trained-them>.

the close relations of prior days [with Iran] is unlikely.”²⁵⁸ With the increasing hostility between these three ruling governments, an alliance between Iran’s regime and Islamic extremist groups residing within Pakistan or Afghanistan is a reality needed to be considered by the U.S. and the international community. If Iran does engineer nuclear technology in the future, and if Iran continues to back Islamic extremists, then the idea of Islamic radicals harboring nuclear weapons could become a terrifying reality for the world community to endure. In order to ease the tensions and differences held by the majority of Iranians - and the Shia population, in general, around the Middle East - toward Western motives of globalization, U.S. policymakers must make admirable efforts to stray away from its exclusive and nationalistic interests in the unconditional support for Israel’s regional policy. Also, the United States must reconsider its reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies from governments who are viewed in an unfavorable light by parts of their populations.

The United States will continue to push for globalization in the Middle East. Yet, the directive of U.S. foreign policy in the region has varied considerably. Its former and present entanglement with Gulf oil, its containment of Shia Islam and other Islamic fundamentalism within the Middle East, and its overwhelming support for Israel has hurt the U.S. cause for globalization. The current widespread Arab Spring movement and persistent Islamic terrorism, moreover, has deterred the U.S. from interfering with Middle Eastern affairs in recent times. The change of directive in policy in response to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the aftermath of the Benghazi incident of 2012, has raised much concern over the legitimacy of a policy of globalization exclusive to U.S. policymakers and prospectors. U.S. officials must take the backseat, while leaders of the Arab world direct their own path toward globalization. Arab

²⁵⁸ Shireen T. Hunter, “Pakistan Strains Iran’s Patience,” *Asia Times*, February 28, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-03-280214.html.

intellectual, George Tarabishi, argued the case for globalization during a roundtable discussion for the Ministry of Affairs of Bahrain in October, 2000. In support of globalization, Tarabishi advocated:

In the large global village that the world is on the verge of becoming, the Arab world – which is more divided than ever – is in need of becoming first a regional singular village.... At a time when Arab culture, like the other cultures of the world, has no option but to engage with [globalization], then it would appear that this engagement, in the Arab case, will be conflictual rather than cooperative.²⁵⁹

The reality for the Middle East is that in order to become participating members of a global order, their internal religious conflicts must be first managed and then resolved. Middle Eastern society could increase their standard of living, intellectualism, and peace if they decide to relinquish their steadfast belief in Shariah Law.

The 9/11 tragedy created a distorted the U.S. public opinion of Middle Eastern culture and society. More specifically, neoconservatives, religious fundamentalist groups, and various right-wing groups “argue that America’s goal should be to reorder the Middle East, using America’s power in the name of democracy to subordinate the Arab states to its will, to eliminate Islamic radicalism, and to make the region safe for Israel.”²⁶⁰ The political Left, similarly, holds onto similar beliefs, especially in regards to combating Islamic fundamentalism. However, the Left is not as concerned with advancing global corporate capitalism as the Right is. The Obama Administration has been adamant in defending its “firm belief that America’s interests are not hostile to people’s hopes,” while supporting a “policy of the United States to promote reform

²⁵⁹ Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 413-5.

²⁶⁰ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 35.

across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.”²⁶¹ Both, American conservative and liberal ideologies in defeating Islamic fundamentalism, have major flaws in their foundations.

In order for Islamic fundamentalism to become a nonfactor involved in globalization efforts, two major revisions to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East must take place: First, U.S. policymakers must withdraw national self-interests from its mission in the Arab Middle East. American interests in big business, especially around the oil trade, and their special treatment of Israel must discontinue if globalization is to become established as a viable system. Arab, Persian, and Palestinian resentment toward the American-Israeli relationship and America’s interests in Gulf oil have resulted in much of the anti-American attitudes held by Middle Eastern Muslims for decades. Eliminating these two factors from U.S. policy might reverse the negative attitudes against the United States over time. More importantly, the proposition that globalization will replace the popularity of Islamic fundamentalism may become a possibility.

The United States must allow for free-market capitalism to naturally replace the popularity of Islamic fundamentalism in a Middle Eastern context. Economic freedom, which allow for social mobility, the economic abundance of goods and services, and free trade, are a few examples of the pros that globalization has to offer. The inclusion of U.S. social customs and norms in Middle Eastern globalization, however, might not be as welcomed. For example, a sexualized and romanticized consumer culture, equality for women, and the dominance of a wealthy international business elite are factors that will encounter strong opposition by Middle Eastern Muslims. With a rebellious climate growing across the Middle East – especially in the wake of the latest Arab Spring – an Islamic form of organic capitalism provides the means to

²⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, *Remarks by the President on the Middle East*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa%20>.

revising the distorted logic behind Islamic fundamentalism. A Lebanese journalist recently compared the causes surrounding the Arab Spring of 2011 and the European revolutions of 1848 as very similar. He indicated that alongside political corruption committed by Arab secular regimes, “poverty, rising food prices, inflation, human rights violation, and high unemployment” were key issues and problems that many young Arabs wanted resolved, just as many Europeans desired in the mid-nineteenth century.²⁶²

In the case of Iran - which holds much political, religious, and military clout throughout the region – capitalism holds the key in changing the attitudes of all Arab Muslims concerning globalization. According to Vali Nasr, “Iran is today a tired [government] with a failing economy, and under pressure from a restless population. The ruling clerics may opt to continue down the path of confrontation with the West, but they also have incentives to improve relations, and that is especially so due to economic realities.”²⁶³ Arab Muslims across the entire Middle East must first come to embrace capitalism and formulate a method to synchronize it within the framework of Islam. Recently, this transition has taken place and has increased Muslims’ social mobility by increasing their standard of living within their nations’ often corrupt power structure. Economic freedom could then give way to social freedom. “Gradually... the Muslim countries one by one will likely make their individual adaptations of the precepts of Islam to increasingly modern politics based on more participatory social mobilization.”²⁶⁴ Once Arab Muslims come to realize, as individuals, that capitalism can provide for a better life, perhaps globalization will work effectively in the Middle East.

²⁶² Hamze Abbas Jamoul, “The Arab Spring: The Root Causes?,” The Lebanese Communication Group, February 20, 2012, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=45439&cid=31&fromval=1>.

²⁶³ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 262.

²⁶⁴ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 57.

There are other factors to consider as well that bring Middle Eastern globalization into debate. First, Islamic intellectualism, like Islamic fundamentalism, is on the rise in the Middle East. Young adult Muslims have taken to the streets to protest the norm of traditional Muslim culture. “Institutions like Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which is the oldest university in the world, the Muslim World League in Mecca, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference headquartered in Jeddah are the examples of the contemporary, intellectual, educational, and diplomatic forces in the resurgence of Islam.”²⁶⁵ These institutions have been increasing in popularity and interest by the Middle Eastern youth and young adults looking for placement within a rapidly growing and global socioeconomic landscape. Moreover, the rise of Islamic academia and intellectualism has sought to teach the true and peaceful nature of Islam, “free from extremism and violence.”²⁶⁶ Former state-sponsored Islamic schools across the Middle East have been replaced by “trailblazing” schools funded by “market-driven, private sector initiatives.”²⁶⁷

Many young adults and teenagers across the Middle East have grown restless over their stagnant society. In a region where there is limited social mobility, and an isolated, state-controlled economy to work in, scores of Muslims have become aware of their circumstance and have openly voiced the need for change. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States triggered a debate within the U.N. over why Arab-Muslims resented the West. A 2002 United Nation’s Human Development Program (UNDP) report underscored that the origins of Western resentment were identified by corrupted Arab “authoritarian rule and its perpetrators.” Moreover, the study indicated that, “authoritarian rulers know only too well that their survival depends on

²⁶⁵ M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Islamic Civilization,” *Middle East Institute*, accessed on March 23, 2014, <http://www.mei.edu/content/islamic-civilization>.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism*, 195.

the continued backwardness and acute economic underdevelopment of their societies,” while the rest of the world became “enlightened with the spread of the information revolution.”²⁶⁸ The younger members of Islamic society have come to see an Islamic-explicit policy of globalization as opportunity and hope for their nations’ future and cause. Furthermore, the Internet and the recent advances in digital technology and social networking has opened the way for writers, such as Rajaa al-Sanea, “to express their views freely without fear of government retribution.”²⁶⁹ The opportunity in today’s world for ideas and communication to operate at a much faster and abundant rate has aided the rise of Islamic intellectualism. Moreover, these young Muslims have been able to adapt to a peaceful and progressive version of Islam, compatible to the modes globalization could bring to the Middle East.

Another encouraging prospect for globalization to become implemented in Middle Eastern society is the increasing power of the international community, which has accepted globalization as a possible vehicle for peace, equality, and modernization. Countries such as China, with its increasing interest in Saudi petroleum, have become rising players in Middle Eastern affairs. Since the early 1990s, there were “only a handful of countries that explicitly rejected participation” in world trade. By the end of the decade, the value of world trade doubled to about \$8 trillion – a \$3.5 trillion increase from the international trade activities of the 1980s.²⁷⁰ Today, as nations such as Brazil, India, China and Russia continue to make strides toward global prominence and prestige, the Middle East will have to decide whether or not it collectively wishes to reform its society and take the path toward globalization.

²⁶⁸ Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 366-7.

²⁶⁹ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 276.

²⁷⁰ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, 393.

It is very important that the international community coordinates their efforts cordially to bring about the modes of positive change to the Middle East. Perhaps the international community should do nothing in order to allow for organic globalization to take shape across the region's landscape. Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, advocated globalization reform through a collective effort by Middle Eastern peoples and other international forces:

The war on Middle Eastern terrorism will bring the actual elimination of terrorist organizations only when they lose their social appeal and therefore their recruitment ability, and when their financial backing dries up. This victory is likely to be apparent only retroactively. Proliferation will be brought under control when suspect national efforts are either subjected to effective international controls or halted by the duress of outside force. The active involvement of America will be critical to both outcomes, but achieving them will be much easier if American initiatives command genuine international support.²⁷¹

Globalization could also come to the Middle East without emphasizing the need to – by excluding globalization measures from within U.S. foreign policy. However, upon the Obama Administration's re-election victory in 2012, critics of the administration, such as the Iranian government, have argued that its continued use of drone warfare in the Middle East, and U.S. avoidance of the Syrian Civil War involvement have indicated that the U.S. continues to push its own national interests through a unilateral globalization policy. These critics, which includes the Iranian people, suggest that the Obama Administration should pursue a concrete human rights agenda and allow Muslims a "greater freedom of expression" on a global level.²⁷² As the United States continues on a path toward a greater unified world, a decision must be agreed upon by policymakers on what specific globalization policy should be emphasized and implemented, even if it means implementing nothing at all.

²⁷¹ Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 33.

²⁷² SUNY Levin Institute, "Four More Years: Globalization and Obama's Second Term," *Globalization 101*, accessed on April 15, 2014, <http://www.globalization101.org/four-more-years-globalization-and-obama%E2%80%99s-second-term/>.

Chapter 4

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A Fork in the Road: Globalization in the Middle East

For decades, the Middle East has taken center stage for the United States in carrying out its views and desires of a world doctrine. This doctrine, which remains an underlying aim within American foreign policy - created overwhelmingly by elite businessmen and politicians - consisted of an objective to bring about global unity within a political and socioeconomic structure, or globalization. The diplomatic means by which the United States plans to institute globalization worldwide, and particularly in the Middle East, is more evident today than ever before.

In her 2007 article, “America and the World,” renowned historian Emily Rosenberg explained the course of history regarding American diplomacy. Her analysis indicated that, since the emergence of the Wisconsin school of historical scholarship of the late 1950s, most historians agreed that, “economic expansion in search of new markets la[id] at the core of the American experience.”²⁷³ Likewise, historians Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams, “suggested that the United States had long been an outward-looking empire driven by economic interests, which used the state to push an open door order that brought militarism, repression, and war.”²⁷⁴ Rosenberg saw close similarities between the American notion of Manifest Destiny on the domestic front, and its implementation in U.S. foreign policy. Policymakers in the U.S.

²⁷³ Emily Rosenberg, “America and the World: From National to Global,” *OAH Magazine of History* 21, no. 2 (April 2007): 20.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

endorsed this idea of American expansionism, and inserted its cause into foreign policy decades prior to the beginning of the Cold War in 1945.

Globalization, which has emerged today as a system modeled after Western culture and society, is becoming an even more momentous force behind the constructs of United States' foreign policy. Various Middle Eastern and American elite -- those driving the direction of global economics and politics -- exist as the major proponents behind efforts to push the world into a globalized society in the image of American expansionism. Moreover, leaders in China, Japan, Europe, and in other nations around the developed world have tended to support elements of globalization to serve their nations' best interests. The major opponents of globalization seem to consist of groups of Western and Middle Eastern societies who perceive danger or harm from such a development. Moreover, religious fundamentalists, including those of Islamic, Judaic, and Christian backgrounds, and defenders of traditional, cultural, ethnical, and statist trends of thinking, constitute the major opponents of an American effort to globalize developing regions of the world. Globalization, according to Rosenberg, has "offered new terms and paradigms for conceptualizing complex state and non-state relationships" beginning in the post-Cold War days of the 1990s.²⁷⁵ The legacy of globalization remains yet to be seen. As the United States promotes its vision of a global society, efforts by various political and social reformers to reduce and eventually diminish the numerous religious conflicts, cultural ideologies, political strife, and nationalist interests are essential to this endeavor.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the U.S. has witnessed, as well as coordinated, two trends of foreign policy in the Middle East. Beginning at the start of the Cold War in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a diplomatic battle on the world

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 21.

stage. The Cold War trend (1945-1991) of U.S. foreign policy aimed to create an international security shield for the Third World and Eastern European nations against Soviet indoctrination. The endgame of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union was to demonstrate to the rest of the world the society that should serve as a path toward the future. Therefore, the United States' objective was to prevent the Soviet Union from the global economic system and dissolve any communist uprisings in order to isolate the Soviet Union from increasing its political might around the world. The oil trade between the Arab Gulf states and the U.S., the U.S. alliance and steadfast support for Israel's welfare, and the overall containment of the spread of Soviet doctrine were crucial factors of U.S. policy needed for winning the Cold War and protecting Islamic society from communism.

The U.S. and Soviet Union would, at various times throughout the duration of the Cold War, flex their potential military might, win over as many secular allies as possible, and aspire to dominate the world's political-economic system. The Third World or Developing nations – including regions around the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeastern Asia - became a diplomatic battleground for the two superpowers over strategic resources and political alliances vital to Cold War victory. Middle Eastern petroleum resources and the United States' unique alliance with Israel were vital to U.S. policymakers in keeping Soviet expansion at bay while solidifying a U.S. presence in the region. Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the U.N.-American coalition had militarily pressured Saddam Hussein's army out of Kuwait, the United States proved itself the dominant world power. The elite American political-economic establishment embarked on its journey to instill a doctrine of democratic-representative government, modernization, and capitalism within Middle Eastern society, and likewise, the remainder of the developing world.

By the dawn of the 1990s, the United States had transformed the underlying direction of its foreign policy. As declared by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the final days of the Cold War, the world was about to embark on a new path toward a singular political, economic, and social system. For U.S. policymakers, the policy of containment regarding the prevention of the spread of Soviet influence was dissolved and replaced with a policy of globalization. Globalization's prospects included the unilateral support and designation of a unified socioeconomic system for the entire world, being governed by one global political coalition orchestrating its power within its unilateral paradigm. This transformation of policy direction championed in the second trend of U.S. foreign policy: The Globalization trend (1991-present). The plan pioneered by U.S. policymakers to spread its doctrine of globalization to the Muslim world of the Middle East would prove to be a cumbersome task. From this point forward, the United States carried out a globalization policy that defended Western social, political, and economic norms that toppled those of Soviet Russia. At its initial stages, instilling a system of globalization within Muslim culture was met with heavy resistance from Islamic fundamentalists and Arab nationalists. Shia populations across the region, Palestinians' devout dedication to reclaiming its homeland from its U.S.-supported Israeli rivals, the powerful theocratic government of Iran, and particular Sunni regimes – like Saddam Hussein's Iraq -- that displayed animosities toward the West, continuously acted in defiance of U.S. diplomatic actions and goals.

The al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States in September, 2001 reinforced Muslim hatred of Western expansion in the Middle East. The calamity of 9/11 also established the battle lines between globalization efforts spearheaded by the U.S. and Western governments against the portion of Middle Eastern society that wished to remain isolated from perceived outside threats

to their traditional culture. Federal administrations under George W. Bush and Barack Obama created and managed foreign policies in the Middle East that presented conflicting or similar means and measures in bringing about desired changes to the Muslim world. Defeating Islamic terrorism and hostile Islamic regimes was one side of the American policy equation, while instilling democratic reform and lasting peace between Muslims, Jews, and non-Muslims alike became the principle elements of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush sought to protect and enhance big business relationships between U.S. political-economic entities and their Arab counterparts involved in the petroleum industry, to help solidify the U.S. presence and undertaking in the Middle East. The Bush Administration's military crusade against Islamic extremism and uncooperative Middle Eastern governments - alongside imperialistic ties with Saudi oil and the unparalleled U.S. support for Israel - left a lasting legacy of bitterness and divide between the collective social framework of the Muslim peoples and underlying motives of American foreign policy. Once the Obama Administration took to power and began to manage foreign policy in the Middle East, curbing Islamic fundamentalism and extremism remained an essential undertaking, yet implementing a solid policy of globalization in a more turbulent world remained a gigantic task. Obama's lack of business interests and personnel in the Gulf oil trade paradox, combined with new oil extraction techniques in hydro-fracking in North America distanced the imperialistic relationship between the United States and the Middle East. Moreover, the Obama Administration's desire to reconcile with Iran and the Muslim world as a whole in seeking out a strategy to curb Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in return for a culturally evolved globalist doctrine has been the staple of Obama's diplomacy thus far. Although policymakers have sought to bring about permanent peace and pose as mediators

between opposing forces within Middle Eastern society, it remains yet to be seen whether or not globalization will become a viable reality across the entire Middle East. Additionally, what type of globalization, will breach Middle Eastern society has become a topic of debate.

President Obama has recently decided not to have the U.S. intervene in the Syrian Civil War in 2013, and has not seriously engaged Russian President Vladimir Putin on his invasion of Ukraine in early 2014. Instead, the Obama Administration has decided to increase the exporting of natural gas and has focused on economic and environmental issues at home. These developments have indicated a change in U.S. foreign policy directive. Each nation or ethnic group around the globe will have to come to terms with globalization. China has reminded the world there are numerous ways to approach capitalism and modernity. They have, thus far, emphasized a state-directed economy from the top downward, but have allowed entrepreneurs to get wealthy and take advantage of the mechanisms of capitalism, all while clamping down on political dissent. Turkey has been able to maintain its democratic republic and has gained favorable international reputation, all while remaining an Islamic state that contains numerous and different ethnic groups. Iran, meanwhile, is a theocratic republic that views globalization as a Middle East entirely under the strict rule of Shia Islam. Indeed, many varieties of globalization exist within the Middle East, so to gauge what form of globalization will prosper and function in the region's future, including Western policy, will present an enigma to U.S. policymakers.

BRIC nations and other developed countries around the globe will have to coordinate their efforts together, accordingly, in order to effectively indoctrinate globalization into regions of the developing world. On the other hand, the Middle East could enter a stage in its natural development where each society allows for globalization to organically present itself. As countries, like China per se, increase its international power, they must be willing and rational

enough to participate in transcending a benign policy of globalization onto the developing peoples and nations of the world. The United States cannot afford to take on the task of globalization in the Middle East alone. Furthermore, the Muslims of Middle Eastern society, as a whole, must come to recognize how the potential of a global network of democracy and commerce could provide for and benefit the region. Yet, globalization could also threaten the traditional religious and cultural patterns of the various groups of people residing in the Middle East. Writing on the topic of globalization, Lebanese independent writer and elite businessman, Mohammad S. Moussalli, emphasized the importance of a meticulous and responsible method of implementing globalization in the Middle East. He declared that, “if globalization is introduced with significant educational, social, and economic support that could make Arab countries flourish alongside foreign cultures, then it may turn into a universal culture in which Arabs may come under its umbrella as equals.”²⁷⁶

United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East remains an unfinished episode. The current Arab Spring uprisings have raised many questions concerning the impact of globalization across the entire Middle Eastern region since 2011. Furthermore, the current uprisings indicated to the world that the region has yet to experience, encounter, and accept or decline the full reforms of globalization. These uprisings might prove to be the evolutionary initial steps of globalization, however, as Muslims across the region have become resistant to their corrupt governments. Middle Eastern Muslims will ultimately have the responsibility in deciding whether or not they want to partake in a global community or remain isolated from the ever-changing world society. In a social climate where religion reigns superior in everyday life, Muslims, on an individual level, must consider how globalization will impact their own societies.

²⁷⁶ Mohammad S. Moussalli, “Impact of Globalization,” *Middle East Tribune*, accessed on March 27, 2014, <http://middleeasttribune.wordpress.com/impact-of-globalization/>.

U.S. policymakers and officials could work tediously in promoting and sponsoring globalization in the Muslim world, however, the Arab world must accept this proposition in sum, as well as consider other forms of globalization not explicit to U.S. goals.

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